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ART. I.—*The Ways of the Hour; a Tale.* By the Author of "The Spy," "The Red Rover," &c., &c. New York: Putnam. 1850. 12mo. pp. 512.

WE cannot characterize our government and institutions by a single term, without misleading some as to their true nature. They are not strictly democratic, for they include monarchical and aristocratic elements; they are not strictly monarchical or strictly aristocratic, for they evidently include democratic elements. It is always an error to denominate them from any one of the simple or absolute forms of government, that is, from pure democracy, pure aristocracy, or pure monarchy, the only simple and absolute forms of government there are, or can be. Our government, whether State or national, is properly speaking a *mixed* government, and its characteristic is not in any one of the simple forms of government, but in its original and peculiar combination of them all in one harmonious and complex system.

Our government is republican as opposed to hereditary monarchy; it is democratic as opposed to hereditary aristocracy, and in that it recognizes equality before the laws, makes its various officers elective by the people at large, and acknowledges general eligibility; but it is monarchical, in that it establishes the unity of the executive, invests the President with the command of the army and navy, and gives him a conditional veto on the acts of the legislature; and it is aristocratic, in that it vests the legislative power, not in the people at large, but in the *optimates*, or

those legally presumed to be such, and recognizes in these, during their term of office and within the limits of the Constitution, the legislative power in its plenitude, to be exercised according to their own discretion, unfettered by any instructions from their constituents, and with no other responsibility than that which every man owes to God, the King of kings, and Lord of lords. It therefore includes essentially, as essential principles of its constitution, the elementary principles of all the simple forms of government, and its aim is, by tempering them one with another, to secure what is good and to guard against what is evil or hurtful in each.

The great political danger in this country arises from forgetfulness or neglect of this mixed or complex character of our government and institutions, and the constant tendency to interpret them according to the principles of a simple and absolute form of government. Simplicity is more easily understood than complexity; the former is within the reach of every body, the latter is within the reach of none but the few who make it a special study. The human understanding also loves simplicity, and naturally tends in all the matters on which it operates to reduce all as far as possible to a single principle, and to eliminate whatever is opposed to it, or does not logically proceed from it. It craves unity and simplicity, and looks upon multiplicity and complexity as defects. The constitution of the Continental governments of Europe is far more simple, and follows far more strictly the law of unity, than that of Great Britain, and hence, while a cultivated Englishman readily comprehends a Continental government, a Frenchman or a German cannot, without a long and special study, speak for five minutes of the English constitution without committing some egregious blunder. Foreigners always blunder, for the same reason, when they speak of our complicated government, and so do the great body of our own people, whenever they attempt to go beyond the mere routine of practice to which they are accustomed from childhood. They do not take in the government as a complex whole, but seize it merely in one of its elements, and seek to understand and explain the whole by virtue of that as its exclusive principle. Whatever does not proceed from that as its principle, or is not logically reconcilable with it, they regard as an

anomaly to be cleared away. The single element seized upon is regarded as the *norma* of the government, and whatever would oppose, limit, restrain, or modify its practical operation, as repugnant to the government itself, and therefore not to be suffered to remain. Consequently, the tendency is always to reduce the government as far as possible to a simple and absolute form of government, and therefore to pave the way for tyranny, since every simple and absolute form of government, untempered by some admixture of the elements of the other forms, is always tyrannical.

The monarchical and aristocratic elements, though essential to our Constitution, do not hold in it the most prominent place. They are there, but they are there without *éclat* and without development, and their real character and importance in our system are the very last that strike the student of our peculiar civil polity. The democratic element has apparently a much larger sphere than either of them, is the most prominent, and that which first strikes the attention. It accordingly is the element first apprehended, and the one the majority take to be the exclusive principle, the *norma* of the government. Hence the government is generally taken to be in its principle and intention a purely democratic government, to be interpreted and administered on the democratic principle alone. This is a great mistake, and involves the gravest consequences,—consequences, perhaps, no less grave, in the long run, than the total destruction of our government as a mixed government.

This mistake is perfectly natural. The democratic element has in our institutions too large a sphere, as Washington and the more eminent statesmen of his time contended. Let us not be misunderstood. When we say that the democratic element has too large a sphere, we do not mean that the sphere actually assigned it in the Constitution is too large, providing it practically remains within that sphere. It is too large in the sense that it has the power to make itself larger, and to gain the absolute ascendancy over the other elements intended to restrain or temper it. If democracy would be contented to remain and operate only within the bounds prescribed, it would not have too large a sphere; but as these bounds are to a great extent prescribed only on the parchment constitu-



tion, and as they are not sufficiently defended by the power given to the other elements, it is able to transcend them, and to operate beyond its constitutional sphere. The original defect of the American constitutions was not so much in the too great power given to the democratic element as in the weakness of the defences provided against its usurpation. The framers of those constitutions gave a just proportion to the several elements so long as each remained within its constitutional limits, and in the exercise of its legitimate power; but they did not guard sufficiently against democratic ascendancy. They were familiar with the abuses of monarchy and aristocracy, and effectually guarded against them; but they were not so familiar with the abuses of democracy, and did not fully anticipate and guard against them. They did not take into the account the fact that every people, by a sort of instinctive logic, labors incessantly to simplify its institutions, and that in the process of simplification the stronger element gains the ascendancy, and tends to render itself exclusive by eliminating or absorbing the others. They did not take sufficiently into the account the influence of popular theories, or foresee the consequences which would be drawn from certain maxims which passed current with them, and certain principles which they laid down as the basis of their own proceedings. They had had no experience of the Jacobinical revolutions which followed the establishment of our republic, and consequently could not anticipate the facility with which their own principles could be perverted to serve as the basis of a system with which they had no affinity. They did not see that the *Contrât Sociale* was already in Locke's Essays on Government, that the French Revolution and all its horrors were in the *Contrât Sociale*, and that all modern Red Republicanism, Socialism, and Communism were in the French Revolution. They had no suspicion of the poison concealed in the phrase *sovereignty of the people*, — a phrase in their sense so innocent and so just. Hence they did not take all the precautions which were requisite against the perversion of the institutions they founded to a pure democracy, or which they would have taken if they had had our experience.

The whole history of the formation of our governments, and the maxims we adopted, when seen in the light of

Jacobinical interpretation, were well calculated to induce the half-learned, the *semidotti*, as are always the majority where education is general, whose little learning is more dangerous than none, to regard our institutions as purely democratic in theory. The sovereignty of the people was loudly and unequivocally asserted. This meant at the time, save in the minds of a few speculators, whose designs were not suspected, simply the right of the people in any given locality, when finding themselves without legitimate government, and thrown back into a state of nature, to assemble in convention and institute government for themselves, and in such form as they believed, under the circumstances, best adapted to the public good. This was all that was really meant by this phrase. But when Jacobinism arose, the phrase assumed a new and a terrible meaning. It then came to mean that the sovereignty resides permanently in the people regarded as prior to government, — after the institution of government, and during its existence, as before its institution, and where there is no civil polity. The people were thus, instead of being in certain exceptional cases the medial origin, or rightful institutors of the government, the persisting ground of its authority. They were then the real persisting sovereign, and the so-called government was nothing but an agency created by them, holding to them the relation of an agent to his principal, and bound to obey its instructions, which they could alter or revoke at will. This is pure democracy. As our institutions plainly recognize the sovereignty of the people, the conclusion that they are purely democratic became inevitable as soon as the sovereignty of the people came to be understood in this sense. The fallacy arises from the ambiguity, as the logician would say, of the middle term, that is, the sovereignty of the people. Where there is no government the people have the right to institute government. This is all the sovereignty our institutions recognize in the people; for as soon as the government is instituted, their sovereignty or right to institute government no longer exists.

Precisely here lies the difference between the theory of our institutions and Jacobinism. The theory of our institutions is, that as soon as the government was instituted, it became vested with the sovereignty, with full authority,

according to its constitution, to govern,—an authority derived, not from the people, save as they were the medium of its institution, but from the Divine Law under which all legitimate governments hold; the Jacobinical theory agrees with ours as to the origin of the government, but goes farther, and maintains that the popular sovereignty does not cease with the institution of government, but survives it, and persists through all its acts as the permanent and indestructible ground of its authority,—that the government not only is indebted to the intervention of the people as its medial origin, or instrument of its institution, but actually holds its powers from them, and is in all respects simply their agent, bound by their instructions, alterable or revocable at their will. This Jacobinical theory of popular sovereignty is much the most natural and simple, and is far the most easily apprehended; it demands very little practical wisdom or strength and acuteness of thought to be understood and applied, and places the wise and simple, the learned and unlearned, on the same level. It is, therefore, the very theory that the multitude, washed or unwashed, must find the best adapted to their powers and attainments, and the one we may be sure they will accept and insist on.

Having once entertained the Jacobinical doctrine of the sovereignty of the people, it was easy to find it confirmed by our own institutions, both State and national. As a matter of fact, our political constitutions had been framed by conventions of the people, and most of these constitutions contain provisions for convening the people anew to alter or amend them. These facts, rightly interpreted, afford no countenance to Jacobinism. The rule for interpreting facts is to draw from them no principle broader than is requisite to account for them, and to interpret them as strictly as possible in accordance with the principles generally received on the subject to which they relate. The first of these two facts merely implies the right of the people, when destitute of government, and thrown back into a state of nature, to institute government,—a right derived from the necessity of the case. The second fact does not necessarily warrant any thing more; for the people can come together in convention, and alter or amend the constitution, only by virtue of a legal provision, and as legally convened. Some of the constitutions provide



for their amendment through ordinary legislative bodies, without an extraordinary convention, and all might have done so, if it had been deemed expedient by the framers of the law. Conventions called for amending the constitution are, then, only a part of the legal machinery of the government, and rest for their authority, not on the will of the people regarded as antecedent to government, not on a supposed reservation of popular sovereignty, but on the law, as do the several other parts of the governmental machinery. But hardly had our government been instituted before the Jacobinical doctrine was broached. Contemplated in its light, the convention was no longer a part of the machinery of government, brought into play only on extraordinary occasions, but a resumption by the people of the power they had previously delegated. It was an appeal of the agent to his principal for additional instructions, or it was the principal calling his agent to an account of his agency, and modifying or revoking his instructions. This interpretation is more easy and less complicated than the other; it demands no acquaintance with law or political science to be understood; and therefore was held to be the true theory of the convention in our political system, making that system pure Jacobinism.

The frequency of elections and constant recurrence to the people in the practical operations of the government tend to produce the general impression, that our government is theoretically a pure democracy. The people are constantly called upon, in consequence of general suffrage, and the short term of all elective offices, to give their votes in reference to all important measures, and are seen everywhere acting, and deciding by their votes the most important questions of the country. The fact is, that the part they act is solely by virtue of positive law, which intrusts them with a share in the administration of government, for suffrage is a trust conferred by law on whom the will of the legislator chooses, not a natural right. But the people and their action are visible, while the law by virtue of which they act, and to which they are responsible, is invisible, save to the lawyer and statesman. Demagogues do not generally themselves perceive it, and when they do, it is for their interest to keep others from seeing it. They are in popular states what courtiers are in monarchical

states, and flatter the people as these flatter the king. In order to be in favor with the people, they flatter them, exaggerate their power, as well as their wisdom and honesty, and tell them that they are sovereign, that they have the right to do as they will, and that government and all institutions are but the work of their hands and the instruments of their pleasure. The elections being almost daily, at least following each other with such frequency that one is hardly over before the politicians begin to prepare for another, and the flatteries and adulations of the people being so unremitting and so gross, the limitations or restrictions originally imposed on the democratic element are lost sight of, and the general conviction is naturally and almost inevitably produced, that our government is intended, and should be interpreted, to be a pure democracy, a simple and absolute government of the democratic form.

These facts and considerations show that the democratic element had too many facilities for escaping its constitutional limits, and of making itself recognized as the exclusive principle of the American government. Certain it is, that it is now so recognized, and democracy, pure, simple, unlimited democracy, is now the general political doctrine of the country. No man who seeks power or place dares question the soundness of democracy, and all parties profess to be democratic, and only vie with each other as to which shall be the most thoroughly democratic. Whigs, Democrats, and Free Soilers all alike profess to be democrats, and to bow alike to the majesty of the people. All consent to regard democracy as the law, and to be tried under it. The consequence is, that there has come to be a wide discrepancy between the political theories and the political institutions of the country. In reality a democrat, in the proper sense of the term, is false to our institutions, as much so as is an aristocrat or a monarchist, and yet the man who opposes exclusively what is called *ultra*-democracy or radicalism is sure to be denounced, when not ignored, as one who opposes the form of government our fathers established. We ourselves are so denounced, and ninety-nine out of every hundred of our political readers will hold us to be no loyal American citizen because we will not advocate exclusive democracy. They will accuse us of going to extremes, simply because we protest against all extremes. They will pronounce the distinctions we



have made vain subtilties, the over-refinements of a metaphysical mind, and look upon us as at heart the friend of tyrants and aristocrats, so little do they appreciate our motives, and so far are they from comprehending and being loyal to the mixed and complex character of the American government and institutions.

This discrepancy is not only wide, but exceedingly dangerous. When the people have the part they really and constitutionally have here, one of two things is necessary, either that popular political theories conform to the political institutions of the country, or that the political institutions conform to the popular political theories. In the long run the institutions must correct the theories, or the theories will undermine and revolutionize, by force or otherwise, the institutions. Our own experience proves this. The popular political theory of the country is purely democratic, that is, Jacobinical, although practically there are and must be by every party, when in power, many departures from it. The struggle is really to carry out this theory, and to reduce every thing to it as the *norma*, or rule, — to eliminate from our institutions every thing repugnant to it, or that interposes any obstacle to the immediate and sovereign action of the popular will. No man can have observed with any care the course of events amongst us without having perceived that there has been, and that there is, a constant tendency to bring every thing in our institutions into strict logical consistency with the democratic principle as the exclusive principle of the government. This is seen in the constitutions of the new States, and more especially in the changes introduced into the constitutions of the old States by the conventions assembled from time to time to amend them. The grand aim in all appears to be to remove all the provisions which give to the government a mixed character and restrict the action of the democratic element, and to provide for the free, full, and immediate action of the popular will, that is, the will of the majority for the time, in determining every measure of the government. A revolution has been silently going on. Even Mr. Jefferson, the father of American radicalism, to say nothing of Washington, Adams, Hamilton, or Madison, were he to come back among us, would no longer recognize the institutions he helped found, and which he so ardently loved. Even he would now be re-

garded as a conservative, as one of those men who are afraid of progress, who dare not trust the people, and have their faces on the backside of their heads, or, as Mr. Emerson expresses it, "have their eyes in their hindhead, not in their forehead." In several of the individual States this revolution has gone so far as to convert them very nearly into pure democracies, where the will of the multitude, or the will of what the demagogues make pass for the majority, reigns without a rival, unrestrained, as absolutely as reigns the Grand Turk in Stamboul.

The revolution affected by popular theories touches the more important and vital interest of the community. The great body of our people, with their half-learned leaders, mistake the liberty of the multitude to govern for the liberty of the people under government and through its protection. With them the great questions regard the elections of presidents, congress-men, governors, assembly-men, the institution of government, the installation of its officers, and special enactments relating chiefly to industrial and financial matters. They do not reflect that government with us is already instituted, and that the chief concern is now as to its administration, and especially the administration of justice. The state with us is constituted, and as originally constituted well constituted, and nothing can be more foolish or more mischievous than to proceed as if we had no state, and were called upon to constitute it, — as if the inquiry were not how to govern, but how to get a governor. The great business of a state is not to be ever constituting itself, but to administer the laws. The very idea of a state (*status*) is of something established, fixed, and immovable; and a nation by the very fact that it is a nation has already a body of laws, written or unwritten, and is not called upon to make the laws. In no civilized state are the laws to be made, or is any other legislation requisite than the few enactments which relate to administration, or which are demanded to adapt the existing laws to the altered circumstances which time and events may have introduced. To suppose that the laws are still to be framed in any nation, is to suppose that it is either in the infancy or in the decrepitude of its civilization. It must be a nation just born, or a nation passed into its dotage, that has every thing to learn and do, or that has forgotten all that it has ever done or known, that

has inherited nothing or that has dissipated its patrimony, and in either case the attempt to make for itself a body of laws must always prove no less unsuccessful than ridiculous. The glory of a generation is in having inherited a noble patrimony, not in having every thing to create anew for itself.

The glory of our country is not in its own enactments, with which it is seldom satisfied, and which it seeks to repeal or modify as soon as made; but in the common law, which we have inherited from our English ancestors. What is of most vital importance to us is an able and independent judiciary for its administration. We enter not here into the controversy between the common lawyers and the civil lawyers as to the relative merits of their respective systems. Some might, perhaps, prefer the civil law, but the common law, the law inherited from our English ancestors, is a good system of law, and if the civil law practice renders it less difficult for the guilty to escape detection, the practice of the common law courts, we are inclined to believe, affords the best protection to the innocent. The main principles of the two systems are substantially the same, and it is easy by statute to adopt those provisions of the civil law which are thought to be superior to the common law, if any such there are. The common law is the law of the land; it is interwoven with all our habits as a people; it is the life-blood of all our institutions, the conscience of the American state, the common sense of the American community. There is no good reason for rejecting it, and every lawyer, if worthy of the name, knows that the various modifications that have in late years been introduced into it by statute have only marred its beauty, broken its symmetry, and detracted from its efficiency. What is wanted is not a change of the law, or a modification of the law, but courts independently constituted for its administration.

But, unhappily, the independence of the courts of law, or the judiciary, is precisely the thing to which the popular theories of the country are the most directly and inveterately opposed, because an independent judiciary opposes the most effectual barrier to popular tyranny and oppression. The radical movement of the country exerts all its force to destroy the independence of the courts, and to make them, like every thing else, mere agencies for executing whatever may be the popular will, caprice, or prejudice for



the moment. It seeks to deprive the judiciary of every member competent to discharge the duties of a judge, and to render the courts weak and contemptible. Under the pretext of economy it cuts down the salaries of judges to a point so low, that none but third or fourth rate men, men who could not gain a competence at the bar, can afford to accept a seat on the bench. Having got a weak judiciary that will yield to every popular breeze, the movement seeks to secure the fruits of its victory by making the judges elective by the people for a short term of years, and reëligible. The independent tenure by which the judges originally held their office is now destroyed in most of the States, and soon will be in all. The popular theory declares the multitude to be sovereign, and the multitude can tolerate no institution not flexible to their will. So the judges, on whose competency, independence, and impartiality depend the vital interests of both the community and the individual, must be selected from the class of inferior men, be made elective by the people for a short term of office and reëligible, so that they will be impotent to resist popular opinion or prejudice, and have every inducement to bow in all obsequiousness to the majesty of the multitude. *Vive la multitude!*

But this is not enough. The same popular tendency, which distrusts whatever is supposed to rise above the common level, attacks the prerogatives of the court, and claims them for the jury. The court having, or being supposed to have, some knowledge of the law, may still have some regard to its legal reputation, and insist on abiding by the law, instead of yielding to popular clamor. So the office of the judge must be reduced to that of a mere presiding officer, and the jury, innocent of any legal attainments, must be made judges both of the law and the fact. Being taken immediately from the multitude, sharing all their prejudices and passions in the given locality, the jury will be pretty sure to gratify them, and render a verdict in accordance with the decision arrived at out of court.

Yet even this is too little to satisfy the democratic tendency. Law is both a science and an art, and can therefore be understood and practised only by those who have made it the subject of special study and preparation. These by virtue of this special study and preparation constitute a distinct class or profession, and have the exclusive

privilege of practising law. Hence they, the lawyers, are a privileged class, and exclusive democracy can tolerate no privileged classes. Every man should be free to make hats or coats without ever having served an apprenticeship, or learned the mysteries of the craft; and if he cannot do it, then you have no business to have hats or coats, and you must either dispense with them, or else consent to have such as any one can make without any previous apprenticeship. Such handicrafts as cannot without apprenticeship be pursued by all are undemocratic, strike at the fundamental idea of equality, and can never be tolerated by a free and enlightened people. So the law must be codified and simplified, so that every blockhead in the country can understand and practise it without previous study or preparation, and the courts must be thrown open to every miserable pettifogger whose impudence gets the better of his sense. Democracy cannot tolerate any thing that is not on a level with every understanding, or that demands preparatory discipline, that would give science an advantage over ignorance, wisdom over folly, intellect over stupidity. New York, the Empire State, has taken the lead in this democratic warfare against science and skill, in favor of ignorance and ineptness. She has codified her laws, altered the procedure of her courts, and thrown open the practice of the law to every man who can obtain a client, and such thorough work has she made that her learned judges no longer know how to proceed, and are obliged to confess that in her courts the erudite lawyer has no longer any advantage over the ignorant ploughman. Long life to the New York law reformers and codifiers!

These proceedings, in which all our States are following at a greater or less distance, would be simply ridiculous, if they did not involve the most vital interests of every man, woman, and child in the community,—if they did not sweep away every guaranty of personal liberty, poison the very fountain of justice, and place life, liberty, property, and character at the mercy of the mob. We may boast of our free institutions as much as we please, but let us at least have the modesty not to boast of our freedom as individuals, so long as the administration of justice is subjected to popular opinion, prejudice, or caprice, and a man must be acquitted or condemned, not according to the law and evidence, but according to the ignorant and prejudiced

clamors of the multitude outside. There is not a monarchical state in Christian Europe that would tolerate the direct and personal intervention of the sovereign in the administration of justice. It was one of the gravest complaints of our ancestors against several of the kings of England, that, instead of remitting the decision of causes to independent and impartial judges, they usurped it to themselves. And yet this is precisely what we in our *enlightened* love of liberty are laboring to do. We are laboring to secure the direct intervention of the people, said to be sovereign here, in the decision of causes. We have not yet wholly succeeded in doing it; the judiciary, in some localities, still retains its former character; but the tide is setting in strongly and rapidly against it everywhere. Yet few take the alarm; the majority clap their hands and exult, and if one ventures to utter a warning, the mob exclaims, "What, you distrust the people, do you? You are afraid to trust your cause to the wisdom and justice of the people, are you? Do not be frightened. *Vox populi, vox Dei*. You are safe in the hands of the people." If he remonstrates, he is denounced as no democrat, and nobody will venture henceforth to furnish him wood or water. Every man who wants office, or wants popular influence, must join in the cry of retrenchment, low salaries, open courts, responsible judges, a popular judiciary, and urge on the destructive movement with all his might. It may be death to liberty, but it is sport to the demagogues, and so no man must dare raise his voice against it.

We have been drawn into this train of remark at the present time by Mr. Fenimore Cooper's late work, the title of which we have placed at the head of this article. Our readers are aware of our estimation of our distinguished countryman as an author. He undeniably stands at the head of American authors of his class, and has done as much as any other man, if not more, for the literary character of our country. As works of mere amusement his earlier works are superior to his later productions, but for depth of thought, solidity of principles, and high moral aims and tendency, they are far inferior. To our judgment, and even to our taste, his later works, in which he attempts to correct the foibles, errors, and dangerous tendencies of his countrymen, are far preferable to those of his



earlier works in which his principal moral aim was to defend our character and institutions against the aspersions and prejudices of Europeans. We will not say that he has performed the delicate task he undertook with as much adroitness, amiableness, and tenderness as was possible, but he has labored at it in a free, noble, and manly spirit, and deserves the warm gratitude of his fellow-citizens. The press, as was to be expected, since it could not ignore, has assailed him with a spite, bitterness, and meanness worthy of itself and of him. To fall under the condemnation of the American press, as it now is, with a very few exceptions, is a high honor, for it has no appreciation of manliness or nobleness of character, and no real knowledge of the various subjects on which it pronounces its judgments. Its conductors have just that smattering of knowledge which makes a man conceited, and fancy that beyond what he knows there is nothing to be known, and when they commend any one we may always presume that he has said or done some very foolish or very wicked thing. Happy is the literary man in this country whose character is established, and whose reputation can neither be enhanced nor diminished by the newspaper rabble. The editorial rabble have done their best to make Mr. Cooper unpopular, and to drive him from the place he originally held in the hearts of his countrymen; but, unless it be for a brief moment, they have labored in vain. No sensible man heeds the newspapers in this country, — hardly enough to feel contempt for their flippancy, conceit, and impudence, — and Mr. Cooper will live in the hearts of his countrymen when his newspaper assailants and their sheets are as if they had not been.

The work before us, the last of Mr. Cooper's that we have seen, may not be precisely to the taste of the young, the giddy, the thoughtless, the sentimental, and the romantic, — although it is by no means void of interest simply as a novel, and contains scenes and incidents of great beauty and power; but the grave and thoughtful, the cultivated and refined, the Christian and the patriot, the moralist and the statesman, will read it with pleasure and instruction. We do not by any means claim perfection for it. It has some slight defects; it appears to have been hastily written, and not to have received so high a finish as the author was capable of giving it. It contains some

views with which we do not wholly agree, and some exaggerations which will impair its efficiency. Lawyer Timms, one of the characters introduced, is hardly a faithful representative of the class of lawyers intended. Mr. Dunscombe, his model lawyer, is a noble character. We love and honor him as a man, but one of our legal friends tells us that his management of the case of Mary Monson does not justify the high praise awarded him as a counsellor; and the author seems to have sacrificed his legal reputation to the exigencies of the story. The author has also exaggerated the feeling of the people towards what they call the aristocracy. With all our democracy, we are the most aristocratic people on earth, and we do not think that, in any part of our widely-extended country, a lady would find the fact of her being young, beautiful, accomplished, and very rich, likely to tell to her disadvantage on a trial for murder. The difficulty, as far as we know the temper of our countrymen, would not be to obtain a verdict acquitting such a person as Mary Monson is described to be, in case of her innocence, but in obtaining a verdict against her in case of her guilt. We are a gallant people; and, though we are chary of hanging a man for murdering a woman, especially if she was his wife or his paramour, we have, as a people, too devout a worship for the sex to hang a lady, especially if young, brilliant, accomplished, beautiful, and rich. All the young men would swear to her innocence because they are young men, and all the old men would do the same because they would be thought young. Aristocracy as such, that is, wealth and breeding, the only aristocracy we have among us, does not generally excite hostility in our society, if modest and unassuming. Even according to Mr. Cooper's showing, the hostility to his heroine grew out of her isolation, and apparent contempt for public opinion in Biberry, rather than out of her supposed connection with the aristocratic classes. Had she been known in the outset to be connected as she was with those classes, she would never, under the circumstances alleged, have been put upon her trial.

There is no doubt a feeling of envy towards those who have wealth and breeding very widely diffused through the community, but this does not operate, except in the case of the Antirenters, unfavorably towards them in the courts of justice. We have nothing to say in favor of the Anti-

renters, nor in favor of New York justice so far as the rights of the Van Rensselaers and other landlords in that State are concerned, and in the countenance New York has shown and still shows to Antirentism, she has incurred a disgrace that twenty generations will not wipe out. But the tenants have votes, and no party can do without them, and they must be permitted to refuse to pay their rents, and encouraged to murder the officers sent to enforce payment. In cases like these, aristocracy is in the way of one's getting his honest dues, and when justice is on one side, and the majority of voters on the other, justice, of course, must be allowed to kick the beam. What mighty advantage would there be in votes, if they must be controlled by a sense of justice, or if one man, because he has law and justice on his side, can withstand a whole community? No; democracy goes for the greatest good of the greatest number, and when one man has rights that conflict with the interests of numbers, the rights must yield to the interests. This is the beauty of a popular government, under which the interests of *the people* are to be consulted before the interests of the Patroon, and the law is not to be enforced when it does not accord with public sentiment. In the State of New York they have carried out the principle of popular government to its fullest extent, and possess it in all its beauty. We shall have it so in all the other States soon, and then the administration of justice will be wonderfully simplified, and the courts have nothing to do but to collect and register the sentences pronounced by public opinion,—perhaps not so much, for Judge Lynch may be then the only administrator of justice retained. Woe then to the man who has not the local press, the demagogues, the old women, and boys of the neighborhood, on his side. A short shrift and a hempen tippet will be all the justice he can expect. We live in an age of progress, and we make rapid progress, for our road is down hill. We shall be at the bottom soon, unless bottom there proves to be none.

Nevertheless, Mr. Cooper's work is sound and healthy, and contains much matter that every American citizen ought to read and meditate daily. The purpose of the author is, by means of an ingeniously devised and in general felicitously managed story, to draw the public attention to the administration of justice as affected by the



popular theories of the country and the recent legislation and attempts at law reform especially in the State of New York, and to point out the dangers to which we are exposed from the extraneous influences brought to bear upon both court and jury. His arrows are pointed more particularly against this outside influence, the want of independence in the court and jury, and the recent law of the State of New York with regard to the property of married women,— what he calls “the Cup-and-Saucer Law.”

This outside influence is so strong, that the author thinks the trial by jury has become very nearly a mockery, and he would go so far as to abolish it altogether. With much that he says on this point we cordially agree, and it is certain that the jury in a popular government has a very different signification from what it has under a monarchy, or even an aristocracy. The jury was originally intended to operate to the protection of the accused, by introducing a popular element to temper the authority of the crown, represented by the court; and where the crown had an undue influence, it was, no doubt, a wise and salutary institution, especially in England, after the Norman conquest had introduced a distinction of race between the governing class and the people. But precisely for the reason that the jury was needed in monarchical England, it is objectionable in this country; for here the element to be guarded against is the popular element, which is too strong, not the element of authority, represented by the judge, which is too weak. As in England the influence of the crown might defeat the ends of justice, so here the popular influence is liable to do the same. This danger is increased, not guarded against, by the institution of the jury. Moreover, the jury here often fails of its end, in consequence of the little care or judgment employed in the selection of jurors. Men utterly incompetent, morally and intellectually, often make up the panel, and serve on our juries,—men who cannot be made to understand a single element of the cause they have to try, and who are utterly unscrupulous as to the verdict they render,—who even consent to decide important causes by tossing up a copper. These and various other objections can easily be urged against the institution; but, nevertheless, we are not prepared to go so far with Mr. Cooper as to abolish it. It is an old institution, dear from old associations to our people; it is a part of our general system

for the administration of justice, and we are unwilling, especially in these times of change and innovation, to disturb it. We do not see what we could substitute for it, that would be an improvement; and after all, we are far from being convinced that it does not even here serve a useful purpose, at least the purpose of taking off a portion of the odium of unpopular judgments from the judge, — in these times a matter of vital importance. Without it the people would lose their confidence in the courts, and would attack still more vehemently the independence of the judiciary. Let more care be bestowed in determining the qualifications of jurors, and let the jury more distinctly understand that it is the province of the court to declare the law, and that their province is simply to judge of the fact, and there will be little occasion to find fault with the jury. Certain we are, that it would, upon the whole, be beneficial, and equally certain we are, that, if it should in the present temper of the people be abolished, its place would be supplied by some institution that would be little less than unmixed evil. The age and country should go to school for some time before attempting innovations, unless it be in the purely material world. Because the age has invented lucifer matches, it does not follow that it can invent a useful substitute for the jury.

The author shows also this outside influence as it affects the judges, in rendering them impatient, and afraid of wasting time. Not only our courts of law, but our legislative assemblies generally, are afraid of consuming time, and seem to fancy that their merit is in proportion to the celerity with which they despatch the business before them. This is a great mistake, and it, no doubt, arises from the everlasting cry of "retrenchment," and constant reference to public opinion. Nothing is lost by taking full time to deliberate. The great defect of our people is to be always in a hurry, to do every thing in a hurry, and consequently to do nothing well. It would be better to increase the number of judges, and to have smaller judicial districts, than to have our courts always in a hurry, and always reminding the counsel, "Time is precious," often to the confusion of their brains, and to the great detriment of their clients. Multiplying the judicial districts and appointing more judges would remedy the evil, and be a great economy of time and money in the end, even if the judges were

paid, as they should be, a liberal salary. High salaries, for all important offices, are always commended by a wise economy. Offices which do not demand much learning or talent, which any body that is honest and has common sense can fill, should have only a low salary attached to them, — too low to make it much of an object to aspire to them. Higher offices, which demand a high order of intellect and attainments, should always have liberal salaries attached to them. Unhappily, fancying ourselves wiser than all the past, and called upon to open a new era for the world, we in this country reverse this rule, — give a liberal salary to a tide-waiter, and a meagre one to the Chief Justice and his associates, to the President, heads of departments, Congress-men, and members of State legislatures. The consequence is, no man fit to fill the higher offices can accept one of them without a great personal sacrifice, and half the country is scrambling for the lower ones. But this comes from claiming to be wiser than our fathers.

The "Cup-and-Saucer Law" deserves all the severity with which Mr. Cooper treats it. We have no wish to see revived the old pagan doctrine, which includes a man's wife and children among his goods and chattels; we thank God for our holy religion, which has emancipated woman, and elevated her to be the companion, though not the head, of man. We yield to no one in our respect for the dignity of woman, or in our appreciation of her appropriate sphere. But we have no sympathy with the almost universal pruriency of our age and country, and have long since ceased to be a follower of Frances Wright, or a disciple of Mary Wolstonecroft. Woman often suffers much from man, and man often suffers, too, from woman, and the woman as often ruins the man as the man does the woman. Neither is, ordinarily, an angel nor a demon, though both are sometimes the latter. In families where there is misery the fault is not always that of the husband, and not unfrequently a man flies to the club or to the dram-shop solely because his "angel" wife cannot make his own fireside pleasant to him. We are willing that the property a wife has before marriage should be settled on her, or at least a portion of it; but we cannot endure a law which not only vests her with it after marriage, but allows her the management of it during coverture independently of her husband, and to make and receive devises and bequests, pre-



cisely as if single. This separation of the interests of the husband and wife, this distinction of the unity of the married pair, making them two, and permitting them in hardly any respect to be one, effected by the recent law of the State of New York, and which all the other States are aspiring to imitate, is incompatible with the true nature and meaning of marriage, and is the most odious and immoral in principle of any measure we remember ever to have seen deliberately adopted by a civilized state. It is simply the first step towards realizing the doctrines preached by Frances Wright. Under this law, the wife may, if we understand it, as freely buy and sell, sue and be sued, as if she were single. She is during coverture, as before or after, in the fullest sense, a *person* in law. She may dispose of her property to enrich her paramour, if disposed; or she may receive from him the gift of a farm in a distant part of the country, and, under pretence of managing it, leave her husband's house, and reside on it, to her husband's dishonor, and to the neglect of all her duties as a wife. She may even charge her husband with every cent she lets him have, and bring a suit against him to recover pay for any cup and saucer of hers he may have accidentally broken when taking his tea. If she is not pleased with his society, she can leave him, if she has property of her own, and reside where she pleases, return when it suits her convenience, and go away when she is tired of her spouse. Such is the legislation of a free and enlightened people. The full effects of this legislation will not be immediately seen, for as yet our men and our women retain, to some extent, the views and habits formed under a less unchristian system, and our wives will not at once avail themselves of all the license the law gives them. But our daughters, at farthest our granddaughters, will, and then the beautiful effects of the Antichristian and immoral legislation now insisted on will be seen and felt; but then it will be too late.

It is not our design to enlarge, at present, on this topic, for we confess that we have not ourselves thoroughly examined all the bearings of the law in question. It seems to us to have been the work of ignorant, but well-meaning persons, who, seeing certain evils accrue under the old law, undertook, without any just conceptions of their cause, to remedy them, and adopted the first remedy that presented itself, without ever once stopping to inquire whether the

application of that remedy would not produce a thousand other evils, each a hundredfold worse. In this way most of our legislative innovations are introduced. Their authors have no bad intention, nay, they have good intentions; but they are ordinary men, from the ordinary walks of life, with nothing but a superficial knowledge of the subjects on which they attempt to legislate. A legislator was once thought to be a rare character, and it was supposed no man, unless divinely assisted, could be a competent legislator; but now every ploughman, blacksmith, shoemaker, tinker, or shopkeeper has only to be chosen a member of a legislature to be a Moses, a Minos, a Lycurgus, a Solon, or a Numa. No previous study or discipline is regarded as necessary; learning, science, art, are superfluous, and we attempt to make ignorance and folly answer the purposes of knowledge and wisdom, and with what ample success — is it not written in our statute-books?

In the legislation that affects financial matters and purely business interests, we respect public opinion, and the intervention of the people. In reference to this legislation, we are as good a democrat as any of our countrymen, and in this legislation we think our country compares favorably with any other country. In this legislation the people are at home, and we have always great confidence in the wisdom and utility of those measures which command the general assent of the people. Here we believe the judgment of the people is a safer guide than the judgment of individuals, however learned, able, and distinguished. It is, indeed, only on matters of this sort that we need legislation, and it is probable that legislation on other matters was not contemplated by our fathers; for all other matters, with a few trifling exceptions, were already covered by the common law, which contained the condensed wisdom of ages. The error of the country lies in claiming for the people a legislative capacity beyond these, in regarding statute law as the most important portion of the law, and in attempting to amend the common law, or the *lex non scripta*. We set out with the false assumption that we are a new people, bound by nothing that was before us, and under the necessity of creating every thing anew for ourselves. Hence, instead of confining ourselves to such alterations in statute law, the *lex scripta*, as our separation from the mother country and our peculiar circumstances rendered

necessary, we have undertaken to revise the whole law of the land, as it affects both the rights of persons and things. We have unsettled every thing, and in our ineptness have vitiated the administration of justice, and rendered life, liberty, and property insecure, by making them, as in Turkey, wholly dependent on the will or caprice of the sovereign, — there on the will or caprice of the Sultan, here on the will or caprice of the multitude.

In purely economical matters the people are the best judges, and in regard to those matters we would have the democratic element felt; but in matters of justice, in the respect in which law is ethical, and deals with ethics, we want no popular legislation. In regard to rights, whether of persons or of things, and the administration of justice, the people can intervene only to do injury. In regard to these, save as to the organization of the courts, we needed no further legislation, and no further intervention of the legislator. The law had been settled from time immemorial, and only needed to be executed, and for its execution the executive and judiciary branches of the government sufficed. Least of all did we need the intervention of the popular element in the judgment of causes, especially in the shape of public opinion outside of the courts of law. The habit of appealing to the public on all occasions is so universal amongst us, and the practice of discussing all questions in public, and deciding them by a plurality of voices, has become so general, that nearly all manliness and independence of character have been lost amongst us. There is no country on earth where public opinion is so powerful and so intolerant as in these United States, or where men's souls are really so enslaved. It is not that dungeons and racks are prepared for the body, which were, after all, but a trifle, for it matters little what is done to the body if the soul be free; but it is that the mind itself, the very soul, is fettered and bound by the intangible tyrant called public sentiment. We do not dare act from principle, to follow the right from our own personal conviction, whether we go alone or with the crowd, but we are as a people continually asking, What will people say? We are so habituated to this, it has become so much a part of our American nature, that we regard it as the normal order of things, and are utterly blinded to the evils which spring from it, and the gross injustice it operates, and we little suspect its full influence in the administration of justice.



Whether there is any probability of correcting the evil, and excluding from our courts this outside influence, is more than we know. Certain it is that matters are growing worse and worse every day. The rage for innovation is so strong, and the tendency to sweep away all the guaranties of individual rights is so irresistible, we have gone so far, and are going with such an ever-increasing celerity, in a wrong direction, that we see little prospect of things becoming better. As long as radicalism confined itself to the constitution of power and the financial concerns of the country, and let the law, the courts, and the administration of justice alone, we could suffer it to go on, without any vital injury to personal liberty; but now that it makes these the especial objects of its care and solicitude, we see no hope for the country but in its conversion, which depends on God, not on man. The whole tendency we deplore results inevitably from Protestantism, which destroys the conservative influence of religion, by subjecting it to popular control. Protestantism, instead of being able to resist the evil tendency, and recall the people to a just public sentiment, must itself yield to that tendency, and be, as we every day see it, carried away with it. In fact, there is no human help for us, and if God does not in his providence specially intervene to save us from our own madness, the country will ere long lapse into barbarism.

Our political parties might do something if they would, but they can do nothing so long as they all profess to be democratic. *Democracy* is a stronger word here than *Constitution*, and the term cannot now be generally adopted except in its Jacobinical sense. If all parties accept it, then all parties will only conspire to strengthen the destructive tendency we have pointed out. Properly there are but two parties in the country, Conservatives or Constitution-alists, and Destructives or Radicals. The Free Soil party is an organization of the latter; and those not incorporated into that party should lay aside the name of *Whig* and *Democrat*, two names which refer to the constitution of government, and inappropriate here, because here government is already constituted, and rally around the Constitution, as a true conservative party, both in regard to the general government and the State governments. Were they to do so, the evil could be arrested. But they will not do so; old

party animosities, personal rivalries, and petty jealousies will prevent them from doing so. Things will go on as they have been going, and those of us who sound the note of warning will be unheeded, laughed at, or denounced, while the multitude will continue to boast of the wisdom and progress of the age and country. Be it so. We have done our duty as a loyal American citizen in pointing out the evil, and the great body of our Catholic brethren will do theirs, we trust, and the responsibility must rest, where it belongs, on those who have the power, and only abuse it.

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ART. II. — *Essays (Third Series) on the Errors of Romanism having their Origin in Human Nature.* By RICHARD WHATELY, D. D., Archbishop of Dublin. Third Edition, revised. London. 1845.

THE fruitful pen of the Protestant metropolitan of Dublin, during several years, has entertained the public with many learned and attractive essays, which, however they may fail to produce conviction in the minds of the discerning reader, must interest by the beauty of the style as well as the liberality of the views which they embody. The persuasion generally prevailing, even among the adherents of the English Establishment, that the author does not hold the Christian faith in regard to the Trinity, must necessarily awaken distrust in his teaching on other points, so that his testimony for or against us can carry but little weight. Several passages in the *Essays* now before us strengthen the suspicion of his unsound views on this great mystery, since he virtually charges its defenders with Tritheism, and simply styles it "God's threefold manifestation of himself." "On rising," he remarks, "from the disquisitions of many scholastic divines on the inherent distinctions of the three Divine Persons, a candid reader cannot but feel that they have made the Unity of God the great and difficult mystery." (Essay II. p. 36.) Borrowing from unbelievers the trite objection, that revelation and mystery are contradictory, since the latter supposes the incomprehensible character of the truth which the former manifests, he says, "The doctrine of the Trinity, and the

rest of the mysteries of the Gospel, as far as they relate to us, since He has thought fit to reveal these to us in the Gospel, every Christian is allowed, and is bound, to learn from that Revelation 'of the mystery which was secret from the beginning of the world, but now is *made manifest.*'" The manifestation of which the Apostle speaks is plainly the accomplishment in time of the Divine counsel for the salvation of men by the Incarnation of the Son of God. The revelation of this fact takes away nothing of its mysterious character. It must ever fill men and angels with wonder, that God should become man, in order to redeem man from eternal death.

We fear that the views of the author on the Atonement are as unsound as on the Trinity, since in a former work he denied the preëxistence of the Son, and in the present he complains, that "the doctrine of the Atonement has often been made the basis of abstruse metaphysical disquisitions respecting the mode in which Divine justice was satisfied by the sacrifice of Christ, considering that act more as to what it was to God, than what it was to man." Must not the Christian know whether to regard the death of Christ as an act of propitiation to the Divine Majesty, or the tragic end of a career of benevolence? It is surely by recognizing it as the ransom offered to God for our redemption, the price of our purchase, the atonement for our sins, that we can best estimate the benefits which flow thence to us, and conceive corresponding gratitude and love for such unbounded mercy. But Dr. Whately considers the idea of "vicarious religion" as a superstition having its source in the corruption of nature, and he consequently must repudiate the idea of atonement offered by Christ for men, whereby they are cleansed, justified, and sanctified through the sprinkling of his blood. How much more philosophical and consistent is the view presented by De Maistre, who in the expiatory sacrifices of the heathens themselves traces the vestiges of the primitive tradition of an atonement to be offered by the effusion of blood!

It were indeed a gross superstition to believe that men may be saved, notwithstanding the wilful perversity of their dispositions, through the efforts and merits of others, — even through the atonement of the Redeemer, which, according to his own wise ordinance, cannot be available to those who persist in resisting his saving grace. But it



is consonant with reason that God should accept a victim of propitiation, voluntarily offered for the sins of men, and in virtue of it grant graces impelling to repentance, and pardon the sincere penitent. All that the Church teaches regarding her ministers is in strict harmony with this view. They plead with God through Christ for the people, and in union with them cry, "Spare, O Lord, spare thy people!" They flatter no one that he can be saved independently of his own free coöperation with Divine grace, saying rather to each one, with St. Augustine, "God, who created thee without thy concurrence, will not save thee without thy coöperation." They teach none to rely on the merits of others, although, like the Psalmist, they put forward the fidelity of the patriarchs and saints, that God may be moved to pardon the frailty of sinners; but they warn all to repent in time before the Lord come to judgment, when it may be too late to prepare. They ascribe no magical virtue to any external rite, although they proclaim the sacraments to be unfailing rivulets flowing from the side of the crucified Redeemer, and fertilizing the well-disposed soil, whilst they glide over the obdurate heart without improving it.

The leading idea of these Essays is, that the source of Roman errors is to be sought in the corrupt tendencies of human nature. "No one," says accordingly the learned writer, "can point out any precise period at which this 'mystery of iniquity' — the system of Romish and Grecian corruptions — first began, or specify any person who introduced it. No one in fact ever did introduce any such system. The corruptions crept in one by one, originating for the most part with an ignorant and depraved people, but connived at, cherished, consecrated, and successively established, by a debased and worldly-minded ministry." The charge of innovation has been often met by a challenge on the part of Catholic apologists to point to the innovator, and to the circumstances that marked the rise and progress of the novelty. Dr. Whately gives up the matter in despair, and asserts that the new doctrines stealthily crept in from a corrupt tendency of the human heart. Unfortunately for his theory, he has not succeeded in sustaining it by facts, which rather militate against it. We are not disposed to question the harmony of Catholic doctrine with natural instinct: on the contrary, we believe

that nature, in its purest condition, is the foundation on which the structure of revelation reposes, because God, the author of both, has planted in the human breast sentiments and affections which prepare us for his supernatural communications. The moral principles, which are designated by the name of Natural Law, are the basis on which the Divine Architect has planted revelation. Nature, chastened and directed by it, is worthy of its Divine Parent, who has wisely provided for himself a testimony in its instincts. When the human mind, dazzled by the splendor of the Deity, turns towards created objects, and, charmed by their seductive features, concentrates its affections in them, the natural sense of the power and greatness of the Creator, although for a time obscured and deadened, is not altogether extinct, so that in sudden emergencies even the votary of idolatry gives spontaneous expression to Nature's voice, recognizing her Author, as Tertullian long since observed. Not to the Capitol does he turn, nor is it Jupiter whom he invokes; but with eyes uplifted towards the heavens he cries out, O God! Well does the great apologist of Christianity exclaim on this occasion, "O testimony of the soul, which is naturally Christian!"

When pride and passion have combined to shake off the yoke of Divine religion, and the evidences of revelation are rejected as insufficient to render credible incomprehensible doctrines, man feels himself ready to deny all moral law, and the controlling power of a Supreme Ruler; but he finds that law written in his heart, his conscience bearing witness to it, and his thoughts either accusing him, if he transgress its dictates, or approving his acts as far as they harmonize with its suggestions. Here the contest between faith and atheism is ultimately fought. The discrimination between vice and virtue being maintained, even after the abandonment of all supernatural teaching, the mind is forced to acknowledge a Being the essential criterion of right and wrong; and is prepared to submit, as of necessity, to any manifestation of his power. Thus the natural law proves the safeguard, as well as the introduction to revelation.

It may be thought that the gifted writer has pointed in great detail to the many corrupt tendencies of human nature, which led to the devising of our tenets and the introduction

of our practices; and that with nice discrimination he has distinguished between the direct consequences of some natural instinct, and the perverse results occasioned by human depravity; but no such work has been accomplished. It costs no labor to assert that the worship of images sprang from a natural tendency of the heart, and to give in evidence the pagan superstitions; but it is not so easy to prove that a crucifix is an object equally to be abhorred as the shrines of Diana, and that relative reverence paid to the symbol of redemption involves the guilt of pagan worship. "One of the most prevailing characteristics of superstition," according to our author, "is the attributing of some sacred efficacy to the performance of *an outward act*, or the presence of some *material object*, without any inward devotion of the heart being required to accompany it." Had he proved that Catholics are taught to confide in external acts independently of inward devotion, he might have traced this feeling to that source. He alleges, indeed, as a matter of fact, that they ascribe such efficacy to pilgrimages, sprinklings with holy water, veneration of relics, and the like, and refers to some local ceremonies in Spanish countries on Good Friday; but were the facts such as he states, they would not establish the principle. Individuals might entertain exaggerated views, or a superstitious confidence in external observances, although the rites themselves did not foster this false feeling. It is much more consistent to trace the veneration of relics to the miracles which were performed through the cloths which had touched the body of St. Paul, than to any natural tendency to confide in outward performances or material objects. How much safer it is to look to facts than to construct theories!

"It is not really," says Dr. Whately, "the doctrine of Purgatory which led to prayers for the dead; on the contrary, it is doubtless the practice of praying for the dead that gave rise to that doctrine." He does not say how the practice itself arose, but in accordance with his theory he must ascribe it to an instinct of nature prompting us to wish the happiness of our departed friends, and to give expression to this desire, even without hoping any result from it. Had we no evidence of a different and higher origin of this usage, we might suffer such a supposition to pass without contradiction, since at all events it would not

indicate any corrupt feeling, but rather a generous affection. We ourselves were witness of such an expression as could not be accounted for by the religious convictions of the individual, and seemed the voice of nature itself. An aged Protestant lady being apprised that a young man, whom she had cherished as a son, was in his last agony, rushed into his chamber, and, on learning that his spirit had just departed, exclaimed almost unconsciously, "O God, have mercy on his soul!" But we are not left to speculate on the origin of the ecclesiastical usage, which Calvin acknowledges to be most ancient; "*mos vetustissimus est.*"\* He found it necessary to apologize for resisting it, harmonizing as it does with the best feelings of nature, and, to defend himself, alleged that it necessarily implies the doctrine of Purgatory. "For if we admit," he says, "that prayers should be offered for the dead, we must all acknowledge that they now suffer punishment by the judgment of God, for not having satisfied for their sins whilst living." The connection of the usage with the doctrine is thus established by the consent of Calvin and Whately, whilst its origin is traced to the Apostles by the unexceptionable testimonies of St. Augustine, St. Chrysostom, and Tertullian. It was not, however, by reasoning on the practice that the doctrine was discovered, for both were delivered simultaneously. It was well suggested by the Tractarians, that it should be considered "whether this dictate of human nature, warranted as it is by the early Church, may not be implanted by the God of nature, — may not be the voice of God within us."†

Confession is undoubtedly referrible to natural instinct, for all men feel that the humble and sorrowful acknowledgment of an offence is a title to forgiveness, or at least to a mitigation of punishment. Each sinner feels that by disclosing his sin his heart is somewhat relieved, not only by the sympathy he excites, but also by the atonement which he makes to offended virtue. The public at large accord merit to the avowal made by a culprit on the eve of paying the awful penalty of his crime. Nevertheless, it is not to this natural sense and feeling, much less to Divine institution, that Dr. Whately ascribes the practice of confession; but to the proneness of men to vicarious re-

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\* In *Acta Ap. Cap.* XV.

† Tract 77.



ligion, by which the priest is regarded "as a mediator between them and God." "Hence," he says, "sprung the doctrine of the necessity of confession to a priest, and of the efficacy of the penance he may enjoin and the absolution he bestows." The facility with which the author adapts facts and doctrines to his private theory is truly admirable. Others might be at a loss to understand the necessary connection of these ideas, and might choose rather to account for the belief of this power by the plain force of the commission to forgive or retain sins. Olshausen traces it to the command of the Apostle, that each one should try himself before partaking of the Eucharist, and says that the Church instituted it in perfect accordance with that injunction: but the apostolic mandate was but the promulgation of the law of Christ himself, requiring sinners to show themselves to the priest, in order to be cleansed from spiritual leprosy. Well may the German pietist lament that the practice has disappeared from his communion. It subsists in the Church in its original vigor, because it is not a matter of ecclesiastical discipline, which might be overwhelmed by contrary usage, but it is an essential part of the institutions of Christ, which must continue to the consummation of ages.

Superstition, according to Dr. Whately, is a natural tendency of man. With greater justice he might have said that religion is his natural tendency; and superstition is an abuse of this natural inclination. Man is formed with a sense of dependence on his Creator, whom he feels bound to worship. If from mistaken piety he perform acts ill suited to the Divine honor, he is deemed superstitious. Idolatry is a distinct crime, of far greater enormity, since it implies a transfer of divine honors to images. We cannot agree with the essayist that this is impossible, for profane writers, as well as the Sacred Scriptures, bear indubitable testimony to the sad degradation of men, worshipping the works of their own hands. It may not be easy to conceive how they could imagine these objects to be divine, — whether inhabited by a deity, or invested with a divine virtue; but certain it is, that they did not worship the true God through them, nor did they use them as occasions to remind them of his presence. The prohibition of image-worship contained in the Decalogue was manifestly intended to proscribe the pagan usage of idols, and

to take away all occasion of it. The breaking of the brazen serpent by Ezechias proves that the Israelites themselves, in burning incense to it, had made it an object of worship, contrary to the commandment. It does not, however, follow, that all use of images is unlawful, since the brazen serpent had originally been formed by the order of God to excite the confidence of the people in the Divine goodness, and had been instrumental in their recovery from the bite of the fiery serpents. The fact proves, what all Catholics admit, that, if images become an occasion of idolatry or superstition, their use may be abrogated, notwithstanding the previous sanction which they had received, or the favors which God may have imparted to those who with faith had employed them. Dr. Whately clearly perceives the distinction between their use as memorials of illustrious servants of God, or exhibitions of Scriptural facts, and the pagan worship of stocks and stones, or images; yet does he apply the prohibition of the Decalogue to all alike, and become partially the apologist of idolatry, in order to involve the Catholic in the condemnation which should fall on the heathen. He applies this censure to the Greek Christians, as well as the Latins, between whom he admits there is scarcely any discrepancy in worship or doctrine; and fears not thus to arraign as idolaters three fourths of those who glory in the name of Christ. Yet even he admits that "pictures and images are not in themselves superstitious"; and accordingly he adds, "We do not now exclude them from our houses of worship." The Council of Trent instructs us, that images are not to be venerated as if any divine virtue or divinity were in them, so that there is no room for the hypothesis of Dr. Whately: — "If, in worshipping before a crucifix, he [the Catholic] attributes a certain sanctity to the image, as if some divine virtue were actually present in it, he is clearly as much guilty of idolatry as the Israelites in worshipping the golden calf and the brazen serpent." The proof which he alleges is the preference sometimes shown of one image to another; but this only supposes that God may have manifested his power and favor on some special occasion, which, unquestionably, he may do. Every Catholic knows and feels that the image is but a memorial of the sufferings of Christ, in whom alone our homage must centre. We may repeat the words

of St. Gregory the Great:—"We prostrate ourselves before the cross, not worshipping the wood, but Him who died on it for our redemption."

Dr. Whately has failed to show what principle of nature has led to what he brands as superstition in the use of images. We are indeed prone to form the likeness of those whom we love; we almost naturally impress on the image the kiss of affection; we prize the memorial; we preserve it with respect; but no instinct of nature prompts us to confound the symbol with the original. If nations sunk into idolatry, it was because their passions obscured their understanding, and led them to seek in material objects Him whom their mind could not contemplate in his spiritual nature. Christians who are taught that God is a spirit, and that he must be adored in spirit and in truth, are not likely to confound him with the painted memorial of his merciful manifestation. This compendious and affecting exhibition of the Mystery of Redemption directs the mind to Calvary, and to the great work there consummated.

The adoration of Christ in the Eucharist is termed idolatry by the learned writer, who rejects the reasons offered by Jeremy Taylor and others for removing so grave a censure from the countless millions who believe this mystery. According to his favorite theory, this worship was not originally grounded on any text of Scripture, but it sprang imperceptibly from the corrupt tendency of human nature, to defend which the Scriptural passages were made subservient. We willingly acknowledge that it was not a fruit of hermeneutics, because the mystery was celebrated long before a word of the New Testament was written; but the words of our Lord, revealed to St. Paul the Apostle, were appealed to by him in confirmation of that which he had orally delivered to the Corinthians, when he first communicated to them the knowledge of Christianity. Dr. Whately admits that the doctrine of Transubstantiation does not contradict the testimony of the senses, because the accidents, which he designates attributes, of bread and wine remain after consecration, and the testimony of the senses goes no farther. "That whatever has the appearance and other sensible qualities of bread is bread, is not attested by the senses." He labors to show that according to our belief Christ is transformed

into bread ; but he does not reflect that the change of the bread into the body of Christ is the direct object of the rite of consecration, and consequently no transformation can be attributed to him, although it be true that his body becomes present under the external appearance of bread. The acknowledgment of Dr. Whately that our doctrine is not in contradiction with the testimony of the senses, added to the avowal of George Stanley Faber, that it should not be prejudged by an appeal to reason, which cannot judge of supernatural objects, ought to remove many of the difficulties which lie in the way of the sincere inquirer. If the evidence of its Divine revelation be examined, it will be found to be more copious and satisfactory on this point than on any other mystery.

The assertion that the passage, "This is my body," was before the eyes of the whole Christian world for ten centuries before the doctrine of Transubstantiation was ever thought of, is one of those bold allegations which could be pardoned only to a disputant in the excitement of controversy. How a learned man, penning an essay in the calm retreat of his study, could venture on it, is to us inexplicable. Mark, he does not speak of the term, but of the doctrine ; so that, according to him, for ten centuries after Christ, no one ever thought that the bread and wine in the Eucharist were changed into the body and blood of Christ. Yet, according to the testimony of Mr. Palmer, "all the ancient liturgies now existing, or which can be proved ever to have existed, contain a prayer of consecration that God will make the bread and wine the body and blood of Christ."\* What the whole Church prayed for, at the most solemn moment of the mysteries, was surely thought of and believed to be the object of the Divine institution. The Greeks designated this change by terms equivalent to transubstantiation, μεταβάλων, μετασκενύσων, μεταρρύθμιζων. Their illustrious writers in the fourth century expressed it in language the most unambiguous. "Since Christ himself," observes St. Cyril of Jerusalem, "pronounced and said of the bread, 'This is my body,' who will dare doubt? And since he affirmed and said, 'This is my blood,' who will ever doubt, and say that it is not his blood? He once, at Cana of Galilee, changed

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\* Oxford Tracts, No. III.



water into wine, which resembles blood, and do we think him unworthy of belief that he changed wine into blood?"\* The passages of St. Cyril of Alexandria, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Chrysostom, and other Greek fathers, which affirm the change, are no less striking; but we cannot hope that they would convince a writer who has had the hardihood to assert, that for ten centuries after Christ the doctrine was not thought of!

With great candor, Dr. Whately exposes some superstitious ideas entertained by some members of his communion in regard to the sacramental elements, which they hold to be an infallible cure for some diseases of children, and carry home to their houses for this purpose. Another superstition, still stranger, is their eagerness to obtain sacrament-money, the collection made at the celebration of the Eucharist, "to be made into a ring, as an infallible cure for fits." This surprises us the more, as they are said to offer other money of the same value in exchange. Here certainly is manifest superstition, since such confidence is utterly groundless. The eagerness of the sick to obtain the sacramental bread and wine, without caring in what state of mind they receive them, is justly charged with the same vice, whilst their impatience under examination and instruction is almost amusing. "Do pray, dear Sir," said a patient to the minister who strove to prepare him, "give me the sacrament first, and then talk as much as you please."

The discipline of the Church in early times, as all the learned know, required a certain reserve in the communication of the higher mysteries, lest pearls should be thrown to swine, and that which is holy should be trampled under foot by dogs. This has been shown, especially in regard to the Eucharist, by the late Bishop of Strasburg, in his learned treatise styled "*The Amicable Discussion*." The phrases "the initiated understand me," "I speak to the initiated," occur frequently in the writings of St. Cyril of Jerusalem, St. Augustine, and other fathers; so that Dr. Whately had no need to seek among the priests of Eleusinus for examples of secrecy; but even those most deeply imbued with sacred learning — the dispensers of the mysteries of God — are unable to comprehend those sublime

truths in which they are instructed. In the very act of consecrating the chalice the priest says, with a deep feeling of reverence and awe, "O mystery of faith!" When the *disciplina arcani*, as it was called, prevailed, it was confined to those who were catechumens, not yet fully prepared for the higher doctrines which were communicated to all baptized believers. There never have been two classes of tenets, as Dr. Whately would insinuate, one for the clergy, the other for the laity, although the distinction of teachers and people, as established by our Lord, has been maintained, and a higher degree of knowledge has been looked for from those who by their office are bound to instruct others.

The idea of any superior knowledge in the clergy to that which the faithful generally must have of Divine things, is rejected by Dr. Whately; and justly, indeed, if it were pretended that some articles are to be believed by one class which are concealed from the other; but in the Catholic Church one faith is common to all, and no doctrine is withheld from any of her members, however humble. Still, the great and primary truths of the Trinity and of Redemption by an Incarnate God are necessarily more prominent, and more explicitly professed by the multitude of believers, than doctrines less directly connected with the Divine counsels for human salvation. It has never been maintained that men could be saved through the faith of others; although the people are not expected to have the learning of doctors in theology, and the general assent to the doctrine of the Church, as the pillar and ground of truth, is deemed sufficient for those whose condition of life or dulness of intellect does not permit them to attain to more than a knowledge of the leading truths of Christianity. These humble believers have true and full faith, conceived under Divine inspiration; for even they are taught of God. The evidences of revelation present themselves to their mind in a way to win their assent, so that they know why they believe, and their imperfect knowledge can be no obstacle to their salvation. No one is precluded by the Church from aspiring after the fullest knowledge, although the circumstances of life in which one is placed may prevent his attaining to it.

However common the persuasion may be that the multitude of our poor are ignorant, because many may be unable to read or write, we believe that in regard to Chris-

tian doctrines they will advantageously compare, not only with Protestants of the same class, but with others of superior intelligence and acquirements. They will be found generally to know the substance of the Catechism, — the great mysteries of faith, and the moral duties, — and it will be difficult to find one so plunged into ignorance as those whom Dr. Whately describes, who regard baptism chiefly as the rite of *naming*, one adult female having actually presented herself to be baptized a second time, in order to change her name into one more agreeable to her fancy!

The means which God has appointed for communicating revealed truth must necessarily be adapted to the ordinary condition of mankind, since he wishes all men to be saved through the knowledge of the truth. If, then, it be evident that it is impracticable for men generally, even under the most favorable circumstances, to attain to the certain knowledge of the revealed doctrines by personal examination and the exercise of private judgment, it is clear that this method is not such as we may reasonably suppose God to have established. We doubt whether any man could attain to certainty by such method, since his strongest convictions must be disturbed by a knowledge of the contrary results of investigations made by men equally learned and conscientious; but at all events, the slaves, whom it is treason to instruct in the rudiments of letters, the peasantry, and the working classes generally, are under the impossibility of making the necessary studies. Their belief, whatever it may be, must rest on authority, and the only question is, whether that authority shall be an unerring one, to which they submit in the consciousness of their own incapacity, or one avowedly subject to err, which, by flattering their self-sufficiency, persuades them that they are exercising an independent judgment, at the moment that they blindly follow a deceiver. "Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil," said the tempter.

The principle of reliance on authority, by which the faithful are governed in regard to Divine things, is not the result of indolence, or of a disposition to leave to others the labor of inquiry; it is in conformity with the plan laid down by Christ, that those who hear should believe the Gospel preached by his authorized messengers, since faith comes by hearing. Dr. Whately does not deny that this was their office, although, strange to say, he adds, "not ex-

clusively indeed, but principally and especially," as if others, not sent by Christ, might teach with authority. He even maintains that the Eucharist may be celebrated by men not sharing the privileges of their order: — "Those who pretend that *there is necessarily* no celebration of this ordinance without a regularly ordained minister, are proceeding entirely without any shadow of Scriptural authority." It seems to be his object to lower as much as possible the idea of the sacred ministry, and accordingly he ascribes to superstition the "priesthood" which is recognized by the ancients as subsisting in the Church, and for which he would substitute the office of elder, because the Greek term employed by the sacred writers is *πρεσβύτερος*, not *ιερεύς*. Did it never occur to him that this latter term, although simply implying a sacred officer, was by long use determined to signify one who immolated animals, and consequently that it was proper to avoid its use in the commencement of the Church, in order to distinguish her ministers from Jewish or Pagan priests? As soon as the danger of mistake was removed by the diffusion of Christianity, we find the terms promiscuously employed. How will our Puseyite and High-Church friends, who vaunt their priestly name and office, relish the declaration of the Dublin metropolitan, that Christianity has no priest on earth?

We must interrupt our observations, to thank the liberal writer, who, notwithstanding his many severe censures on us, blames those who refuse our children the benefit of education, unless purchased at the price of conscience, by reading the Protestant version of the Scriptures. "To refuse," he says, "to teach them to read except on condition of their consenting to read the Bible in our authorized version, when they have a conscientious, though ill-founded, scruple against it, is in reality to withhold the Scriptures, under the pretext of distributing them." He also observes, most justly, — "Some are accustomed, inadvertently, to speak of the practice of keeping the Scriptures in an unknown tongue, as if it had been introduced by, or had arisen in, some church; forgetting that the *Latin* Bible of the Romish Church, (like the old Slavonian of the Russians,) is a *translation* into the then vernacular tongue, which subsequently *became* a dead language. The case is manifestly one of those in which 'Time, the greatest innovator, has insensibly insinuated alterations.'" Again, he



remarks, — “A language, be it remembered, which gradually became obsolete ; for the Church did not *introduce* the use of an unknown tongue in its prayers, or recital of Scripture.”

The whole tendency of the Essays is to undermine Divine faith, and leave men, if not in actual doubt, in a state of uncertainty, so as to be ready to change their present convictions on further investigation. This may be very philosophical, but it is plainly repugnant to the idea of revelation. If God has revealed any truths, he must have provided certain means for communicating them to sincere inquirers ; and to doubt of his truth, once ascertained with certainty, is to sin against his attributes. They who are “ever ready to listen to argument, ever open to conviction,” show that they are not certain of possessing the truth, and that their belief is no more than opinion. He who has not attained to certainty should be ready to weigh every proof that may be presented to him ; but he who believes with Divine faith is in the condition described by St. Augustine : — “ We who are well grounded in the Divine authority of our religion do not hesitate to say, that whatever is opposed to it is utterly false.”

Reliance on authority may be considered as a natural instinct, since the child is thus guided by his parents, and all men are more or less disposed to place confidence in the testimony or judgment of other men ; but pride is so congenial to our fallen nature, that we are most likely to prefer our own views to those of others. Certainly nature does not lead us to believe any infallible authority in our fellow-men. Enlightened reason may dispose us to recognize it in those who are avowedly the messengers of God, and faith may embrace their teaching ; but this cannot be accounted for by any natural tendency.

Dr. Whately calls attention to the fact, that the Apostles left no summary of doctrine, no catechism, or creed, or articles of belief, which would have been an easy and certain mode of directing the Christian mind, but contented themselves with writing, as occasion demanded, books or letters, from which the revealed doctrine might be gathered by the diligent inquirer. He makes evidently no account of the creed called of the Apostles, which, although most probably it was not written, possibly not composed, by them, cannot be fairly doubted to contain the chief articles

of Christian faith as believed in the various churches from the highest antiquity. The omission of the Apostles to compose a doctrinal summary is easily understood by those who reflect that the wisdom of Christ chose oral teaching, — the preaching of the word, — as the means of transmitting to the end of time the truths which he had delivered, and that he promised his presence at all times to guaranty its integrity. He instituted a ministry, to whom he gave an unrestricted power to teach, whether by word or in writing, and he left them to devise such formularies as might be necessary to distinguish truth from the ever-changing phases of error. The learned author claims for the Church, in qualified terms, something of the kind, with a view to account for the enactment of the thirty-nine articles: — “A church is authorized to draw up creeds as a test or *symbol* to preserve uniformity of faith in her members.” Yet he deprecates all idea of admitting it as a standard of orthodoxy: — “Never should we appeal to creeds, liturgies, or catechisms for the proof of any doctrine, or the refutation of any error.” Consistency would have obliged him to discard altogether creeds and symbols, “for no church is empowered to do that which God, for wise reasons, evidently designed should not be done”; but this did not suit his position as a prelate of a church furnished with three symbols and thirty-nine articles; so he chose rather to qualify his radical view, and to claim for each church a power to make articles, or compose creeds, as criterions of communion, but of no value whatever to determine the truth of doctrine. We need no longer wonder that these should be regarded as mere “articles of peace,” designed only to obtain external uniformity, without regulating the sentiments of their professors. Dr. Whately, indeed, thinks that none should claim church-membership who do not hold them, but he maintains that, if they be applied to control private judgment, “the grand principle of Protestantism — the only one that could justify the Reformation — is abandoned; and our Reformers must stand condemned as schismatical heretics” (p. 221).

The necessity of some exercise of private judgment in every system, even when the principle of church authority is admitted, is strongly insisted upon by the learned essayist, who, however, confounds the assent to authority with the independent exercise of judgment. By private judg-

ment we commonly understand the right claimed for each individual to judge for himself what God has revealed, so that, by examining in detail the evidences of each particular tenet, he may ascertain what he must believe. The act by which the individual recognizes the Church as alone competent to decide the truth or falsehood of doctrine, is plainly opposed to this claim. It is, indeed, an exercise of the mind and will, — it presupposes evidence presented and accepted, as well as grace by which the mind is enlightened, — it may be preceded by long and diligent examination, — but it is not an act of private judgment in the sense which we have explained. A man may select a lawyer or physician from public fame, or personal knowledge of his skill or success, although he may not be competent to pronounce on the various cases incidental to law or medicine; and it would be strange to assert his competency, because, by the fact of selecting the practitioner, he manifested a power of discrimination. Those who saw the miracles of Christ might recognize him as the Son of God, and believe his teaching unreservedly, because his words were words of eternal life. The act by which they became his disciples was an exercise of free will, under the influence of supernatural revelation; but by it they parted with their mental independence, so far as to bind themselves to receive with unqualified docility whatsoever he delivered. Faith can only be conceived where this entire assent is given to revealed truth, to the exclusion of all liability to err; for if error be supposed possible, the strongest conviction amounts to no more than an opinion of high probability; whereas the true believer says with St. Augustine, "I should rather doubt of my own existence, than of the truth of the things wherein I have been instructed."

Our author is not willing to admit that the Catholic belief of the prerogatives of the See of Peter, and the inerrancy of the Church in connection with it, is derived from those passages of St. Matthew which are commonly appealed to. We are most ready to concede, as we before remarked, that no Catholic tenet is the result of mere Scriptural interpretation, the revealed doctrine having been first preached, and the living faith and testimony of the Church being taken as guides to the meaning of the word when committed to writing; but we maintain that such interpretation is in strict accordance with the context,

and not a forced meaning devised to subserve a doctrine emanating from corrupt nature. Every one who weighs the words of our Lord, and the circumstances in which he uttered them, must feel that he meant to confer on Peter high prerogatives in reward of his Divinely inspired confession, and that he extended to the Church founded on him the privileges conferred personally on this Apostle. That his successors in office should be embraced in the promise made to him, can surprise no one, who considers that he is evidently presented as a permanent foundation, and a supreme ruler, so that his prerogative must continue whilst the Divine fabric remains, and the spiritual empire needs a governor. Dr. Whately candidly avows, "That all Christians should belong to one single ecclesiastical community, the chief governor of which should reside at Rome, though excessively inconvenient, would not necessarily imply the abandonment of any Christian principle."\* He also admits that the Church of Rome "was built by Apostles on Jesus Christ, the only true foundation; she was left by them with sound doctrines and pure Christian worship." This, independently of the Divine promises, forms a strong presumption of her orthodoxy, against which positive evidence becomes necessary. When it is considered, that, according to the confession of Dr. Whately himself, "she scarcely differs in doctrine at all from the Greek Church," the consent of two thirds of professing Christians, in connection with their predecessors during so many ages, cannot be lightly branded as erroneous. "It must be admitted, moreover," he remarks, "that the claim of infallibility in the Church, when it is distinctly avowed, is at least more consistent — perhaps I may say, more honest — than the sort of appeal which is sometimes made by Protestants to the authority of the 'Universal Church,' and which may be characterized by the homely but expressive proverbial metaphor, of 'playing fast and loose.'"

The closing essay on Persecution is ingeniously written, on the supposition that this is an acknowledged vice of Catholicity, from the danger of which Protestants are not entirely exempt. History indeed bears witness that it has invariably marked the ascendancy of Protestantism. We cannot agree with Dr. Whately, that persecution has arisen



from any natural instinct, prompting men to seek the spiritual advantage of others, although this may have been alleged by its apologists, and may have mixed itself up with the motives of its agents. "Too anxious," he remarks, "we cannot be, for the salvation of men's souls, — for the diffusion and for the purity of the Christian religion, — so long as we seek to compass these objects by the gentle force of persuasive argument and winning example: but when these methods fail, or even when it is apprehended that they *may* fail, the endeavor to prevent, by restraint, deviations from the established faith, and to force the stubborn and unpersuadable into that which appears to be for their own good, as well as for that of the community, is perfectly natural and conformable to the character of man."

We are borne out by history in the assertion, that coercive measures against sectaries originated in a desire to restrain their violence, as is clearly seen in the case of the Circumcellions. St. Augustine, it is true, modified his views as to their expediency, on seeing that many were reclaimed, being brought to investigate the truth, under salutary fear of punishment, and others were rescued from unjust intimidation; but he did not recommend their adoption as a means of proselytism, although he bore witness to the numerous and sincere conversions that had ensued when the terror of the law restrained the fanatical abettors of error. Coercive laws were enacted, in almost all cases, to maintain the established order of society, in conformity with the prevailing belief; not to introduce new doctrines, and terrify men into their profession. When this system of legislation prevailed, we may not wonder that its supporters, after the violence of the sectaries had subsided, sought for other motives to justify the continuance of legal restraints, and argued that it was a benefit and blessing to deter the bold and presumptuous by coercion, proportioned to their obstinacy and pride.

The excesses of sectaries, by which all society was convulsed in the Middle Ages, gave occasion to laws of great severity, which remained in force after these sects had spent their fury. This became the settled jurisprudence of all Christian countries, to which canonists and divines naturally adapted their reasonings. Generally, however, the execution of these laws was less rigorous, when the causes of them had ceased, as is evident in the history of

the ancient Inquisition, which, after its first efforts to root out the Albigensians, soon became inoperative. The revival of this tribunal in the fifteenth century was owing to the plots of false professors of Christianity against the independence of the Spanish nation, no less than against the Catholic faith, and its violence in the following age sprang from a similar sense of danger, inspired by the revolutionary movements of innovators in Germany and France. The Inquisitors themselves who pronounced on the guilt of heresy, and left the impenitent culprit to the severity of the law, did not regard this as a means of conversion, so much as a preservative of society against the contagion of dangerous principles. Even they subscribed to the principle of the old Council of Toledo, which forbade violence to be used for the purpose of bringing any one to the faith, and to the teaching of St. Gregory, who observed that it was a novel mode of preaching, to inculcate faith by blows of a club. All agree that unbelievers cannot be compelled by force to receive the faith, for faith is always voluntary.

"The tenet," says Dr. Whately, "that salvation is impossible out of the pale of the Church, has been, not unfrequently, considered as the necessary basis of persecution." From this view, however, he properly dissents. If St. Peter could avow, that under heaven there is salvation in no other name than that of Jesus Christ, without thereby pledging himself to persecute the heathens that heard it not, or the Jews, who blasphemed it, surely no principle, however exclusive, involves this necessity. If St. Paul could affirm, that "without faith it is impossible to please God," without placing himself in the attitude of a persecutor of all unbelievers, it cannot be reasonably contended, that, by declaring that without the true Catholic faith no man can be saved, we become necessarily deadly enemies of all who reject it. We need not here stop to explain the precise import of this clause, or the theological distinction of vincible and invincible ignorance, which may pass for what it is worth. Taking the Catholic tenet in its most repulsive form, it clearly involves no duty but that of zeal and charity towards those who are out of the pale of the Church, of whom we might say with St. Paul, "I wished to be anathema from Christ for my brethren according to the flesh."

The perusal of this work furnishes painful evidence of

the total absence of divine faith in its author, who scarcely labors to conceal his disbelief of the real distinction of the Divine persons, and of the atoning nature of the death of Christ. He avows his dislike of many usages which serve to transmit the knowledge of revealed truth, and to cherish piety. He objects to "the practice of reciting the Apostles' Creed as a portion of prayer," as if to confess the great truths of revelation were not an act of homage to God, implying a prayer to persevere in their belief. "The practice," he says, "of teaching or allowing very young children to learn by heart prayers, psalms, portions of Scripture, &c., which they are incapable at the time of understanding, is one which is very often superstitious, and almost always leads to superstition." He urges on clergymen "a constant care to check the superstitious idea, that either the consecrated ground (whether within or without the church), or the funeral service, have any thing to do with the individual's future destiny." His disregard of the ceremonial observances still retained in his communion was manifested on occasion of laying the foundation-stone of a church, which he performed *sans cérémonie*, lest the beholders should superstitiously ascribe any peculiar sanctity to the spot on which the temple was to rise. He complains that the sanctity attributed in Scripture to the Church, that is, to the body of believers, is commonly transferred to the *building* in which a congregation assembles, and he denounces as superstitious the "feeling of satisfaction on the supposed merit of having, in bodily presence, frequented it during life, with perhaps a hope of future security from the lifeless body's reposing within its walls." Although such a feeling may, in some instances, be open to censure, it originates in a sense of religion, and is associated with holy recollections. To condemn it as superstitious savors much of irreligion, and warrants no favorable judgment of his Christian faith. It must be humiliating to High Churchmen, and to all sincere believers in the great mysteries of Christianity, to hear the occupant of the metropolitan See of Dublin treating with open disregard the few religious rites which escaped the retrenching knife of the Reformers, denying all certainty of doctrine, and undisguisedly assailing the Mysteries themselves. Yet this is no novelty in a church of human organization, whose prelates are the creatures of the civil power. As Hoadley,

an avowed Unitarian, occupied for many years an English see, so Whately may continue to enjoy his titles and revenues without disturbance, as long as he does not put himself in opposition with the prime minister of the crown.

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ART. III.—*God in Christ. Three Discourses, delivered at New Haven, Cambridge, and Andover, with a Preliminary Dissertation on Language.* By HORACE BUSHNELL. Hartford: Brown & Parsons. 1849. 12mo. pp. 356.

WE proceed now to the second of these three Discourses, the one delivered at Cambridge, before the Unitarian Divinity School. It is on the Atonement, and is designed to give us Dr. Bushnell's views of the sacred Mystery of Redemption. The author discusses this subject with special reference to the points in dispute between Unitarians and the so-called orthodox Protestants, and not without the hope of disclosing a ground on which the two parties may come together, and each retain every thing really essential to its own theory. He selects for his text 1 John i. 2, "For the life was manifested: and we have seen it, and do bear witness, and declare unto you the eternal life, which was with the Father, and hath appeared to us"; or, as the author reads from the Protestant version, "For the life was manifested, and we have seen it, and bear witness, and show unto you that eternal life, which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us." Having recited his text, he proceeds:—

"This particular passage of Scripture has seemed to me to offer one of the most comprehensive and most deliberate announcements of the doctrine of Christ, that is anywhere given in the sacred writings, with the advantage that it is yet so far unoccupied as not to have become a technic, under the wear of any theory. In the verse previous, the writer opens by setting forth the fact, as I suppose, of a Divine incarnation in the person of Jesus. By the Word, or Word of Life, that peculiar power in the Divine nature by which God is able to represent himself outwardly in the forms of things, first in the worlds and now in the human person, which is the liveliest-type of feeling possible, and closest to God,—by this Word of Life, God has now expressed himself. *He has set forth his*



*Divine feeling even to sense and as a fellow-feeling*, — he has entered into human history, as one of its biographic elements. We have seen, looked upon, handled, what may thus be known of him. Then he adds, — throwing in a parenthesis which is to be a solution of the whole evangelic history, — ‘For the Life was manifested, and we have seen it, and bear witness, and show unto you that Eternal Life, which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us.’

“Observe three points in this very peculiar language. First, there is a manifestation of something, the mission of the Word is looked upon inclusively as a manifestation, that is, a coming into visibility of something before invisible. Secondly, it is the Life that was manifested, — not life generally speaking, but *the* Life. And, thirdly, as if to distinguish it in a yet more definite manner, it is called *that* Life, that *Eternal* Life, that *Eternal* Life that was *with* the Father, and was manifested unto us.

“Taking, now, these three terms, in connection with the assumption, elsewhere made, that our human race, under sin, are alienated from the life of God; also, with the declaration of Christ, that, as the Father hath life in himself, so he hath given to the Son, as the world’s Redeemer, to have life in himself; and, again, with that deep utterance of joy sent forth by an emancipated soul, — ‘For the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death,’ — taking the text, I say, in connection with these others, as commentaries, we have a good synoptic view, it seems to me, of the doctrine of the Messiah.

“It is not that Christ is a man, a human teacher, who is sent to reform us by his words and his beautiful human example, but it is to this effect: — All souls have their proper life only in the common vivifying life of God. Sin, being a withdrawal into self and self-hood, separates them from the life, and, as far as their own freedom is concerned, denies all influx of the Divine into their character and their religious nature. Passing thus into a state of negation, as regards the Divine all-sustaining life, they become imprisoned in darkness, unbelief, idolatry, and a general captivity to sense. And now the Life is manifested in sense; in Christ is life, and the life is the light of men. Christ enters into human feeling, by his incarnate charities and sufferings, to re-engage the world’s love and reunite the world, as free, to the Eternal Life. To sum up all in one condensed and luminous utterance, every word of which is power, *God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself*. The Apostle says nothing here, it will be observed, of reconciling God to men, he only speaks of reconciling men to God. Had he said, ‘The Life of God was manifested in Jesus Christ, to quicken the world in love and truth, and reunite it to himself,’ he would have said the same thing under a different form.

"I am well aware that, in offering such a statement, as the true doctrine of Christ and his work, I affirm nothing that is distinctively orthodox, and shall even seem to rule out that view of Christ as a *sacrifice*, an *expiation for sin*, a *vicarious offering*, which, to the view of most orthodox Christians, contains the real moment of his work as a Saviour. It will be found, however, that I am proceeding exactly in the line of the Scriptures, and I trust also it will appear, before I have done, that the Scriptures advance two distinct views of Christ and his work, which are yet radically one and the same.

"I. A subjective, speculative, — one that contemplates the work of Christ in its ends, and views it as a power related to its ends.

"II. An objective, ritualistic, — one that sets him forth to faith, instead of philosophy, and one, without which, as an Altar Form for the soul, he would not be the power intended, or work the ends appointed.

"Thus, when it is inquired, as in the first form specified, for what end did Christ come into the world, we have a class of terms in the Scripture which can scarcely get any proper meaning, if what is said under the second form is considered to be the whole doctrine of Christ. The converse also is equally true. The real problem is to find a place and a meaning for *all* that is said concerning him, — to effect a union of the two sides.

"As examples of the manner in which the Scriptures make answer, when the question is, for what ends did Christ come into the world, we have the following: —

"‘To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, to bear witness to the truth,’ — a passage that is remarkable as being the most direct, specific, and formal statement Christ ever made of the object of his Messiahship; and here he says, that he came to bring truth into the world.

"‘I am the way, the truth, and the life’; — ‘I am the light of the world,’ — are declarations of a similar import.

"‘Unto you, first, God having raised up his Son Jesus, sent him to bless you, in turning away every one of you from his iniquities.’ ‘Who gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works,’ — where the end of his mission is declared to be a moral effect, wrought in the mind of the race.

"For this purpose, the Son of God was manifested, that he might destroy the ‘works of the devil,’ — a passage declaring the precise object of the incarnation as affirmed in my text; and, as the work of the devil is not the punishment, but the corruption, of his followers, we are brought to the same conclusion as before.

"In all these citations, we have so many echoes of the one just produced, as the grand, comprehensive doctrine of Christ’s work,

or mission : — GOD IN CHRIST, RECONCILING THE WORLD UNTO HIMSELF. And I affirm, without hesitation, that whenever the question is about *the end* of Christ's work, that end to which he stands related as the wisdom and power of God, the answer of the Scripture will be, that he comes to renovate character ; to quicken by the infusion of the Divine life ; in one word, that he comes to be a Saviour, as saving his people from their sins." — pp. 187 – 191.

The reader will perceive here a repetition of that form of the old Apollinarian heresy which we pointed out in our last Review, and which, if it does not absolutely deny the Incarnation, at least completely reverses it ; namely, that the Word, in some sense, enters into human nature, or is converted into flesh, or that the Divine is assumed by the human, instead of human nature by the Word or second Person of the Ever-blessed Trinity. The reader will also perceive that here again the author represents the Word, Logos, or Son, not as a Divine person or Hypostasis, but as the power or faculty of God to produce himself outwardly in the forms of things, which, if explained so as to escape pantheism, can only mean that the Eternal Word is simply the creative power of God, or God's ability to create existences, and therefore the Incarnation is only the creation of a human existence, or a human person. Giving the author the benefit of the most favorable construction his language will bear, he undeniably falls into these two fatal errors, errors which necessarily imply the denial of the whole Christian religion.

But passing over these two fatal errors, as already sufficiently discussed, it is obvious that the author's doctrine in regard to the purpose or purposes of our Lord's mission is, that Christ came solely to effect a moral renovation or change in the human race, to make satisfaction for sin, to fulfil the law, and effect the Atonement by reconciling us to God, that is, by leading us to repentance and newness of life. The whole significance, end, or aim of Christianity is the moral regeneration of mankind, or the production of certain subjective states or affections in us. This is evident from the extract we have made, and from the whole Discourse.

With some modification, we could accept this statement, so far as relates to the end of our Lord's mission. The end of his coming was undoubtedly the salvation of sinners. "The Son of man has come to seek and to save

that which was lost." (St. Luke xix. 10.) St. Paul says, it is "a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptation, that Jesus Christ came into this world to save sinners, of whom I am the chief." (1 Tim. i. 15.) "The only cause of the coming of Christ," says St. Augustine, "was to save sinners. Take away diseases, take away wounds, and there is no cause for medicine. If the great Physician came from heaven, great infirmity was on the earth." — *Si venit de cælo magnus medicus, magnus per totum orbem terræ jacebat ægrotus.* (Tom. V. 1208.) On this point we have no controversy with Dr. Bushnell. Mankind were sick, and Christ came to heal them; they were alienated from God, and he came to liberate them from their sins, and to reconcile them to God, — although he reconciles by liberating, rather than liberates by reconciling them, in the author's sense.

The author contends that Christ does not reconcile us as a human teacher, by his beautiful words and beautiful examples, as Socinianism holds. Something more is necessary. The subjective view alone is insufficient, and the objective view must always be joined with it.

"Then, again, to show that a view is offered of Christ, in the writings especially of the Apostles, which is wholly different from this, one that speaks of him as a propitiation, a sacrifice, as bearing our sins, bearing the curse for us, obtaining remission by his blood, is altogether unnecessary. In the Epistles to the Romans, the Galatians, the Hebrews, those of Peter and John, this altar view or form of Christ appears even as the eminent, or super-eminent truth of the Gospel.

"Omitting, therefore, because it is unnecessary, to offer any particular citations to this effect, I will simply refer you to a passage that is remarkable, as being an instance where one view runs into the other, and the altar form becomes, in the issue, a renovating power. The eighth chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews opens with a look toward sacrifice, describing Christ as a 'priest' 'having somewhat to offer,' but still as 'having obtained a more excellent ministry' than the priests of the law, and brought in for us a 'better covenant.' How better? Because it has a more transforming power in the life, because it fulfils a better and higher design, writing the law in the heart: — '*I will put my laws into their mind, and write them in their hearts.*' Here the objective, ritual view passes into the subjective, and reveals the fact that it has and was designed to have a renovating power in character; — thus becoming a 'new' and 'better covenant.' Accordingly, I design to



show that, if the first or subjective view of Christ, that in which I state the end and aim of Christ's work, is true, that end or aim could not be effectively realized without the second, or objective view, in which his whole work is conceived in the altar form, and held forth to the objective embrace and worship and repose of faith." — pp. 191, 192.

But this objective or ritualistic view and the subjective "are yet radically one and the same." The objective view represents no objective reality, no truth independent of the subjective, and is only the subjective objectively expressed, or the machinery which the Almighty invents and employs to produce and express the subjective states or affections which it was the end of Christ's mission to produce in us.

To understand this, we must bear in mind that the end of Christ's mission, according to the author, is the production of certain moral changes, states, or affections in us, and the whole truth and value of all the transactions brought to view in the Gospel history consist in their artistic or æsthetic fitness to produce them. They do not produce these changes, states, or affections in the way of doctrine or didactic teaching addressed to the logical understanding, not as philosophy or as theology, but as art, addressed primarily to the feelings. This ritualistic view is the artistic form of the subjective or philosophical view, and without which it would be practically inefficient.

We shall better understand this, if we glance at the author's theory of language laid down in his Preliminary Dissertation. According to the author, all language depends for its significance, not on an objective world to which it introduces us, and of which it is primarily the sensible sign, but on the mind to which it is addressed. Words are signs, indeed; but not signs of objective realities; they are signs only of subjective states or affections, and the whole value of the verbal sign is in its fitness to suggest to the mind or call up in the mind a certain thought or feeling. All words, even those which are suggestive of spiritual thoughts and affections, will be found on analysis to be primarily signs of feelings, and only mediately signs of intellectual and spiritual affections. They are not purely arbitrary or conventional signs, but are significant by virtue of a certain innate correspondence between the sign and the feeling, and between the feeling and the

intellectual or spiritual affection. Our philosophical readers will readily understand this theory, which is substantially the old Conceptualistic theory, advocated in the twelfth century by the too famous Abelard, completely and confessedly refuted by St. Bernard. On this theory there is no intelligible reality, that is, the intelligible is simply *in mente* and does not exist *a parte rei*, and God himself is for us only our subjective conceptions. He can reveal himself to us only by means of certain sensible signs, which are significant only by the affections they are fitted to produce in us. God is supposed, mediately or immediately, to prepare the signs and to construct them artistically as signs of our feelings, as he does the feelings as signs of spiritual affections. Hence the whole value of the signs as a medium of Divine communication consists, not in what they signify of God to us, but in what they express in us that has its equivalent in God, or rather, that is identical with God.

Christianity is constructed and made expressive on the same principle. The author's radical conception of it is that of a work of art, a Divine drama, or fable, intended to illustrate and impress a moral, or to produce certain moral or spiritual states or affections in the soul. The Trinity, he tells us, is the *machina Dei*, or the Divine machinery by which God reveals himself to men; and he expressly calls the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost the *dramatis personæ* of the revelation. They are not three persons eternally subsisting in the Godhead, but three impersonations, or representations expressing in a dramatic or poetic form to our feelings the three characters or attitudes which God, regarded as absolute being, bears to his creatures; or, in other words, they are the machinery or fable which God employs to make us aware of the contents of his own being. Their value is solely in what they express. They are real or true, because the subjective affections they stand for in us are the affections of God; but whether, beyond what they express to our feelings, that is, beyond the subjective affections, they have any reality or not, is more than we can affirm or deny, for to do either would require a knowledge of the internal nature of God to which we cannot attain.

The Incarnation completes God's dramatic representation of himself, and adds the fifth and last act to the Di-

vine tragedy. It includes, in fact, the whole of the Christian representation; for the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are first brought to view in it, and are either incidental to it or produced by it. "This threefold denomination is itself incidental to and produced by the central fact, or mystery of the Incarnation, as an impersonation of God developed in time." (pp. 167, 168.) In it God expresses himself under a human form, under human relations, as living a human life, associating with us as a friend and a brother, and pouring out upon us the human contents of his being; that is, he expresses in it, in a manner most impressive to our feelings, the human affections, charities, and sympathies which eternally dwell in the bosom of the Divinity. Strictly speaking, the Incarnation is not God exalting human nature by taking it up to himself, nor does it import new divinity into humanity, but is simply a new and striking manifestation of the substantial identity of the human and Divine natures. Christ is not God, is not man, absolutely considered; but the expression of both in what they have in common. He is God in that what he expresses is God, and man in that what he expresses is also human, and both God and man in that he expresses the common properties of both, — that is, the humanity of God and the Divinity of man, which at bottom are one and the same. This must be the author's meaning, for he denies the doctrine of two natures in Christ, and contends that he has but one simple nature. If, then, he is the expression of both God and man, both God and man, as far as he is their expression, must be identical; which follows, also, from the author's pantheism. But apart from the expression, what is Christ? Is he man? Is he God? Is he both? Let no one be foolish to ask; for whether he is, or what he is, independent of the expression, is a matter clearly out of the range of our investigation. He is for us only in the expression, and as he expresses both God and man to us, he is both to us, and that is enough for us to know. Who asks whether the beasts and birds in Æsop's fables were or were not objectively real, and really talked or not? The errors and divisions among theologians all grow out of the attempt to get behind the expression, and to impose their idle conjectures and uncertain guesses as dogmas of faith. We should learn to stop with the expression itself.

Such, in brief, is the author's conception of Christianity. It is a divine tragedy, conceived, written, and acted by Almighty God, by which he makes known to us through our own subjective states the affections of his own bosom, the feelings of his own heart. Like every dramatic performance, nay, like every work of art, it is addressed primarily to our feelings, and affects and improves us on the same principle that any tragedy affects and improves us, though in a far higher degree, as being far more perfect as a work of art than any human tragedy ever represented or conceived. Hence the author says :—

“The value of Christ's mission is measured by what is expressed. And if so, then it follows, of course, that no dogmatic statement can adequately represent his work ; for the matter of it does not lie in formulas of reason, and cannot be comprehended in them. It is more a poem than a treatise. It classes as a work of Art more than as a work of Science. It addresses the understanding, in great part, through the feeling of sensibility. In these it has its receptivities, by these it is perceived, or perceivable. Moving, in and through these, as a revelation of sympathy, love, life, it proposes to connect us with the Life of God. And when through these, believably opened as inlets, it is received, then is the union it seeks consummated. Were it not for the air it might give to my representations, in the view of many, I should like, in common with Paul (Phil. i. 9, 10), to use the word *æsthetic*, and represent Christianity as a power moving upon man, through this department of his nature, both to regenerate his degraded perception of excellence, and also to communicate, in that way, the fullness and beauty of God.

“Hence, it would not be as wild a breach of philosophy itself, to undertake a dogmatic statement of the contents of a tragedy, as to attempt giving in the same manner the equivalents of the life and death of Jesus Christ. The only real equivalent we can give is the representation of the life itself. It is not absurd, however, to say something about the subject, if only we do not assume the adequacy of what we say ; we could offer some theoretical views of a tragedy, but our theoretic matter would not be the tragedy. No more can we set forth, as a real and proper equivalent, any theoretic matter of ours concerning the life and death of Jesus Christ, which is the highest and most moving tragedy ever acted in this mortal sphere ; a tragedy distinguished in the fact that God is the Chief Character, and the divine feeling, moved in tragic earnest — Goodness Infinite manifested through Sorrow — the passion represented.” — pp. 203 – 205.

We can now easily understand what this objective or



ritualistic view is, and what is its relation to the subjective view. The subjective view is Christianity philosophically stated, the objective is the same philosophical truth artistically represented. The former is plain prose, the latter is the former done into poetry, or the form in which it must be expressed in order to be practically efficient.

Turning now to the subjective view, we find that it represents Christ as accomplishing his mission, the salvation of sinners, — 1. By placing in the world “the example of a sinlessly perfect being,” which of itself is sufficient, by the new feelings and ideas it awakens, “to change the destinies of the race, and even their capabilities of good” (p. 205). 2. By the fact that it manifests the Life, the Eternal Life of God, which penetrates men’s souls, moves their feelings, enlarges their views, “elevates their ideas and purposes, and even their capacity of good itself” (p. 207). 3. By giving assurance, through the charity manifested in the Life, of God’s willingness to forgive and justify the sinner on condition of repentance and reformation of life; and thus dispelling the imaginary fears of the wrath and vindictiveness of God, and that dread of future punishment which sin generates in the breast of every transgressor, and exciting the sinner’s love to God, inspiring him with confidence, and giving him courage to begin a new life (pp. 213–216). And 4. By bringing the law closer to men’s souls, and giving it a more sacred rigor and verity than it had before his advent (p. 219).

Christ brings the law closer to men’s minds and gives it a more sacred rigor in four methods: —

1. By his instructions concerning it. The advent of Jesus was a new and more fearful revelation of God. Christ holds up the law in tones of greater rigor and exactness than any which had been used before. (pp. 219, 220.)

2. By his obedience. This and the two following methods the author considers in relation to the institution of sacrifices, and to do him justice we must extract at length his own words.

“The institution of sacrifice is most reasonably regarded as a positive institution, originally appointed by God. We find the rite in use at a time when marriage, a far less artificial institution, is represented as being received by God’s appointment, and when he himself was introducing, by his lessons, the culture of the ground and even the dress of the body. It was most natural, too, that,

when he was teaching the guilty, fallen pair their severance from him, by removing them from their paradise, he should also teach them by what rites of penitence and worship they might be purified and restored to union with him. We also find a positive statute enacted, at a very early period, forbidding the eating of blood, the object of which is to make it a sacred thing for the uses of the altar. Afterwards, undeniably, the system of sacrifice was carefully elaborated by the minutest and most specific positive statutes. Besides, which to me is most convincing of all, there is a certain fore-looking in this ritual, and then, when Christ appears, a certain retrospection, one answering to the other, one preparing words and symbols to express the other, and a beautiful and even artistic correspondence kept up, such as argues invention, plan, appointment, and indicates a Divine counsel present, connecting the remote ages of time, and weaving them together into a compact and well-adjusted whole. And if the redemption of man is the great work of the world, that in which all existences here find their highest moment, as most assuredly it is, then what may better occupy the wisdom and the greatness of God, than the preparation of so great a work?

“The matter and manner of the sacrifice are familiar to us all,—the going up to Jerusalem, driving thither, or purchasing there, a choice, unblemished animal; the confession of sin upon his head before the altar; the solemn formalities of the slaughter and preparation of the sacrifice; the sacred blood sprinkled before the veil that is closed against unholy feet, the horns of the altar touched with blood, and the remainder poured out before it on the ground; then the fire kindled and the smoke of the victim, made a total loss for sin, rolling up before the eyes of the worshipper to heaven. And then he returns again to his tribe, thinking, on the way, of the journey he has undertaken for his sins,—as he went up thinking of the sins that required him to go.

“What, now, is the real meaning or value of this transaction? The ceremony is proposed to be connected with the remission of sins. How thus connected?

“It is not that God has been appeased by the smell of the sacrifice. It is called an atonement, or propitiation, but it cannot be supposed that God is pacified in any way by the sacrifice.

“It is not that the worshipper has embraced the atonement of Christ, typified in his sacrifice, as we sometimes hear. He had no such conception. Even the sacred prophets themselves, we are told, were guessing *what*, as well as what manner of time, the Spirit that was in them did signify when they spoke of Christ and his day. Nay, his own disciples, explicitly taught by himself, could not understand the import of his death till they were specially illuminated. Doubtless the worshipper did sometimes, and ought always to have exercised faith in God, as a forgiver of sin;

and, as God is Christ and Christ is God, there was exercised, of course, a virtual, but not formal, faith in the Christ of the future.

"It is not true or supposable, as needs to be specially noted, that the animal offered is punished for the sins of the worshipper. No hint or trace of any such impression can be found. Nor can it be argued from the confession of sins upon the head of the victim; for, when the scape-goat is employed, the confession upon his head is even more formal, and yet the animal is only driven away into the wilderness to signify the clearing of sin, its forgiveness and removal for ever. Besides, if there were any idea of punishment connected with the sacrifice, if the death of the animal had a penal character, because of the sins supposed to rest on it, then something would be made of the suffering inflicted; which we know was never thought of, and made no part of the transaction. The animal was simply despatched, as when slaughtered for the table, and it nowhere appears, in the whole range of Hebrew literature, that any one ever thought of the sufferings of the animal as entering at all into the real moment of the transaction.

"We come now to that in which the real value of the sacrifice did consist. The institution had, of course, a historic value as connected with the future life and work of the incarnate Redeemer; for in it are prepared correspondences and, so, types or bases of language, in which that more spiritual grace may be represented. It had also a value, considered as part of a great national religion, in which public remembrance of sin is made every year. It was also, as a rite, to have a renovating power over the character, somewhat as the manifested Life in Christ Jesus is designed to have; only in a vastly feebler and inferior degree. And therefore, in cases where it had no such effect, it was openly declared, on the part of God, to be an abomination to him, and as such to be rejected. The value of the sacrifice lay chiefly, however, in the power it had over the religious character, — the impressions, exercises, aids, and principles, which, as a liturgy, it wrought in the soul of the worshipper. And among these, as connected especially with the remission of sins, was the impression it cherished of the sanctity of violated law; for, as I have said already, it is on the ground of that impression secured, both that forgiveness will be wanted, and may be safely offered." — pp. 222 – 225.

The design of the ritual sacrifices was to strengthen and sanctify the law in the minds of the worshippers, and especially to impress them with a sense of the sanctity of the violated law, however freely through God's mercy sins may be forgiven. "The same impression is made, and far more deeply, by the obedience of Christ; for, considering who he is, there is more of meaning in his obedience than

there is in the obedience of many nations." "God is really under the same law of obligation that we were under and [which we] cast off, and it is the glory and greatness of his nature that he delights eternally to acknowledge this law. Christ is the manifested Life revealing this everlasting obedience of the Divine nature. All that he does and suffers is but an expression of the homage, rendered by God himself, to that which we reject." If God himself renders homage to the law we have violated, how sacred must that law be! (pp. 226, 227.)

3. "Christ, coincidently with the sin-offering, sanctifies the law through expense and painstaking. The sacrificer must come bringing the best and choicest of his flock, — a lamb or a bullock without blemish. He must be absent from home, and leave his business behind for whole days, — all in the way of expense and painstaking." Save in its subjective effect on himself, all this is "a dead loss." The victim must be wholly destroyed, — must all "go to smoke," and then it will move his conscience, and make him feel the sacredness of violated law. "Christ, by the sorrow and suffering of his painstaking life, accomplished a like result." "Every thing he does and suffers, every labor, weariness, self-denial, and sorrow, becomes an expression of his sense of the value of the law, — every pang he endures declares its sacredness." (pp. 227 – 229.)

4. "The law of God is yet more impressively sanctified by Christ, if possible, in the article of his death, considered as counterpart to the uses of blood in the ritual." The whole ritual turns on the essential sacredness of blood. The blood was considered as the life, and its use in the ritual signified to the worshipper that "only the most sacred thing he knows, even life, can suffice to resanctify the law violated by his sins. Nay, more, a sacred thing is something that belongs especially to the occupancy and right of God, and the impression was that blood, being the mysterious principle of life, is somehow especially near to the Divine nature, — thus and therefore sacred." The meaning of sacrifice is, therefore, that "only something derivable from God, some sacred element yielded by him, can suffice to cover man's sin, and hallow again the violated majesty of broken law." Hence the maxim, "Without the shedding of blood there is no remission of sins." "Christ appears and closes his sanctified and sublime life



by submission to a violent death. He is not a sacrifice in any literal sense, as we know. There is no altar in his death; no fire is kindled; by no act of religion or priestly rite is he offered up; he is simply murdered by the malice of his enemies." But his life, considering who he was, in comparison with which the most sacred things the apostles had ever known were profane, — it was the life of God, and, being yielded up in devotion to the law, and in its honor, was admirably fitted to show us that nothing conceivable is too sacred for us to yield up to cover the breaches made by our sins.

Here the author apparently breaks down in the attempt to sustain the analogy which he asserts, and really gets no more in the death of Christ than he had previously got in the sacrifices under the law. The signification of the sacrifice, he says, was that "only some sacred thing, yielded by God, is sufficient to cover the breaches made by sin," and therefore blood, as the most sacred thing known under the law, and yielded us by him, was offered in sacrifice. To carry out this view, he should be able to say that we have something infinitely more sacred than the blood of goats and calves yielded us in Christ, and which we can offer to God, or which by his death in our place he offered for us. Christ was sinless, and shedding his blood on the cross, not for us, not in the place of sinners, but simply as murdered by the malice of his enemies, could in no sense signify that only some sacred thing yielded by God is sufficient to cover the breaches made by sin, for in his case there were no breaches made by sin to be covered. The only view the author can take, in accordance with his theory, is, that Christ was engaged in a work of charity to mankind, and he chose rather to suffer himself to be murdered by his enemies than to desert it, and thereby showed that the law of God exacts that in a charitable work we persevere unto death, even the death of the cross; which, we apprehend, is not true, since the law of God only commands us to love our neighbor *as* ourselves. However, let the author speak for himself.

"Looking, now, at the death of Christ in this manner, we are made, first of all, to feel, whether we can explain it or not, that it has a marvellous power over our impressions, concerning ourselves and our sins, the law of God and his character. It brings an element of divinity into every thing, sheds an air of solemnity and

grandeur over every thing. It is even more awful to the guilty conscience itself than the thunders of Sinai. And, then, secondly, we shall be able also, I think, to see that the whole effect, contemplated under the laws of art, is produced by the fact that the Life, thrice sacred, so dimly shadowed before in the victims of the altar, is here yielded, as a contribution from God, to the pacification and reconsecration of his realm. The effect depends, not on any real altar ceremony in his death, but it depends, artistically speaking, on the expressive power of the fact that the Incarnate Word, appearing in humanity, and having a ministry for the reconciliation of men to God, even goes to such a pitch of devotion, as to yield up his life to it, and allow the blood of his Mysterious Person to redden our polluted earth ! ” — p. 236.

Here is the whole significance of the Gospel considered philosophically in its relation of a means to an end. Setting aside the author's attempt to explain the Hebrew ritual, his blunder as to the significance of sacrifice, and his assertion that God is under the same law of obligation that we are, we recognize, not, indeed, the whole truth, nor the central truth of Christianity, but a truth, and an important truth, in what he appears to be driving at. Christianity, no doubt, is, in some sense, addressed to our feelings, and operates æsthetically. The life and passion of our Saviour are admirably adapted to affect us, and they move us far more powerfully than do the simple truths they express, when logically drawn out and stated in a dry and didactic form. Remembering who our Lord is, we cannot follow him step by step from his lowly birth in the stable to his agony in the garden and death on the cross, — we cannot see him, who was rich, for our sakes become poor, who was in the form of God and without robbery could judge himself equal to God, take upon himself the form of a servant, humble, and as it were annihilate, himself, live a life of poverty and want, go about doing good when he had not whereon to lay his head, — despised and rejected of men, derided and scorned by the world, betrayed by a follower, deserted by his friends, arraigned as a criminal, mocked, buffeted, spit upon, scourged, and finally crucified between two thieves, — bearing all in meekness and patience, in sweetness and without a murmur, forgiving his enemies, and in the agony of his passion, with his latest breath, praying for his murderers, — without being touched in our hearts, filled with abhorrence for sin, and furnished with the most powerful incentives to contrition and virtue. Cer-

tainly one of the most efficient means of Christian growth is daily meditation on the life and passion of our Lord, and no one can hope to attain to Christian perfection who neglects it. All this is true, and well known to all masters of spiritual life.

But this is not by any means the whole truth, and would not be a truth at all on Dr. Bushnell's theory. The power of the life and passion to produce the effect indicated depends on their being believed to be the life and passion of a real being, a real individual, who in the highest and most absolute sense is both God and man. Dismiss this belief, let it be understood that the whole life and passion are only a grand dramatic representation, or theatrical exhibition, gotten up and displayed merely for artistic or æsthetic effect, and their power to move us would be destroyed, because they would want reality. In denying or rendering doubtful the objective reality or ontological truth of the Christian mysteries, the author should bear in mind that he takes away their very power to affect us. If Christianity is only a dramatic fable, designed simply to illustrate and impress a moral, and has no reality but in the feelings it excites, the thoughts it suggests, and the resolutions it leads us to form, he has done a very unhand-some thing in telling us of it. He has destroyed the illusion by admitting us behind the scenes.

There is no doubt that the ceremonies, sacrifices, sacred things, and observances enjoined by the Jewish ritual, reacted upon the worshippers in the way the author supposes, and that the worshippers, when sincere, were really instructed, edified, and made better by them, as simple spiritual exercises. But if the worshippers had approached them with the understanding that their sole value was in the spiritual exercises they demanded or were fitted to produce, they would have failed to receive from them even that advantage. Prayer is certainly the most holy and profitable spiritual exercise conceivable,—indeed, it includes every spiritual exercise; but if undertaken solely for the sake of the exercise, it would not be, for it would then cease to be prayer. Prayer is the elevation of the soul to God; but a man praying for the sake of spiritual exercise does not elevate his soul to God, and therefore loses the benefit of prayer even as an exercise. The poor man would be merely endeavoring to lift himself by pulling

away with all his might at his own waistbands. The Gospel, no doubt, operates to some extent on the principle *ex opere recipientis*, but to make it operate solely on that principle is pushing the matter further, we should suppose, than even Protestants generally are prepared to go.

But waiving these obvious objections to the author's doctrine, we confess that we do not see wherein he gets any thing more from Christ than beautiful words and beautiful examples. All the methods by which he represents the Gospel as regenerating men are reducible to the moral force of the truths Christ taught, and the examples he set. It is true, he calls Christ the Life of God manifested in the world, but this life, according to his own principles, operates only æsthetically, as a poem, a picture, or a statue, and connects itself with the life of mankind only in the thoughts it generates and the feelings it excites in them, — that is to say, only in and through the effects which naturally result from the contemplation of a holy life, — a life of truth and goodness, love and mercy, meekness and patience, disinterested affection and heroic suffering. That such a life has power to move and excite us to virtuous effort we have conceded; but it imparts no new power to the soul, no new strength to any of its faculties. It only stimulates the powers and calls forth the strength the soul already has, and always has had; for the author must remember that there is, on his doctrine, no infused grace, and that Christ does not exalt humanity, or import any divinity into human nature. He only declares the union of the human and Divine natures which has always existed, and all the additional power he imparts to us to keep his commandments is what naturally flows from a clear and full conviction, that, up to a certain point at least, the human and Divine are one and the same, — a conviction produced by a dramatic representation, instead of a dry, didactic statement of the fact. We confess, therefore, we do not see wherein the author rises above simple Unitarianism as to the substance of his doctrine, and he even falls far below it, for Unitarians in general do at least admit our Lord was a real man, not the mere hero of an epic poem, a drama, or a novel.

But the author himself concedes that this subjective view of Christianity is insufficient, — is not the complete Gospel of our Lord.



"Here I close the subjective view of Christ's mission. Considered as a power moving the spiritual regeneration and redemption of man, this is the conception we form of it. Is it a true conception? I have a degree of confidence that it is. But there is yet another question: is it satisfactory,—is it the Gospel of Christ? However it may seem to others, for it certainly appears to be a plan not wanting in magnificence, I am still obliged to confess, that, taken by itself, it is not satisfactory to me, and I could not offer it as the full and complete Gospel of Christ.

"I observe, in the Scriptures, a large class of representations, such as speak of the *atonement* received by Christ, his *sacrifice*, his *offering*, his *bearing the sins* of many, the holiest opened by his *blood*, the *curse* he became, the *wrath* he suffered, the *righteousness* he provided, which do not seem to have their proper, natural place and significance in the view here presented. I recollect, also, that around these terms of grace the whole Church of God, with but a few limited exceptions, have hung their tenderest emotions, and shed their freest tears of repentance; that by these the righteous good, the saints and martyrs of the past ages, have supported the trial of their faith; that before these they have stood, as their altar of peace, and sung their hymn of praise to the Lamb that was slain; and remembering this, I cannot convince myself that they were wholly mistaken, or that they were not receiving here, in the living earnest of their spirit, something that belongs to the profoundest verity and value of the cross. Men do not live in this manner, from age to age and by whole nations, upon pure error. Spiritual life is not fed, thus interminably, upon a Gospel that mocks all reality. If their supposed Gospel does not stand with reason or theory, it must somehow stand with faith, feeling, and all that is inmost in eternal life. This brings me to the second department of my subject, that in which I proposed to unfold an objective ritual view, answering to the mere speculative and subjective now presented, and necessary, as such, to the full effect and power of Christ's mission."—pp. 244–246.

This would seem to be something; but, as we have seen, it is only the subjective view we have already stated, objectively expressed. In itself considered, this objective view contains no truth not contained in the subjective view, and is only a sacred language, a divinely constructed system of signs, for producing in us certain states or affections. It is true because it expresses the truth to us, but the truth it expresses is subjective, not objective truth. It is only the form under which Christianity is to be represented in order to have an artistic effect.

"But it will be imagined, I suppose, by some, that the objective

religion, the view of vicarious atonement which, as we have seen, may be generated by a transfer of the speculative doctrine, is only a rhetorical accident, — that the Apostles and Evangelists only took up certain Jewish figures, made ready at their hands, using them to convey the Christian truths. Contrary to this, it is my conviction, and I shall now undertake to show, that God prepared such a result, by a deliberate, previous arrangement. It is the *DIVINE FORM* of Christianity, in distinction from all others, and is, in that view, substantial to it, or consubstantial with it. It is, in fact, a Divine Ritual for the working of the world's mind. It was not more necessary, indeed, that the Life should find a body, than it is that the power Christ deposits in the world should have an operative vehicle. The Christ must become a religion *for* the soul and *before* it, therefore a Rite or Liturgy for the world's feeling, — otherwise Christianity were incomplete, or imperfect." — p. 258.

This ritualistic view, if not a rhetorical accident, is not so only because its author is God, and not man. It is clearly an accident in relation to the substantive truth of Christianity, for it is only the artistic form of that truth, and is no more essential to it than the fable is essential to the moral it is intended to illustrate and impress. With this objective view the author's system is at best only Socinianism clothed in Christian garments, or Unitarianism expressed in orthodox phraseology; and the only reason why, in so expressing it, we are not guilty of fraud and deception is, that God himself has prepared that phraseology as the fitting vehicle of Unitarian doctrine. How the author has learned all this, and many other things he asserts, is more than we know, or are able to divine.

The objective or ritualistic view of the author comprises the whole of the great mystery of redemption objectively considered, or the representation of Christ as our sponsor, our redeemer, the propitiation for our sins; as dying in our place, bearing our sins, redeeming us by his blood, making satisfaction for us to Divine Justice, and by his own merits obtaining for us the grace of pardon, and sanctification, and heaven. This view must be taken, not because Christ really did die in our place, satisfy for us, and merit our pardon and salvation, but because this is the necessary form of Christian expression, the only form in which the Gospel can be expressed so as to produce its intended effects. It is a Divine form, because the old ritual from which it is borrowed was itself the work of God, designed, aside from the æsthetic effect it was to have on those who

observe it, to supply a fit and appropriate language for worshippers under the new law.

That the Mystery of Redemption expressed in orthodox language is admirably fitted to produce the subjective affections the author supposes, is not denied, and we have already conceded it more than once; but only on condition of its being believed to be objectively true. Reduced, as the author reduces it, to mere fable, to mere poetical machinery for the production of those affections, it would not be so fitted. Moreover, we are not prepared to look upon God as dealing in fable, using fiction, and requiring us to believe it literally and strictly true. To say that he cannot without fiction or fable reveal himself to us, or move us to contrition and virtue, is to derogate from both his wisdom and power; and to say that he uses fiction, and requires us to believe it as truth, is to derogate from both his truthfulness and his justice. God does not employ fiction as truth, and Christianity is not a fable. Either the objective form of Christianity is objectively true, true to the letter, or God has deceived us, and the Gospel is an imposition.

Dr. Bushnell is, no doubt, an able man, and many parts of his theory indicate no little ingenuity and speculative talent; but he fails to see his doctrine in all its bearings. If his theory, that Christianity effects its end only æsthetically, be true, the whole benefit of the life, passion, and cross of our Lord must be restricted to those who have lived and died since his coming. The old patriarchs, and the saints under the old law, were not then saved by Christ *crucified*, and they cannot hail him as the Captain of their salvation. He did nothing for them; he did not by his cross and passion consummate their faith, and perfect what was wanting to them; for, as all the transactions brought to view in the Gospel were subsequent to their death, they could not affect them as Divine art. The Divine drama, not being represented before them, could not touch their hearts, and operate their reconciliation to God. Either, then, they are not saved, and are suffering now in hell, or there is another than Christ crucified in whom there is salvation, contrary to St. Peter, who says, "Neither is there salvation in another. For there is no other name given under heaven to men whereby we must be saved." (Acts iv. 12.) It would not be true, then, as St. Paul teaches us, that "there is one God, and

one Mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself a redemption for all, a testimony in due time." (1 Tim. ii. 5, 6.) Nothing is more evident from the Scriptures, than that all who are saved at all are saved by Christ crucified, and that the effects of the cross of Christ extend backwards to the first sinner of our race, as well as forward to the last, and were as essential to the salvation of those who lived and died before his coming as to those who live and die since. There never has been but one true religion, but one medium of salvation, and that medium is the cross of Christ. Hence, St. Paul, enumerating the saints who lived and died before the Incarnation, and commending their faith, adds, "And all these being approved by the testimony of faith, received not the promise, God providing something better for us, that they should not be perfected without us." (Heb. xi. 39, 40.) This plainly intimates that we have received something necessary to salvation, which they had not received; that we have received the promise, that is, the fulfilment of the promise, in which they confided, but which they did not receive; and that our having received it, or that which was promised to them having now come, not only perfects us, but them also. The author is therefore precluded from giving to the life and passion of our Lord any interpretation which restricts their effects to those living only after his advent.

The author denies the vicarious atonement, or that Christ suffered as a sacrifice for the sins of mankind, and made satisfaction for them to the justice of God. Such satisfaction, he contends, was not necessary, was impossible, could serve no purpose, and God would have been unjust and cruel either to have exacted or to have accepted it from an innocent person. That it was not absolutely necessary is conceded. God could have pardoned the sinner gratuitously on the simple condition of penitence and amendment of life, if he had so willed. "If God had willed," says St. Thomas, "to liberate men from sin, without satisfaction, he would have done nothing contrary to justice. The judge who is charged to punish crime committed against another, as another man, the commonwealth, or a superior prince, cannot, indeed, save justice, and dismiss the guilty without punishment. But God has no superior, and is himself the supreme and common good



of the whole universe. Therefore, if he forgives sin, which derives its guilt from the fact that it is committed against himself, he does no one any injury; thus a man who forgives an offence against himself acts mercifully, not unjustly. Hence David, seeking mercy of God, says, *Tibi soli peccavi*, as if he would say he can be forgiven without injustice.\* On this point we have no controversy with the author, or with his Unitarian friends.

But because God could have willed to liberate us from sin without satisfaction, we cannot say he has so willed. *Argumentum a posse ad esse, non valet*. God was free to will not to pardon without satisfaction, as he was free, if he had willed, not to accept satisfaction, but to leave the sinner to suffer in his own person the full penalty of the law he had broken. He was not obliged to pardon either with or without satisfaction. Man had sinned wilfully, and had voluntarily incurred the penalty of everlasting death, and would have had no cause of complaint against the Divine justice if left to suffer it. To have pardoned the sinner on the simple condition of penitence and reformation would have been a great mercy, an act of grace on the part of God; but to refuse to pardon on that condition, for the sake of making a higher display of his infinite love and wisdom, and of raising us to a greater dignity and to a higher blessedness than we lost by sin, would have been a still greater mercy, a higher act of grace. Now this may have been the reason why God refuses to pardon gratuitously. He may have willed something better for us, something more to his own glory; and all orthodox Christians believe that such is the case, that he willed, not only to repair the damage done by sin, but to make even sin itself contribute to the exaltation of the sinner and the Divine glory by the means taken to repair it. Hence the Church in her exultation breaks out, "O felix culpa, quæ talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem!" Hence, whether we reason either from the justice or the mercy of God, we cannot conclude, that, because God could have remitted our sins without satisfaction, he actually does so remit them.

To all human wisdom and power the satisfaction asserted is unquestionably impossible, and no created intellect

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\* *Summa* 3, Q. 46, A. 2, ad 3.

could ever have discovered its possibility. But not therefore was it impossible to God. The author's arguments against its possibility are irrelevant, because founded on a misapprehension of the orthodox doctrine. He states the doctrine as he may have learned it in the bosom of his own sect, but not as it is taught by our theologians. He gives what he calls "the Protestant views" of the Mystery of Redemption, and states them to be,—1. That Christ satisfied the Divine justice by suffering in his own body all the pain to which mankind were doomed for their sins; and 2. That he suffered simply to express the Divine abhorrence of sin. The cross certainly does express this abhorrence, and the suffering of Christ during his life, which was one continued passion, was beyond our conception, for never were there sorrow and pain like his, and his humanity was miraculously strengthened, by its union with the Divinity, to suffer; but neither view stated by the author is the essential condition of the satisfaction. The satisfaction contended for is what theologians call condign satisfaction, that is, a satisfaction which is equivalent in value and dignity to the penalty incurred by transgression, or that renders to the majesty of God offended by sin an honor equal in dignity to the offence. Christ does not make it by suffering in his own body the actual amount of the debt, for the satisfaction concerns personal, not material things; but by offering that which in the estimation of Divine justice is, to say the least, fully equivalent in value to the offence. A debt can be discharged, without paying its actual amount in money, by offering its equivalent in some other form, if the creditor consents to accept the commutation.

That Christ could make condign satisfaction, offer to Divine justice a full equivalent, and far more than a full equivalent, for our debt, or our dishonor to it by sin, is most certain; for he was both God and man, the union of the Divine and human natures in one Divine person, and we can therefore, as we showed in our last Review, predicate of him on the one hand all that is predicable of God, and on the other, all that is predicable of man, sin excepted. He could not, indeed, suffer in his Divine nature, but he could suffer in his human nature, and his suffering in his human nature would be as really his suffering as God as if he suffered in his Divine nature, since what I

suffer in my body is as really my suffering as if I suffered it in my soul. Christ could suffer, and, as the value or dignity of whatever is done or suffered is always determined by the value or dignity of the person doing or suffering, his suffering, since his person is God, would have an infinite dignity or value. We say not that it would be an infinite suffering, for human nature, however exalted, is still finite, and cannot be the medium of infinite suffering, but by virtue of Christ's infinite person it would be infinite in dignity and value. A single drop of blood, a single tear, a single sigh of the Incarnate God, therefore, was amply sufficient to satisfy for the sins of the whole world, whether we say with some that sin is finite, or with others, that, since committed against the infinite majesty of God, sin is itself in some sense infinite. But as his whole life on earth was one continued passion, simply consummated on the cross, and as he shed every drop of his blood for us, his suffering was not only a full satisfaction of the law even to its utmost rigor, but even a superabundant satisfaction. The value of this suffering of our Lord he did not need for himself, either as God or as man. Not as God, for as God he possessed the infinite fulness of the Divine nature, and could neither need nor receive anything; not as man, because he was without sin, and had no sin to atone for. The title to this value was not in the Trinity, because it was acquired by suffering, and the Trinity did not and could not suffer, but was in Christ, the Son, who had acquired it in his human nature, the only sense in which God did or could suffer and die. It is, then, in the Son as the Son of Man. Possessing it as Son of Man, Christ could make it over to us, or, what is the same thing, offer it to the Trinity in satisfaction for our sins, and in doing so he would offer it to another than himself as Son of Man, in which sense he acquired and holds it, and offer what is even more than equivalent to all the demands of Divine justice against us. The satisfaction is, then, possible on the part of the Redeemer, and herein is seen the wonderful wisdom of God, as well as his unbounded goodness, that he should have provided a Redeemer who could make full and complete satisfaction to the law for all the sins of all mankind.

That it would be unjust on the part of God to accept this satisfaction in commutation of the penalty annexed to

transgression cannot be maintained. It is certainly not unjust to the sinner. To the sinner it is an act of pure mercy, because God might have justly refused to accept any commutation, and actually inflicted on him the whole penalty of sin. It is a great favor to the sinner, and not merely a favor of the Son distinctively considered, for, though only one person of the Trinity was incarnated, the Incarnation, without which no satisfaction or commutation could have been made, was the work of the whole Trinity, in which the whole Trinity concurred. The Trinity provided the Redeemer, and therefore the redemption is a display of the mercy of the Trinity, not, as the author supposes, of one person only. There is no violation of eternal justice in accepting the satisfaction in so far as it releases the sinner, because we have seen God could have willed to release the sinner without any satisfaction, and if he could justly release him without satisfaction, he certainly could with satisfaction.

But the author contends that it would have been unjust to Christ on the part of God to have required him to make the satisfaction, against his will, and still more to have accepted it in case the Son freely consented to make it. That it would have been unjust to have compelled the Son of Man to make the satisfaction against his will, we do not deny, but not unjust to exact or accept it, the Son voluntarily consenting to make it. The Son of Man freely consented to redeem mankind, and as he had the right to consent, since he had free will, and violated no law in consenting, no injustice is done in accepting it. Otherwise, we must say that every exaction from the surety of the payment of a debt is an act of injustice. If I voluntarily become surety for another, there is no injustice on the part of the creditor in accepting me as surety, or even in exacting payment of me, in case the one for whom I become surety fails to discharge the debt. If not unjust, it is not cruel, for there can be no cruelty where there is no injustice. Moreover, the injustice and cruelty, if any in the case, are not avoided by the author's own theory. There is just as much suffering of the innocent for the guilty, of the just for the unjust, according to his doctrine, as there is according to ours; for he holds that Christ was innocent and just, and that God permitted him to lead a life of humility, to be persecuted and finally crucified by his ene-



mies, for the purpose of manifesting to sinners the Divine love and mercy, and of reconciling them to God by taking away their sins. It is as unjust and cruel to permit him so to suffer for the sake of reconciling sinners æsthetically, or by way of dramatic representation, as for the sake of reconciling them by way of satisfaction. But there is no injustice or cruelty in the case, unless it is unjust and cruel on the part of God to permit any act of heroic charity, or any heroic suffering for the sake of others. All through the world the good suffer for the bad, the innocent for the guilty, the just for the unjust, and if this were forbidden, not a flower of charity would ever bloom to gladden us with its beauty and fragrance, and not a shower of mercy would ever descend to refresh the earth, and clothe its dusty face with verdure.

Dr. Bushnell contends, that, even if Christ makes satisfaction for our sins, nothing is gained by the transaction but the simple transfer of the evil from the guilty to the innocent. This objection is founded on a misconception of the orthodox doctrine of Redemption. Christ does not satisfy for our sins by bearing in his own body an amount of pain equal to that which mankind have incurred by transgression, but by offering to God in its stead its equivalent in value, or that which does more to repair the honor of the law dishonored by sin than would be done by the actual infliction of the penalty. God is more pleased with the submission and obedience of his Son, than he is displeased with sin, and his justice is better satisfied by his offering than it could have been by the suffering of all mankind in hell eternally for their sins; for their suffering could never fully satisfy it, otherwise it would not be endless. There is, then, by the transaction the gain of perfectly satisfying the Divine law by the offering of Christ, and on such conditions that its honor may be fully repaired and the sinner be saved, enter heaven, which he could not have done if he had had to endure the penalty.

The author, moreover, does not seem to understand that to the innocent and just there is and can be no evil. Strictly speaking, there is no evil but moral evil, that is, sin and its penalty, because nothing else excludes us from our supreme good. The evil of what Christ suffered was not evil in him or to him, but solely in the malice of those who persecuted and crucified him, that is, in the malice of

mankind for whose sins he suffered, and to them alone. Christ merited in his sufferings. He merited for himself, as Son of Man, the resurrection from the dead, the glorification of his body, his exaltation to the right hand of God the Father, and all power in heaven and in earth. "He humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. *Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him*, and given him a name which is above every name: that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow of those that are in heaven, on earth, and in hell, and that every tongue should confess that the Lord Jesus Christ is in the glory of God the Father." (Philip. ii. 3-11.) He was rewarded for what he did with the glory as Son of Man which as Son of God he had had with the Father before the world was. He bore our evil, but none of his own, for he knew no sin, and his humility and obedience, his cross and passion, became, through God's wisdom and love, the medium of his exaltation to the glory of the Father, to be honored as we honor the Father, and obeyed as Universal Lord.

We, also, gain by the transaction, if we are sanctified, more than tongue of men or angels can tell over and above what we should have received by gratuitous pardon. In being redeemed by the passion of Christ, we receive many things pertaining to salvation besides the simple remission of our sins. We learn from his passion the great love wherewith God loves us, which excites our love to him, and in which consists the perfection of salvation. "God commendeth his charity towards us: because when as yet we were sinners, according to the time, Christ died for us." (Rom. v. 8.) In being thus redeemed, we have given us an example of obedience, humility, constancy, justice, and the other virtues exhibited by our Lord in his passion, and which are necessary to salvation. "Christ suffered for us, leaving you an example that you should follow his steps." (1 Pet. ii. 21.) Again, Christ by his passion, besides liberating us from the penalty due to transgression, a penalty that God could have remitted gratuitously, merited for us the grace of sanctification and of final beatitude. The simple, gratuitous remission of our sins would have imparted to us no additional grace, would have given us no new interior strength, no supernatural elevation of our nature, and would have left us as blind and as weak as we

were before, and equally incapable of that supernatural virtue to which alone is promised the reward of heaven. We know little of what would have been the final destiny of Adam had he persevered in the original justice and sanctity in which he was constituted, but a higher destiny, a more supernatural blessedness, is promised to us who are redeemed and sanctified in Christ. The redemption we have in him is not merely the remission of the penalty of transgression, is not merely our restoration to the state in which Adam stood before he fell, but our supernatural elevation to a higher spiritual state here, and to a higher glory and blessedness hereafter. Christ does more than repair the damage done by sin; he makes the very fact of sin turn to the advantage of the sanctified. "Where sin abounded, grace hath abounded more." Christ was constituted our head, and Christians are members of his mystic body, and as such partake of his fulness. "And of his fulness we have all received, grace for grace." (St. John i. 16.) The grace by which he is constituted our head, and by which Christians are made members of his mystic body, and therefore the beatitude of being united to him, and participating not only of his human, but also of his Divine nature in heaven, the reward of the sanctified, we receive through his incarnation and passion, over and above the remission of sin, and over and above what we should have received even if restored to the state in which Adam was before he fell; and therefore it is the Church, anticipating as it were, on Holy Saturday, the resurrection of our Lord from the tomb, and his triumph over the grave, over sin, and the powers of darkness, breaks out, "*O felix culpa, quæ talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem!*" Herein, we repeat, is displayed the wonderful wisdom and love of God. It were comparatively a small thing for God to defeat the Devil, and to repair the damage done by the fall of Adam, but to turn sin, which is the abasement of man, the death of his soul as well as his body, and his exclusion from all good, to his advantage, and to make it the occasion of exalting his nature, and raising him to a higher dignity and blessedness than he would have attained to had he not fallen, is what passes all created understanding, what we can never sufficiently admire, and what will excite the admiration and gratitude of the blest through all eternity. God's love and mercy are manifested to us not

merely in not leaving us to suffer the penalty incurred by transgression, not merely in restoring us to the state in which Adam stood before he fell, but in making man's sin, through the mode of reparation adopted, the occasion of ennobling our nature, and of raising us, who had offended, grossly insulted, his infinite majesty, to be in some sense companions of God himself, and coheirs with his Son. "Behold, what manner of charity the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be named and should be the sons of God." "We are now the sons of God, and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that, when he shall appear, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is." (1 John iii. 1, 2).

Moreover, the reflection that we are purchased with a price, that we are redeemed by the precious blood of God, presents us a far stronger motive to preserve our bodies pure, undefiled by sin, than any that could have been furnished by mere gratuitous pardon. "Ye are bought with a price. Glorify and honor God in your body." (1 Cor. vi. 20.) And, finally, it turns to the greater dignity of man, that, as man had been overcome and deceived by the Devil, so there should be a man who should also overcome the Devil, and as man had merited death, so man might by dying vanquish death. Therefore, "thanks to God who giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ." (1 Cor. xv. 51.)\* Here are considerations, and we have adduced only a few of the many we might adduce, to show that there is great economy in the transaction, and that it is not a simple transfer of the evil from the guilty to the innocent.

The author adduces other objections which it may be well to glance at.

"Then, again, according to the same view, Christ is also God and ruler of the world, in his own person. Would any king, then, be in a fair way to maintain justice in his kingdom, if he took all the penalties of transgression on himself? Or if it be said that the human nature only of Jesus suffered, then we have the brief pangs of one human person accepted, in strict justice, as the equivalent of all the penalties of all human transgression, since the world began!

"Again, there can be no such thing as future punishment or ret-

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\* *Summa* 3, Q. 8; Q. 46, A. 3; and Q. 48.



tribution, in this view, without involving a charge of injustice. For if justice be exactly vindicated, and the terms of the law exactly satisfied, to punish after that is plainly to exact double justice, — which is injustice.

“Again, it is a fatal objection to this view, that it sets every transgressor right before the law, when, as yet, there is nothing right in his character; producing, if we view it constructively, and not historically (for historic and speculative results do not always agree), the worst conceivable form of licentiousness. For, if the terms of the law are satisfied, the transgressor has it for his right to go free, whether he forsake his transgressions or not. As far as any mere claims of law or justice are concerned, he may challenge impunity for all the wrongs he has committed, shall commit, or can commit, while his breath remains!” — pp. 197, 198.

1. Christ makes the satisfaction as Son of Man, in which sense he was not the king against whom the offence was committed, for as Son of Man he was exalted to dominion only as a reward for having made the satisfaction, for having humbled himself and become obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. It is not true, because our Lord suffered only in his human nature, that “we have the brief pangs of one human person accepted, in strict justice, as the equivalent of all the penalties of all human transgression, since the world began,” because his pangs are not accepted as satisfaction on the ground that they are equivalent as suffering to the penalty, but equivalent in value; and because there was no human person in the case. The person of our Lord as Son of Man is his person as Son of God, and therefore the pangs were the pangs of a Divine person, the pangs of God, not of a human person; and being such, although suffered by God in his human nature, not in his Divine nature, which is impassible, they are of infinite value, and therefore amply and superabundantly satisfactory in strict justice for all the sins of all mankind. The author must remember that Christ is the union of the human nature and the Divine nature in one Divine person, or Hypostasis, and that, though some things he can do only as the suppositum of the Divine nature, and others only as the suppositum of the human nature, yet in both he is the one Divine suppositum, and the dignity and value of either class follow the dignity and value of his person.

2. Christ in the Incarnation received not only grace as

an individual, but also the grace of headship, as the head of every man, and it is as our head that he makes satisfaction for us; that is, he satisfies for us as his members, on the principle that the members satisfy in their head. His satisfaction, though amply sufficient, and even superabundant, considered in relation to the offended majesty of God, for the sins of the whole world, can yet be as to us an actual satisfaction, an actual, or personal, remission of our sins, only on condition that we are joined to Christ the Head as members of his mystic body. We do not satisfy the Divine justice out of Christ; we satisfy only in him; and it is only in him that we have redemption from sin. Consequently, if we are not in him, if we are disjoined or sundered from him, we cannot reap the fruits of the redemption. If, then, we refuse to become members of his mystic body, through baptism, the medium he has appointed for the reception of the grace which incorporates us into his body, and unites us to him as our Head,—as we may refuse, since we are endowed with free will, and he forces no one to become his member,—we remain practically under sin, have no practical application of the Atonement, are not practically washed from our sins in the laver of his blood, and therefore remain as obnoxious to all the penalties of sin as if he had not died, besides being guilty of rejecting the grace proffered us, and despising the Lord who has died to redeem us. The Son of Man was free to establish the conditions on which he would apply the pardon he purchased, or bestow the grace he obtained for us, and if we refuse to comply with those conditions, we may be justly punished for our sins. So the author is mistaken in saying that the sinner cannot, since Christ has made satisfaction superabundantly sufficient for all men, be punished without injustice. If he remains a sinner after so much has been done for him, he only shows the deeper malice, and that he deserves the greater damnation.

3. The answer to the third objection follows from the answer just given to the second. Redemption does not set the transgressor, save in Christ the Head, right before the law while as yet there is nothing right in his character. The sinner, regarded in himself, is not justified before the law till he is intrinsically just. The law is satisfied in Christ, in whom is our redemption and our justification, or rather redemption and justification for us; but it is

practically *ours* only as we are practically united to him as our Head, or as members of his body. The justification is in him, not out of him, and we must be in him in order to have it practically ours; and whoever is in Christ is a new creature, is regenerated, and therefore right in character. Till thus right in character, he is not individually right before the law. The doctrine of forensic justification, or our justification in the eye of the law, while we are practically unjust, though held by some sectaries, is not orthodox doctrine, any more than is the author's doctrine that Christ has made no satisfaction at all. The practical application of his satisfaction to us is essential to our individual justification in the eyes of the law, so that there is no personal justification without sanctification. The justice of Christ is imputed to us, justifies us, only in that we are living members of him, and united to him as our living Head by the efficient operations of his grace in us.

We pass over without comment what the author says in refutation of what he calls "the mitigated orthodox view," namely, that Christ by his cross satisfied the Divine justice in that he showed the Divine abhorrence of sin, because, as he states it, we do not hold that view, and regard it as no less heterodox than his own. The cross expresses that abhorrence, no doubt, but the formal expression of that abhorrence is not the satisfaction which Christ offered.

The author objects to the doctrine of satisfaction, that it implies, as he alleges, that God transferred his displeasure against the sinner to his Son, which cannot be supposed, for the Son had never done any thing to displease him. The objection grows out of the author's misapprehension of the Mystery of Redemption. The Father transferred no displeasure to the Son. The voice from heaven was, "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased." And the Son himself declares that he always does those things which are pleasing to the Father, and never was the Father better pleased with the Son, than in his agony in the garden and in his passion on the cross. Christ did not incur the Divine displeasure against sin. Through love he bore the effect of sin, that he might deliver us from it, as the author must, even on his own hypothesis, concede; but as he was himself without sin, the Divine displeasure against the sinner was not manifested against him. He was made a curse for us, it is true, because it is written, "Cursed is

every one that hangeth on a tree" (Gal. iii. 13), but only in the sense that the Scriptures frequently call sin the effect of sin. The curse of sin is death, for death came by sin, and whoever is made subject to death, or is in a mortal body, does so far share the effect of sin, and is cursed. Yet if sharing it without sin, he is not the object of the Divine displeasure. Thus, "God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful [that is, mortal] flesh, even of sin, condemned sin in the flesh." (Rom. viii. 3.) That is, removed the curse, or death, the effect of sin, through his resurrection, which he could not have done had he not been made in the likeness of sinful flesh, or subject to death. He did not suffer death as a punishment, but that he might destroy death by rising again, and becoming the first fruits of them that slept, the first-born of the dead, and obtaining our resurrection and triumph over death and the grave. Here was no Divine displeasure against the Son, but an excessive love of the Son for us, and of the Father, who so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son to die, that whosoever should believe in him might not perish, but have everlasting life. Nor less did the Father love the Son, for he hath highly exalted him, given him a name above every name for his humility and obedience in effecting our redemption, and hath received him into his own glory, and placed all things under his feet. The whole *Mystery of Redemption* is nothing but the manifestation of the surprising love of God to sinners and to his Son who died for them.

The objections to the orthodox doctrine urged by the author, being thus shown to be unfounded, he is bound to admit it; for he concedes that it is clearly taught in the literal sense of the Scriptures, and the rule is always to take the literal sense, unless something obliges us to take another.

The author concedes the fact and the necessity of sacrifice, and not merely such sacrifice as possibly Adam might have offered in paradise, or men may offer in a state of innocence, but such sacrifice as is demanded in the present order of things, offered on account of transgression, and designed to resanctify violated law, and to cover the breaches made by sin; that is, sacrifice designed in some way to repair the honor of the law dishonored by sin, as well as the damage done by sin in us. But sacrifice of



this sort is impossible without the propitiatory sacrifice of our Lord, and cannot be asserted without recognizing in his obedience, in his cross and passion, a satisfaction made for sin.

The author very properly concedes that the sacrifices under the old law were made on account of sin, and had reference to the honor of violated law; but he fails in his attempt to explain the true nature of sacrifice, and the mode in which it effects the purpose for which it is made. He makes sacrifice consist in offering some sacred thing to God, and tells us that its significance is, that only some sacred thing yielded by God, and by occupancy and right especially his, can serve to resanctify violated law, and cover the breaches made by sin. The sacrifices of the old law all turned, he says, on the sacredness of blood. Blood was held to be the most sacred thing yielded by God, because it was held to be the mysterious principle of life. Hence it was the most proper thing to be offered in sacrifice, and because it was so offered came the maxim, "Without the shedding of blood there is no remission of sin." This clearly proves that the author holds that the sacrifice was offered for the remission of sin, which is so far all very well. But blood, even considered as the principle of life, is not necessarily more sacred in the sacrificial sense of *sacred*, and no more God's by occupancy and right, than is every thing else he has created, for the earth is his and the fulness thereof. Life belongs to God as its author and sustainer, and so does every thing else in creation by the same title. The author puts the effect for the cause. The thing is not offered because it is sacred, but is sacred because it is offered, or rather becomes sacred in being offered. Sacrifice is making a thing sacred (from *sacrum* and *facere*), and consists not in offering a sacred thing to God, but in making a thing sacred by offering it to God; that is, in separating it entirely from its ordinary uses and devoting it especially and exclusively to God, to testify his supreme dominion, by way of satisfying his majesty dishonored by sin, rendering him supreme homage, giving him thanks, and impetrating his favors or his gracious assistance. The reason why blood was offered was not because blood was the most sacred thing known, but because, in all the sacrifices under the law, there was a remembrance of sin, and the offering of blood signified that the life of the sinner was

forfeited to God, and he had in strict justice no longer the right to appropriate it to the ordinary uses for which life is bestowed; that is, life itself was in justice sequestered from the purposes for which it was originally given, separated, made sacred, or accursed, as the penalty of transgression. This is wherefore the destruction of the victim, as to all its ordinary or human uses, was essential to the consummation of the sacrifice. Hence the bloody sacrifices, not only of the Jews, but also of the heathen, bear witness to the tradition of the fall of man, and the terrible penalty incurred by sin, — “In what day soever thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt die the death.” They bear witness, also, to a promise and a hope of redemption through vicarious satisfaction; for the life of the sinner is sacrificed only vicariously, — not his own life is offered for his sins, but the life of another, and of one not a sinner.

Now it is certain that we have nothing in our own right as God's creatures that we can offer in sacrifice that will be a sacrifice of reparation, or that will tend in any way to resanctify the law violated by our sins, for the sacrifice of our own life would be simply an infliction of the penalty of death. The animals offered in sacrifice were not in themselves real sacrifices, and the shedding of their blood could in no sense vindicate the majesty of the law, could in no sense make it honorable, for they were wholly disjoined from the sinner, had no communion of nature with him, and in dying yielded no obedience to the law. They could be only symbolical or figurative sacrifices, needing a substantial sacrifice, which they were not, in order to have any sacrificial value. And hence St. Paul denominates them figures, types, or shadows of the one sacrifice of our Lord. Sacrifices in a state of innocence are, perhaps, conceivable, but sacrifices in such a state cannot be sacrifices in the Christian sense, nor in any sense applicable in the present order of things; for we are not born in a state of innocence. Through the prevarication of Adam, we are all born under sin, and sacrifices must in some way be reparatory of the honor of the law, and remove the disability of sin, before they can be acceptable to God as latic, eucharistic, or impetrative sacrifices. We do not mean to say that we can perform in our fallen state no actions not sinful, till the Divine justice is actually satisfied in us for the sin under which we are born, for that is not true. Not all

the works of unbelievers are sin. Men are not born with a totally depraved nature. They have not lost by the Fall reason and free will, nor any of the essential faculties of human nature. By the Fall man lost original justice, in which Adam was supernaturally constituted, with the integrity of his nature, and was turned away in his nature from God, passed under the dominion of Satan, and became darkened in his understanding and attenuated in his will; but his nature, as pure nature, *seclusa ratione culpæ*, is still substantially what it was before the prevarication of Adam, and he may still by actual grace perform acts which are not sinful, which are in some sense good and even meritorious in the natural order, though not meritorious in regard to everlasting life, or in the supernatural order, in which lies our real and only true destiny, since, strictly speaking, we have *in hac providentia* no natural destiny. What we mean, then, is, that we must be liberated from the curse of sin, before we can render unto God in the present order an acceptable worship, and therefore must be able to offer a sacrifice of propitiation before we can offer an acceptable sacrifice of homage, thanksgiving, or impetration. "The victims of the wicked are abominable to the Lord; the vows of the just are acceptable." (Prov. xv. 8.)

Sacrifices, of course, are not alone for propitiation, but sacrifices in the present order must always have a propitiatory character, and in some way liberate from sin. And hence they are always assumed to have this character, whether among the Jews or among the heathen. They are undeniably presented under this character in the Holy Scriptures, and the author implies it, by expressly connecting sacrifice with the remission of sins. Now sacrifices under this character, no mere creature, whether man or angel, can offer, for all the creature has or can offer is only sufficient to fulfil the law, and to save him from being guilty before it. Yet sacrifices in this sense are plainly possible. The sacrifices under the old law were sacrifices, and were expressly enjoined by God himself, as the author clearly allows. But whence became they sacrifices? Whence did they derive their sacrificial virtue? Whence do we derive our ability to offer real sacrifices to God?

Undeniably, we derive this ability only from the one sacrifice of Christ, for none but he ever could offer a sacri-

fice the value of which could be applied to repairing the honor of broken law, or to covering the breaches made by sin. He could offer such sacrifice, on the principle and for the reasons we have assigned in proving that he could make satisfaction for sin. The sacrifices under the old law not being in themselves sacrifices, they could be sacrifices only by virtue of a real and absolute sacrifice; and we not being able to offer any thing of our own, unless something made ours by supernatural gift, can offer them only in so far as they participate of the merit of a sacrifice offered by one who is competent to offer a sacrifice that is intrinsically and absolutely a sacrifice. No one but he who is at once God and man in the unity of one Divine person can offer such a sacrifice, and consequently our Lord, who is and who alone is at once God and man in one Divine person, alone could offer a real sacrifice of the character we are considering, and therefore all other sacrifices of the same sort can be sacrifices only by virtue of his one sacrifice, by which he has for ever perfected them that are sanctified.

But how could the sacrifices of the old law, and how can our sacrifices, derive their sacrificial virtue from the sacrifice of Christ? Nothing is more evident from the Scriptures than that sacrifices in the present order, in so far as they enter into the worship of God, whether propitiatory, latic, eucharistic, or impetrative, do derive all their virtue from his sacrifice, for we are not sufficient to think any thing of ourselves as of ourselves; our sufficiency is from God, through Christ (2 Cor. iii. 5), who expressly declares that without him we can do nothing (St. John xv. 5). How, we repeat, can our own sacrifices, or those of the old law, become sacrifices by virtue of his? Certainly, only on condition that his was offered for us; that is, that he, not needing the infinite value of his sacrifice for himself, since he was without sin, offers it to God for us, or, what is the same thing, makes it over to us to be offered by us in sacrifice for our sins. To offer it to God for us, or to make it over to us to be offered by us, is only offering it in satisfaction for us. Consequently, it follows that sacrifices in the present order, even of the sort the author concedes, if he understands himself, are and were possible only on condition that Christ offered himself a propitiation for the sins of mankind, and by the merits of his sacrifice made satis-



faction for them. Supposing him to have done so, then, as referred to him and as signifying his sacrifice, the sacrifices of the old law were truly sacrifices, acceptable to God; and every act of self-denial, mortification, or alms-deeds of ours becomes a true sacrifice by virtue of his one sacrifice of himself offered on the cross and perpetuated in the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. Hence, in Christ we can do what the Apostle beseeches us to do, "present our bodies a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing to God," (Rom. xii. 1.) and it becomes literally true that "a sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit." (Ps. l. 17.)

No one who carefully studies the Scriptures, especially the Epistle of St. Paul to the Hebrews, can fail to perceive that they fully warrant this view, and can be reconciled with no other. It is necessarily implied in the priesthood of Christ. Christ is a priest, our high-priest, and he abideth a priest for ever after the order of Melchisedech. But the especial function of a priest is to offer sacrifice, and there is no more a priest without a sacrifice, than there is a sacrifice without a victim. "Every high-priest is appointed to offer gifts and sacrifices; wherefore it was necessary that he [Christ] should have something to offer." (Heb. viii. 3.) Christ was both priest and victim, and what he had to offer, and what he offered, was himself. "Christ hath loved us, and hath delivered himself for us, an oblation and a sacrifice to God, for an odor of sweetness." (Eph. v. 2.) A priest is a mediator between God and men, and though men who are priests are obliged to offer for their own sins, as well as for the sins of the people, yet he who is the true high-priest, the source of all sacerdotal virtue, needs not to offer for himself, for he is without sin, and offers for the people only. "For it was fitting that we should have such an high-priest, holy, innocent, undefiled, separated from sinners, and made higher than the heavens; who needeth not daily, as other priests, first to offer sacrifices for his own sins, and then for the people's; for this he did once by offering up himself." (Heb. vii. 26, 27.) The sacrifice is plainly propitiatory, and is offered in satisfaction for sin. "For if the blood of goats and of oxen, and the ashes of a heifer, being sprinkled, sanctify such as are defiled to the cleansing of the flesh, how much more shall the blood of Christ, who, through the Holy Ghost, offered himself without spot to

God, cleanse our conscience from dead works, to serve the living God." (Heb. ix. 13, 14.)

It is only on the principle, that all sacrificial merit in the Christian order flows from the one sacrifice of Christ, that the reasoning of the Apostle concerning the sacrifices of the old law becomes either intelligible or pertinent. These sacrifices were appointed by God himself, but in themselves they had no virtue to cleanse the conscience; "For it is impossible that with the blood of oxen and goats sins should be taken away." (Heb. x. 4.) Yet they had a shadow of good things to come, and as a shadow implies a substance, they implied the sacrifice of Christ as their substance, as the substantial or real sacrifice which they foreshadowed, and without which they could be no real sacrifice. The Apostle plainly teaches that what was wanting in them was supplied by the one offering of Christ. "And every priest, indeed, standeth daily ministering, and often offering the same sacrifices, which can never take away sins; but he, offering one sacrifice for sins, for ever sitteth at the right hand of God, . . . . for by one oblation he hath for ever perfected them that are sanctified." (Heb. x. 11-14.) That this has reference to saints before as well as since his coming, is evident from what the Apostle says farther on, in a passage which we have already cited: "And all these [the patriarchs, and the saints under the old law] being approved by the testimony of faith, [that is, by the testimony they bore to the faith, or to the coming, of Christ, and salvation through him,] received not the promise, [the real sacrifice not having as yet been actually offered save in the prescience and decree of God,] God having provided something better for us, that they should not be perfected without us," (Heb. xi. 39, 40,) plainly implying that with us, or by the sacrifice of Christ which is now offered, and which we have, and which they had only in promise, they should be made perfect, for it gives reality to their sacrifices, and completes or fulfils them.

It is idle, after this reasoning, if we admit the authority of the Apostle, to deny that Christ offered a real propitiatory sacrifice, made by his obedience, his cross and passion, a real satisfaction for sin, and to assert that he removes our sins only on æsthetic principles, by the mere tragic display of his passion and death. The author in so doing loses the whole force of the Apostle's reasoning. The sacri-

fices under the old law did cleanse by way of satisfaction from defilements of the flesh contracted under the law ; if they could do that, "how much more," asks the Apostle, "shall the blood of Christ, who, through the Holy Ghost, offered himself without spot to God, cleanse our *conscience* from dead works, [that is, from sin,] to serve the living God?" There would be no analogy in the case, and no place for the *a fortiori* of the Apostle, if the sacrifice of Christ did not cleanse from sin by way of satisfaction. On the author's theory, the sacrifices under the law could take away sins, in the same sense, though not in the same degree, perhaps, that the sacrifice of Christ takes them away ; but this the Apostle denies, and declares that, in the sense in which he represents Christ's sacrifice of himself as taking away sin, "it is impossible that with the blood of oxen and goats sins should be taken away." If the Apostle was right, Dr. Bushnell is undeniably wrong, and ought to give up his æsthetic theory, and return to the orthodox doctrine of redemption.

Taking the view we have presented, it is easy to understand that the sacrifice of Christ was infinitely meritorious, in satisfying for our sins, and in procuring us grace to rise from sin and to walk in newness of life. We see, also, that all merit, in the Christian order, comes from Christ, that we have no merit of our own, that we merit only in his merit, and are saved by his justice and sanctity, not by our own,—the great truth which the author's Calvinistic friends and their Jansenistic allies so strenuously assert, and which they so seldom fail to abuse. Christ is the great fountain of merit, and is "made unto us from God wisdom, and justice, and sanctification, and redemption." (1 Cor. i. 30.)

But this can be true only in the orthodox sense. Christ satisfied and merits for us by his obedience, not simply by his suffering and dying on the cross. The cross stands for redemption, not because it was the mere death of Christ that redeems us, but because on it was consummated his obedience. "He humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death, even the death of the cross." What satisfies is not the death, but the infinite merits of the obedience of which submission to death was the last crowning act. "For as by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners, so also by the obedience of one shall many be made just."

(Rom. v. 19.) But merit is of a personal nature, and not transferable; how, then, can the merits of Christ's obedience become ours, or we merit in his merit? Christ was constituted, as we have seen, and as the Scriptures plainly declare, our spiritual Head, and he was obedient, offered himself for us, as our Head, and only as our Head, not merely as an individual man, and his merits, which, considered in their intrinsic value are amply sufficient and even superabundant for all men, can avail us only as they become ours; and they can become ours only on condition of our being mystically united to him as his living members. We are redeemed, sanctified, only in him, that is, only as we are in him, and merit in his merits, as the members are in, and merit in the merit of, their head. If we are out of him, sundered from him, and are not made, through the efficient operations of his grace in us, one with him, there is no connection between his merits and ours, but, as it were, a chasm between him and us, across which his merits cannot flow to us, and become ours. Hence the dogma of faith, *Extra Ecclesiam, nullus salus*, — Out of the Church, no salvation, — a dogma which many hold to be unreasonable, but which could not be denied without denying the whole doctrine of redemption, and of salvation through the merits of Christ. God operates by his grace, indeed, in all men to bring them to Christ, to be mystically united to him, and no one can come to him without grace; since he says, "No man cometh to me except the Father who hath sent me draw him." (St. John vi. 44.) But it is only as so united to him in his mystical body that the merits of his obedience are, as it is termed, practically applied to us, that is, become ours; for it is only as so united that we obey in his obedience, or are crucified with him on the cross, and can offer his merits, as merits acquired by us, not individually indeed, but in our Head, in satisfaction for our sins, and plead them as the ground of our title to pardon and everlasting life; since "Christ is the head of the Church," and "the Saviour of his body"; "he loved the Church and delivered himself up for it, that he might sanctify it, cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life; that he might present it to himself a glorious church without spot or wrinkle, nor any such thing; but that it should be holy and without blemish." (Eph. v. 23-27.) Hence Christ tells us, "I am the true vine, and my Father is the

husbandman." "As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, unless it abide in the vine; so neither can you, unless ye abide in me." (St. John xv. 1-4.) But when we are thus united to him as living branches to the true vine, or as living members of a living body to its living head, his merits, acquired as our Head, are, through his free gift, infused into us individually, as the sap flows from the root through the vine to its living branches, and become the principle of our sacrifice and our charity,—of our new life and all its acts,—and we are personally justified because personally just, and we are personally just by the justice of Christ, because as real members of him we participate of the justice of our Head; and being thus just, God can justify us and still retain his justice in all its rigor. Thus are we "justified gratis by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to the showing of his justice, for the remission of past sins, through the forbearance of God, for the showing of his justice in this time; that he himself may be just and the justifier of him who is of the faith of Jesus Christ." (Rom. iii. 24-26.)

The difficulty the author feels in admitting the doctrine of satisfaction, we apprehend, grows out of his having contemplated the *Mystery of Redemption* only in the form presented by his own and kindred sects, which regard the relation of Christ to us as our Head and of ours to him as his members, as merely extrinsic, as a matter of mere outward covenant or agreement. So regarded, Christ does not and cannot make any real satisfaction for us; his merits could only be imputed to us, or reckoned to be ours, without being so in fact, and our justification through him could be only an imputed justification, without implying any inward or intrinsic justice or sanctity on our part. God does not and cannot deal in fictions of law, and does and can pronounce no man justified who is not intrinsically just in the eyes of the law. The doctrine of imputed justice, the common doctrine of the Reformers, invented to save the glory of Christ, entirely mistakes the great *Mystery of Redemption*, and reduces the new law to the level of the old, and Christ to the level of Moses, instead of making him the mediator of a better testament. Moses was the mediator of an extrinsic testament, and his sacrifices did not and could not of themselves take away sin as



pertaining to the conscience, and were only types, figures, or signs of the real and intrinsic sacrifice, which was needed and was to be made. But Christ, we are told, is the mediator of a better testament than that of Moses; and better because intrinsic, not extrinsic merely, so that justification and sanctification may in fact be one and the same thing. "For this is the testament I will make to the house of Israel after those days, saith the Lord; I will give my laws into their minds, and I will write them on their heart; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people." (Heb. viii. 10.) Hence a testament that effects the justice of the sinner while it justifies him before the law, which the sacrifices of the old law could not do.

Here is the truth the Mercersburg Reviewer so strenuously contends for, and which, singularly enough, he accuses the Church of denying, although it is well known that she has always asserted it, and condemns the Reformers, in condemning their doctrine of imputed justice, its contradictory, for denying it. The original pretence of the Reformers for separating from the Church was that she held it, and our Mercersburg friend, having discovered its importance, does not do well to charge us with denying it, and claiming it as the great and essential doctrine of the Reformation. This is at once to bear false witness and to be guilty of the attempt to commit robbery. The doctrine is a truth essential in Catholic faith and theology, and after we have been abused by the whole Protestant world, during three hundred years and over, for holding it, we cannot now consent to be robbed of the honor of having held it, and declared to have rejected the Gospel on the grounds of our not having held it. The Reviewer has well seen that Christ's obedience can satisfy for us, and his merits become ours, only by virtue of our real, living union with Christ as our Head, what the Church has always told him, but, having no infallible guide in matters of faith, he exaggerates the union, makes it hypostatic, asserts that every believer bears to the Divine Word the same relation which subsists between the Word and the human nature he assumed in the womb of the Blessed Virgin, which is to fall into a sort of Christian pantheism, the grand error of our author, and of a large class of German neologists. The union is mystical, not hypostatic, and is effected, not by way of the emanation of Christ, but by the efficient op-

erations of his grace in us, by which he *creates* us anew in him, or by which he begets us unto himself, generates his own life in us, and through it transmits to us his merits.

The author may here see that the two views of Christianity he insists upon can coalesce more really than on his hypothesis, without denying, but by asserting, the objective reality of what he calls the objective form of Christianity. What he wants to maintain is, that Christ actually redeems only in sanctifying us, that the redemption becomes effectual in us only inasmuch as it removes our sins and renders us intrinsically just; and this on the orthodox doctrine is actually the case, and hence, though his merits are always declared to be sufficient and even superabundant for all mankind, none are represented as ever really participating of them but those who are living members of Christ, because it is only *in* him as our Head that we merit, satisfy, or are saved. No man has ever any occasion to be heterodox in order to assert truth, for there is no truth not amply provided for in orthodox theology.

In the orthodox view we have presented, we may see the wonderful wisdom and goodness of God, who not only redeems us from sin through Christ, but gives us the power to render every one of our acts a sacrifice well pleasing in his sight, by enabling us, through a mystic union with Christ, to participate of the infinite merits of Christ's one sacrifice, which was offered in a bloody manner on Calvary, and is perpetuated in an unbloody manner upon our altars, — whether regarded as a propitiatory or a latic, a eucharistic or an impetrative sacrifice, — and of the infinite merits of his most perfect obedience, freely given us through grace operating efficiently in us. On the score of mere magnificence, this somewhat surpasses the author's æsthetic scheme; and to even untutored reason must appear far more worthy of the Divine interposition for the salvation of men. If joined to Christ, through his mystic body, by faith, hope, and charity, we share his infinite merits, and the gift of even a cup of cold water in the name of Christ is sufficient to entitle us to the infinite reward of heaven. What dignity to be bestowed on man, who in himself is but a worm! What grandeur does it give to the humblest act of the humblest Christian!

ART. IV. — *Discours prononcé par M. DE MONTALEMBERT, Représentant du Peuple (Doubs) dans la Discussion du Projet de Loi tendant à ouvrir au Ministre des Finances un Crédit de 1,500,000 Francs, pour Frais de Représentation du Président de la République, Séance du 10 février, 1851. 18mo. pp. 32.*

WE always read with interest the eloquent parliamentary speeches of Count de Montalembert, for we always find in them a noble spirit, and principles becoming the Christian and the statesman; but we have read none of them with deeper interest or more pleasure than the one now before us; nor any one which has given us so strong a proof of his practical wisdom, and real independence of character. M. de Montalembert is not the man of a party; he is a Christian and a Frenchman. He himself was known to our public, in 1830, as connected with the Abbé de la Mennais, in the religious and political movement represented to some extent by *L'Avenir*, and which sought to induce the Church to accept and foster the democratic tendencies of the European populations. The movement, under some of its aspects, was noble and praiseworthy, but under others it was injudicious and revolutionary, and calculated to embroil the Church with the temporal governments, to the serious detriment of religion. It was therefore disapproved at Rome, and forthwith abandoned by M. de Montalembert, and nearly all those who had projected and sustained it, with the exception of the unhappy Abbé de la Mennais himself, who finally for his persistence incurred excommunication from the Church.

In the Chamber of Peers, of which he was an hereditary member, M. de Montalembert, under the monarchy of July, was not a Philippist nor a Legitimist, a republican nor a dynastic oppositionist, but was generally in opposition to the government, with strong sympathies with the European liberal movement. He did not oppose the Orleans dynasty, he did not advocate a republic, but he opposed the government, because it showed itself hostile to religious and civil freedom. His sympathies were with the party struggling for larger liberty, and his parliamentary labors were specially directed to obtaining the freedom of education, which was enslaved by the state through the

infidel University, established in its main features by the Convention. He may be said during this period to have represented in Parliament the Catholic party of young France.

In February, 1848, came the revolution that overthrew and exiled the Orleans dynasty, and proclaimed the French republic. M. de Montalembert was returned a member of the Constituent Assembly, or convention summoned to give France a constitution, and reëstablish social and political order. In this Assembly he took his stand, not as a republican nor as an anti-republican, not as a Legitimist nor as an anti-Legitimist, but as the advocate of order and defender of religious liberty. He saw that the first want of France was legal order, and that every attempt to found such order without a religious basis must prove abortive. Hence the freedom of the Church and the establishment of social order became his watchwords; and he proved himself ready to coöperate with any party devoted to the maintenance of order, and able and willing to recognize, as its indispensable conditions, the full freedom of the Church and of Catholic education. This position he still maintains. Without any preferences for a republic as such, he seems, now that the republican order has been proclaimed, fully disposed to accept it, to give it a fair trial, and a loyal support so long as it is able to maintain social and political order for his country. As he would never have conspired to overthrow the monarchy for the sake of introducing the republic, so he will never conspire to overthrow the republic for the sake of restoring the monarchy, either in the family of the Bourbons or in that of the Bonapartes. In the present crisis in European, and especially in French affairs, the most pressing question, he holds, lies not between one form of government and another, but between government and no government, between order and anarchy, civilization and barbarism; and any existing government, able to sustain order and provide for the wants of civilized society, ought to be loyally supported, irrespective of the claims or pretensions of particular families or individuals. Governments are instituted for the public good, and power is a sacred trust from God, not a personal right of its depositaries; and whenever these have lost it, it must be suffered to pass into other hands if the public good clearly demand it, for society is paramount to the individual.

We have, ever since we can remember, advocated, and we trust we ever shall advocate, the *jus divinum*, or government by Divine right; for we hold that under the law of nature all men are equal, and that no man, in his own name, has the right to govern another. All dominion of man over man is of the essence of despotism. All power is of God, and no power is legal save as ordained of God; and no man has any right to exercise any authority save as the vicar or delegate of Almighty God, immediately, or mediately, appointed by him to govern. Ministers may be variously appointed according to the respective constitutions of different countries; they may obtain office hereditarily, or by popular election; but always their ultimate right to govern derives from God, and they hold it only as his delegates. They are, therefore, bound to exercise it according to his will, that is, according to the laws of eternal justice. This is what we mean by the *jus divinum*, and holding this, we hold that whoso resists government in the discharge of its legal functions resists the ordinance of God, and purchases to himself damnation.

But God authorizes government and invests it with the right to govern for the public good, not for the private good of the governors, and hence power is a trust, and therefore amissible. It may be forfeited, as any other trust, for it may be abused, and it is abused, whenever it is exercised for a private end, in opposition to the public good. It may be lost, also, without the particular fault of its depositaries, by such changes in human affairs as render it impracticable or impossible for them to continue to exercise it compatibly with the peace and welfare of the public, or so as to secure the ends for which government is instituted. In France, the old public order has, by successive revolutions, been completely broken up, and the French statesman is now free, and even bound, to take that course which is most in accordance with the true interests of his country, without reference to the rights of particular families, deriving from an order which has in fact passed away. He is free to support the republic, in total forgetfulness, as it were, of the hereditary claims to reign of the Bourbons or of the Bonapartes, and ought to do so, if in the providence of God and the mutations of human things the republic has become the only practicable order, or the best practicable government for his country; for there is



a broad difference between hereditary personal rights and hereditary public trusts; between overthrowing a monarchy for the sake of establishing a republic, and supporting a republic after monarchy has been overthrown; and between struggling to sustain a monarchy that is assailed, and struggling to restore a monarchy that has fallen. The first want of France is government, and its second want is wise and efficient government, able alike to protect itself and the freedom of the subject; and the duty of the French statesman is to provide for these wants in the best and speediest manner now practicable. If they can be best provided for by monarchical restoration, royal or imperial, in the elder or the younger branch of the Bourbons, then he should labor for such restoration; if they can be best provided for by the republic, princely under Louis Napoleon, or citizen under General Cavaignac, then such republic should be accepted and supported. We regard France, since the revolution of February, as to the constitution of political power, as to a great extent thrown back under the law of nature, and as not only free, but bound, to reconstitute government in the manner best adapted to her future welfare, and the question for her to settle is, not the claims of princes, but the political constitution she needs to preserve herself from becoming a prey to the Socialists and Red Republicans, led on by Mazzini, Ledru-Rollin, and company, those conspirators-general against the rights of nations, the peace of society, and the civilization of Europe.

M. de Montalembert, in the speech before us, as we have intimated, seems disposed to accept and sustain the republic, and the republic with Louis Napoleon for its chief. He is not a Bonapartist; his sympathies are rather with the Legitimists; but he contends that Prince Louis has merited well of France and Europe, and, without committing himself for the future, he ably defends the conduct of the President thus far, and awards him the well deserved praise which many from various quarters have denied him. He concedes that the President has committed some faults, the gravest of which, however, was his ill-advised letter on Roman affairs to Colonel Edgar Ney, which he hastened immediately to repair, and which has had no grave consequences. He regrets the dismissal of General Changarnier from his important military com-

mand, but thinks it was not wholly without excuse. He also regrets the new ministerial appointments, and would seem to regard the new ministry as not likely to inspire confidence in the friends of order; but he is disposed to judge it by its acts. The President is the responsible head of his administration, and he thus far has proved himself the friend of religion, of order, of legal government, and determined to maintain internal tranquillity, peace and dignity abroad.

To appreciate the merits of the French President, we must take into consideration the very delicate and embarrassing position in which he has been placed from the first. He received it in charge to maintain the republic at home, and the influence and dignity of France abroad. When he was elected, December 10, 1848, the Convention had promulgated the constitution, — a miserable abortion, satisfactory to nobody, — and the power of the state was in the hands of the so-called moderate republican party, a feeble minority of the nation, and, whatever their good intentions, without political, and especially administrative capacity. The great majority of the French people were and are monarchists, are not and never have been republicans, and the republic proclaimed by the Parisian mob in February, 1848, could not have lived a week had it not been acquiesced in and supported by those who did not wish it, had no hand in introducing it, and no sympathy with it. It was impossible for Prince Louis to administer the government without the aid of the monarchists, for the moderate republicans were too few and too imbecile to afford him any real support; and the Red Republicans were powerful only in a work of destruction, and were the enemies alike of order at home, and of peace and just influence abroad. He must then conciliate the moderate republicans, secure the aid of the monarchists, and defy the Socialists. But if too decidedly republican, he could not count on the support of the monarchists; and if he trusted exclusively the monarchists, he might awaken monarchical hopes and prepare the way for a restoration of monarchy, to the destruction of the republic, — or for the division of the monarchical party, which would allow a triumph of the Red Republicans to the destruction of social order and the peace of Europe. Here was his great difficulty.

The solution of the difficulty depended on the fact

whether the old monarchical party, composed of Legitimists, Orleanists, and Bonapartists, had really resolved to let monarchy go, and henceforth to accept without reserve, and to support loyally, the republican order. The republicans themselves could not sustain the republic, for the Reds would soon absorb the Moderates, as in the old Revolution the Mountain absorbed the Gironde, and a Red Republic is as impracticable as undesirable. The fate of the republic was, then, in the hands of the monarchists, and would not they at the first favorable opportunity seek to restore monarchy? It was to be feared. At the time of the inauguration of the President, it is true, they seemed to have dismissed all monarchical regrets, and to be prepared to support the republic without any after-thought, and the President showed that he had no serious distrust of them, and wished to make no unfavorable distinction between them and the republicans.

Abroad matters were, if possible, still more delicate and embarrassing for a republican President of France. All Europe was divided into two hostile camps, and it was not yet decided which was the strongest. The Holy Father was in exile, and the infamous Triumvirate had established their Reign of Terror in the capital of the Christian world; the Radicals were triumphing in Tuscany; Charles Albert was preparing a second invasion of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom; Austria was maintaining an apparently doubtful contest with her Red Republican anarchists and her Magyar rebels; Central Germany was in flames; and Prussia alternated between Red Republicanism and despotism, played fast and loose with anarchy, as her sovereign was drunk or sober, was dazzled by visions of the imperial diadem or feared the loss of his hereditary crown. France held the balance, and the party into whose scale she should throw herself could not fail to preponderate, at least for the time. If she manifested any strong sympathy with the republican camp, war would blaze out all over Europe. If she did not, and if she threw her influence on the side of authority, then she would stand in the apparently contradictory light of sustaining a republic at home, and exerting herself to suppress republicanism abroad, and would have to encounter the wrath of all the disorganizers of Europe and of America.

The President does not seem to have hesitated long as

to the part he should take. He seems to have resolved to sustain the republic at all hazards, not so much because he was a republican as because he was a Frenchman, and France had had revolutions enough, and to support the party of order abroad, as the party of justice, of right, and because it was the only means of preserving the peace of Europe, alike essential to France and to the other European nations. He did not break entirely with the republicans at home, but he gave the best pledge possible to the friends of order that he was no revolutionist, that he respected the rights of sovereigns as well as of the people, and, above all, the sacred obligations of religion, by restoring, in harmony with the other Catholic powers, the Holy Father to his temporal dominions, and by expelling the miserable banditti who professed to govern the Eternal City in the name of the Roman people. He withdrew France from her false position as the head of the European anarchical propagandism, and placed her on the side of religion, of order, of legal right, and therefore on the side of liberty. From that moment the reaction against anarchy became decided, and victorious in every Continental state except Sardinia, and that too without in the least compromising the dignity or the stability of the French republic. No ordinary credit is due to the man who, without political experience, could assume the direction of the affairs of such a country as France, at such a time, with such obstacles within and without to encounter, and yet bring them to as happy an issue as they had attained to in March, 1850, and Prince Louis may henceforth without a blush call himself "the nephew of my uncle," for his uncle did nothing greater or really more glorious.

Undoubtedly, the President must divide this glory with the monarchists of France, the majority in the Assembly, for if he had had only the republican party, Red or Moderate, on which to rely, he could never have carried France and Europe through the crisis; but the larger share of the glory is unquestionably his own, as the elected chief of the French nation.

Up to March, 1850, the monarchical party seem to have been united to a man, and determined to support the republic, although they had never desired it. The greater part of them seem still determined to do so, but, unhappily, they are no longer united. The reaction against an-

archy having everywhere proved decisive, the imminent danger of Socialism having been somewhat diminished, monarchical regrets seem to have been awakened, and dreams of restoring fallen monarchy to have been indulged. A greater danger than France has yet had to meet, we fear, now awaits her, and from this very cause, for without the support of the monarchists the republic cannot stand, and hereditary monarchy, we fear, is henceforth impracticable in France.

The republicans, including both Moderates and Reds, are, no doubt, a minority, and even a small minority, of the French people. The monarchists are certainly the majority, and, if united, they could without difficulty sustain themselves against their enemies. But they are not united, and cannot be united. Three times within the last sixty years they have possessed, and three times they have lost power, through their fatal dissensions. The old French monarchy expired in 1789, when Louis the Sixteenth became, instead of king of France, a constitutional king of the French, and no human power can resuscitate it. The order instituted in 1789 by the Constituent Assembly, with a few exceptions, was the clear and spontaneous expression of the will of the French nation, including the king, the nobles, the clergy, and the people. It is worse than idle to attempt to go behind that new order, and undertake to reëstablish the throne of Saint Louis. There is nothing in the habits, the sentiments, or the institutions of the French people at the present time to sustain that throne. The feudal nobility is gone; the feudal church is gone; the distinction of ranks is abolished; and chivalry, if not extinct, has taken an entirely new direction. Sixty years of revolution have destroyed loyalty, changed habits of submission into habits of insubordination, obliterated the sense of law, of the fixed and permanent, and superinduced a morbid desire of change, an absolute impatience of all repose as of all restraint. Here is no place for the throne of Saint Louis, nor even for that of "Le Grand Monarque." We may or may not regret it, according to the temper of our minds. For our part we do regret it, as we regret all modern changes, none of which can we recognize as improvements. But while we regret it, we hope we have the good sense to conform to the inevitable necessity of things. We are not in relation to our own



country any the less loyally republican because we believe the departure from Mediæval Europe has been a deterioration instead of a progress. We seek no impracticable restorations ; we ask what here and now is our duty, and that is plainly for us to support the republican order established, here and now, alike against monarchy and against mobs.

To attempt to restore the monarchy of 1789, is as idle as to attempt the restoration of the authority of the British crown in this country. That monarchy, when it had far more of the sympathy of the nation than it now has, and was surrounded with a prestige which it now wants, could not sustain itself. As a monarchy it rested on a novel basis, and it left too much power in the democracy for a new monarchy. If the order attempted by the Constituent Assembly had been the slow and natural growth of ages, it could have sustained itself, and would have been a model government for the civilized world. Its grand defect was that it was new, a novel creation, and therefore without the power to restrain the popular impulse which had created it. The same thing will occur again, should there be an attempt to reëstablish it, though in a different sense. The monarchical impulse strong enough to restore it would not stop, and could not be stopped, with it. It would seek to give greater strength to the monarchy ; and that would exceed the sentiment of the nation, and provoke a popular reaction against it, which would cause again its overthrow. Without more power in the throne than the constitution of 1789 gave, the monarchy in these times could not sustain itself, and with more it would become odious, and would be resisted, not obeyed, and could sustain itself only by mere physical force ; and every government obliged to sustain itself by mere physical force, sooner or later inevitably falls.

The empire would stand, perhaps, a better chance ; but what chance may be learned from the fate of Napoleon. The empire fell, not solely by foreign bayonets, but through the combined opposition of the Bourbonists and the republicans, and chiefly through the opposition of the latter, — led on by Lafayette, whom the United States have far more reason than France to honor, — always powerful to destroy, always impotent to establish. The same causes which overthrew Napoleon would conspire to over-

throw anew the empire were it reëstablished in the person of his nephew. We have never known political restorations to be successful, and in France the great majority of the monarchists are not imperialists; and if they are to support a monarchy at all, it will most likely be in the family of the Bourbons. They and the republicans of all shades would unite against the empire, if reëstablished, and against the combined opposition of these it could not stand. In our judgment, France cannot again be a monarchy for any great length of time; for there will always be an opposition strong enough to overthrow it. Suppose Henry the Fifth to be crowned; the Orleanists, the imperialists, and the republicans will in a short time combine against him, and against their combined opposition he cannot stand. Suppose the Count of Paris is proclaimed under the regency of the Duc de Nemours, the imperialists, the republicans, and the Legitimists will oppose him, and he must fall. Suppose, finally, that Prince Louis is proclaimed Emperor, the Legitimists, Orleanists, and republicans, especially all the republicans not bribed with office or title, after a little, will unite to oppose him, and his fall become inevitable. Hereditary monarchy, owing to the rooted divisions in the monarchical party, we therefore believe, whether desirable or not, is henceforth impracticable in France, and such is apparently the conviction of a very considerable portion of the monarchists themselves.

We do not profess to be very well versed in French politics, and things change in France so rapidly that a judgment sound at the time we are writing may be unsound before we go to press; but looking calmly at French affairs from this distance, and with such lights as we have, it strikes us that the true policy of the monarchists is to abandon all monarchical regrets, all thoughts of restoring fallen monarchy, and to accept, loyally, without reticence or after-thought, the republican as the definitive political order for their beautiful country. We do not say this as a republican, as one who holds that the republican order, abstractly considered, is preferable to monarchy, but we say it because we believe it now the only practicable order for France. We are for ourselves no fanatical democrats, no republican propagandists, and it was with no pleasure that we heard of the French revolution of February, 1848. We are no more attached to one form of government, ab-

stractly considered, than to another. Perhaps, living as we do under a republic, and, like most people, more impressed by the evils we experience than by those we are ignorant of, we are disposed to underrate the advantages of a popular government, and to think too favorably of monarchy. However this may be, we are sure that, if we have prejudices, they are not republican prejudices. Moreover, government is never an abstract question, and we have never asked ourselves which, abstractly considered, is the best form of government. Government is a thing of practice, not of speculation; and that is the best form which is best adapted to the people who are to live under it. Despotism, whether monarchical or democratic, we detest; but a republican order such as our fathers established here, but which our people are doing their best to revolutionize, we believe the best form of government for us, but we believe it, by way of example, a bad government for Mexico,—not because we are more or less enlightened than the Mexicans, but because government must be to a great extent a matter of routine, and republicanism is congenial to our habits and is not to theirs. We do not pretend that republicanism is better for France than monarchy would be, if practicable; nay, we do not believe it so good, and we think it a great calamity for her that she has abolished monarchy, and rendered its permanent reestablishment henceforth a vain attempt. But a republic is practicable, if the monarchists choose to make it so, and France can live and prosper under it, provided that its constitution and management are not left to those who conspired to introduce it.

There is wisdom as well as point in a remark once made by the late Chief Justice Parsons, that "The young man who is not a democrat is a knave, the old man who is, is a fool." We have no confidence in the statesman who is a democrat in principle, for pure democracy is only pure despotism, as we are in this country beginning to experience. The men who can make a revolution for the sake of introducing a popular form of government, can never safely be intrusted with its administration. Our government owes its success not to the democracy of the country, for that is ruining it; but to the fact that it was established, and for the first twelve years of its existence administered, by men who had no democratic sympathies,

who were not in their personal preferences even republican, but who yet gave the republic a loyal support, because they saw that it was for us the only practicable government, except sheer despotism.

We would not speak lightly of the genuine republican party in France, but having studied their history with some care from the time of Henry the Second,—for it is not a party of recent origin,—and witnessed their disastrous influence on their own country, as well as on other nations, we must be pardoned for saying that we have no confidence either in their integrity or in their capacity,—except for destruction. They are destitute alike of practical wisdom and loyal dispositions. They are moved, not by love of liberty, but by hatred of restraint. What they want is not the freedom and prosperity of France, but power to govern her, and they will be, with some honorable exceptions, the enemies of every government which they do not govern. No real dependence can be placed on them in or out of office, and the greatest of all conceivable calamities for France would be to give up the republic to their management, and this whether they are Moderates or Reds; for the difference between the two classes is not one of principle, and consists simply in the fact that the Reds are good and the Moderates bad logicians. The Reds draw boldly the logical consequences of the principles which they and the Moderates hold in common. They say at once two and two make four, while the Moderates stop short, and stammer out two and two make — *three*, persuading themselves that the poor people will not see that two and two make three and *one more*. The republicans have clamored for the republic, and have finally got it. Let them have it. They wanted it because they trusted, if they got it, they could manage it, and control the destinies of France; in that let them be disappointed. Let them have the republic and share equally whatever advantages it secures, but do not let them be its chiefs.

The republic has thus far been sustained by the men who did not want it, and, if sustained at all, it must continue to be sustained by them. But if they are to do this, they must accept it in good faith, must really resolve to live and die by it, and, if need be, for it. Legitimists, Orleanists, and imperialists must give their united support to the republic, as they did up to the 31st of March, 1850, and

by so doing they can save it from being strangled by its unnatural parents. To do this requires no sacrifice of principle, no change of political creeds; it only requires a little of that chivalry in which French monarchists always abound, and of that readiness to devote themselves to the best interest of their country, in which they ought never to be found deficient. They are not only the majority, but they are the *pars sanior et potior* of France, and the only danger France can run must come either from their standing aloof from public affairs, or from their dividing their influence by movements designed to prepare the way for a new monarchical, royalist or imperial, restoration. France wants repose; she wants time for her numerous wounds to heal, time to recover habits of order and subordination, for the growth of loyalty, and the love of order,—time for a new generation to spring up, trained under better influences than have heretofore prevailed. She needs to feel that sixty years is as much time as any nation can afford to throw away in revolutions or uncertain experiments for the organization of power, and that she must contemplate no new revolution; that the order now established, whether the best or not the best possible, must be final, in order that an end may be put alike to criminal hopes and utopian dreams. The monarchists have it in their power to make her so feel; and to do it, they have only to persevere as they commenced, the day after the revolution of February.

The monarchists have nothing to lose by supporting the republic. They have proved this during the last two years. The revolution of 1789 swept away nearly all the privileges of the old French aristocracy, and introduced equality before the laws; the revolution of 1830 abolished the hereditary peerage, and nothing would remain to the old noblesse, even if monarchy were restored, but empty titles and the memory of the glorious deeds of their illustrious ancestors. These they may retain equally under the republic, and as for distinction, they have shown and are now showing that they can secure that even under universal suffrage. Before the revolution, the republicans talked as if they monopolized all the wisdom and virtue of France, and half persuaded themselves that, under a *régime* of universal suffrage, the monarchists would be nobody. The result must have disappointed them, though



it has disappointed nobody else. In the struggle, man to man, the monarchists have maintained their former superiority over the republicans. They saved the republic from being devoured by its authors; they took it under their protection, and have rendered it powerful and respectable; they have maintained internal tranquillity and peace, and dignity abroad. With the single exception of General Cavaignac, who is a brave officer and a very worthy man, not a single republican has, so far as we can discover at this distance, honorably distinguished himself under the republic. All who have tried to be leaders, and to become great men, have failed, miserably failed. Of the men who made the republic, not one has proved himself competent to its management, and most of them are now in exile or forgotten. In the assembly, in the cabinet, in the army, in the diplomatic corps, the great men are they who were the great men under the monarchy, and who, whatever their errors, were never identified with the republican party. The republic has wellnigh extinguished the republicans. Who hears now-a-days of Lamartine, Arago, Marie, Marast, Cremieux, Garnier-Pages, the more respectable part of the provisional government and its supporters? And who would hear of Ledru-Rollin, Louis Blanc, Caussidière, Blanqui, and their compeers, were they not in exile, intriguing with the madmen of Europe against society itself? The monarchists have maintained, and must continue to maintain, their superiority, and retain the lead in affairs, unless they weaken their strength by division, or by attempting what seems to us an impracticable restoration, that is, impracticable as a permanent and peaceful order.

Assuming that the republic, and we mean a republic of order, not a republic democratic and social, which would be only an organized anarchy, is in the present juncture desirable for France, and to be maintained, the true policy of the French statesman cannot be doubtful. It is, first of all, to prevent the election as its chief of a man whose convictions and sympathies are with the old republican party. We have a very high regard for General Cavaignac, but we should deprecate his election as the successor of Prince Louis Napoleon. He must be elected, if at all, not as the representative of France, of the French nation, but as the representative of the republican party, a feeble minority

of the French people. He will be elected, no doubt, if elected, as a Moderate Republican; but that makes little difference. He will not be able to command the confidence of the monarchical party, and will be obliged to strengthen himself by concessions to the Reds, which will only place the republic on the declivity to anarchy. There is no radical difference between a Moderate Republican and a Red Republican, and all history proves, that, of two branches of the same family, the more consistent will always be the more energetic, and being the more energetic, will, in the long run, be the ruling branch. We do not distrust the honorable intentions of the distinguished general who so nobly defended France in the terrible days of June, 1848, but he and Ledru-Rollin adopt the same political premises, and Ledru-Rollin draws, if more fatal, at the same time more logical consequences from them. We can give a republic a loyal support, but we detest the modern republican theory of government, whether Moderate or Red. It is the modern republican, or rather democratic, theory of government, namely, the sovereignty of the people, that is false and dangerous, not a republican government itself. The monarchists of France can accept the republic, and will, if they accept it at all, without accepting the modern democratic theory; but the republican party cannot. Hence, in the hands of the former a republican government may be a good government, as in many countries it is the best possible government; but in the hands of the latter it must always be a bad government, because their principles in their logical development are repugnant to all government. General Cavaignac's election, in our judgment, would be the doom of the republic, and plunge France anew into all the horrors of civil war, because it would be the attempt to install a political doctrine which the majority of the French nation do and will repudiate, and which no civilized nation can safely tolerate.

All government, practically considered, is founded more or less on compromise, and no government can stand in France that attempts to exclude any of the great parties now existing. There must be a compromise of some sort, and that compromise must be honorable to all parties. The monarchical party cannot abandon its principles, and ought not to do so, though it may perhaps give up some of its prejudices, and the republicans cannot be

expected to become monarchists. A compromise such as M. Guizot proposes, which recognizes the hereditary monarchy and aristocracy on one side, and the democratic principle on the other, is impracticable, because it introduces into the fundamental organization of the state two hostile and eternally irreconcilable principles. This illustrious statesman seems to us to have been misled by his eclecticism, and also to have mistaken the real theory of the British constitution, which he appears to adopt as his model. The monarchical and aristocratic principle is preserved in the king and the House of Peers, it is true; but the basis of the House of Commons is not democracy, or the sovereignty of the people. The British government in its theory — we say nothing of what it is becoming in practice — is a government of estates, and the House of Commons represents, not the sovereign people of Great Britain simply restricted in their power by king and Lords, but an estate, the Commons, as its very name implies. This government of estates since 1789 has become impracticable in France, for then the estates were abolished, and the *Tiers-État* declared to be the nation. Here was the grand error of 1789. The Constituent, instead of abolishing the estates, should have preserved, reformed, and perfected them, and provided for their regular assembling in parliament; but it is too late to attempt this now.

Checks and balances, as they are called, are undoubtedly necessary in a government, and without them every government is a despotism; but no government can stand if organized on two fundamentally irreconcilable principles. This dualism is as objectionable in politics as in religion; and its objectionable character in the latter is strikingly displayed by the whole history of Protestantism. Diversity may be introduced into the organization, and must be, but it must be a diversity with unity for its basis. The compromise that is required cannot be a compromise of principle, but must take place in a sphere that leaves to each party for itself its own principles, and therefore must be a compromise in the order of facts, not in the order of principles. The monarchists can without any compromise of principle accept and support a republican form of government for France, as they have done for the last three years. The republicans can of course do the same. The compromise must be, then, for each to support the republic

as a fact, and as a legal fact, the monarchist foregoing the attempt to carry out into fact his monarchical preferences, and the republican forbearing to attempt to make the republic the embodiment of his theory of popular sovereignty, not necessary to the establishment or free and salutary working of the republic, and necessary at all only as a condition of revolutionizing or overthrowing it. The monarchists must concede the republicans the republican form of government, and with that the republicans must be satisfied, although the republic be not founded on their doctrine of the "sacred right of insurrection," and they must be held, and, if need be, forced to obey it, as they were to obey the monarchy. This is the only compromise that can be honorably made. The monarchists give up monarchy for the sake of peace, and the republicans get what they pretended to want, a republic, and must in turn give up the attempt to realize anarchical theories. But as they will never do this willingly, they must be compelled to do it, and till they are completely subdued, they must not be intrusted with power, although the particular individual they put forward as a candidate for popular suffrage should be personally unexceptionable.

We hope our friends in France will not deem us impatient in these remarks, or if we express our conviction that their aim should be to preserve, for the present at least, the princely republic: for we fear that, if any other than Louis Napoleon is chosen as its chief at the next presidential election, disastrous consequences will follow. If it is resolved to maintain the republican order, it will be exceedingly dangerous to change the person of its present chief before it is more perfectly consolidated. We have no prejudices in favor of the Bonapartists, and what prejudices we have are on the side of the Legitimists. Our own political principles would lead us to wish Henry the Fifth to be king, — to wish the reestablishment of legitimate royalty in France, — if we believed the thing practicable; but we go on the supposition that that is impracticable, and that the long line of the kings of France and kings of the French ended with Louis Philippe. On this supposition, Louis Napoleon seems to us now, even more than in 1848, the most proper person for president of the republic. He may have had visions of an imperial restoration, but if so, he appears to entertain them no longer.

As far as we can discover from his messages, and, what is more to the purpose, his acts, he has accepted the republic in good faith, with a firm resolution, so far as depends on him, to render it successful. He has nobly redeemed the promises he made on assuming the reins of government, and has manifested eminent ability as well as loyal intentions; and if now and then we have discovered a Gallican reminiscence in his administration, he has as yet been found on the side of religion, and been surpassed by no sovereign in Europe in yielding what is due to the Church, or in his respect and submission to the Holy See.

The revolutions of 1848 had even more at heart the destruction of the Church than the abolition of monarchy, and the loud wail that is heard over the fall of Mazzini and his Roman republic is far more anti-Catholic than anti-monarchical. But these revolutions have been overruled and made to redound to the glory of the Church against whom they were chiefly designed, and in no country more so than in France. Never since Charlemagne has the Church in France been more free than under the administration of Louis Napoleon. The legitimate kings of France seldom permitted the Church in their dominions to manage her own affairs in her own way, and their ostentatious protection of her was often, nay, generally, only her enslavement to the temporal power. Not under the empire certainly, not under Louis the Eighteenth, not under Charles the Tenth, nor under Louis Philippe, was there any thing approaching the respect to the Church by the government that has been paid her by the republic, since the terrible days of June, 1848. It may be policy on the part of the President, but if so it is a wise and just policy, and such as marks the Christian statesman. But we believe it something more than policy, and we are not surprised that a man whose life has been checkered like that of Louis Bonaparte, and the greater part of which has been passed in exile or in prison, should feel the need of religion for his own support, as well as for the support of the state. He has shown his respect for religion, not only in his relations with the Holy See, but in the support he has given to the law on instruction, a concession to the Church, not indeed of all that her friends had the right to demand, but of more than any other modern government has conceded, unless it be that of the young Emperor of



Austria, and more than under the late monarchy any friend of the freedom of education from the University monopoly ever thought of asking, and perhaps as much as, in the present state of things, it is prudent to concede. Moderation in removing abuses is necessary lest the attempted reform fail, and matters be made worse than before.

The Catholic party in France, it strikes us, should ask themselves very seriously whether religion is not now doing well, and whether it would not be more likely to lose than to gain by the restoration of monarchy, with its old Gallican traditions, — traditions which no government will surrender unless forced to do so in order to sustain itself, and which no Bourbon on the throne of France can be forced to surrender, so long as a large minority of France are not Catholic, and a large majority of her statesmen, as statesmen are prone to be, are Gallican. In a country where the majority are Catholics, the government, if it rests on popular suffrage, will be pretty sure to respect the freedom of the Church. A republican government, accepted and supported by the majority, will hardly oppress, for it will have little motive to oppress, the religion of the majority. It was, therefore, with great pleasure that we saw the bishops and clergy of France expressing, with singular frankness and unanimity, their adhesion to the republic. The Church is doing well now, and her friends have comparatively little to complain of, — less than almost everywhere else. Will they have less under a king who will study only to enlarge the sphere of the temporal at the expense of the spiritual authority? Why, then, seek a change? Why run the risk of losing what is obtained, in the uncertain attempt to get more? We hear good accounts of the Count de Chambord, and we doubt not his good intentions; but he is heir to the prejudices and traditions, as well as to the rights, of his family, and the promises of a prince in exile are not precisely the acts of a king firmly seated upon his throne.

The difficulty in the way of the reëlection of Prince Napoleon is that the constitution renders him ineligible for a second term, till after an interval of some years; but there is time enough to amend the constitution, and it ought to be amended in that particular, or at least so as to prolong the term of office beyond three years, to eight or ten. Our experience in the United States may not be in favor of re-

eligibility, but it proves clearly that four years are too short a term for a president to adopt and consolidate any policy, and that a change of administration every four years must very soon unsettle every thing. The restriction in the French constitution, as well as the short term of office ordained by ours, betrays the insane jealousy, inherited from the old English Whigs, which is entertained by modern republicans of the executive power. No government is good for any thing without an efficient executive, and where, as in France, the executive is responsible, and is restricted in great part to the execution of laws made by an independent legislature, elected for a short term of years, the power of the executive is more likely to be too little than too great. Moreover, no large and populous country can long survive the repeated shocks which it must receive from the election of a president with extensive patronage every four years. If we do not lengthen the presidential term to eight or ten years, we Americans shall soon find the whole political business of the country resolving itself, directly or indirectly, into president-making. No harm can come, but great good must surely come, to France from amending her constitution so as to prolong to eight or ten years the presidential term of office; and she can now do it, though after a few years she will find it for ever too late.

We are aware that some of our French friends object to prolonging the term of office of the present incumbent, lest he attempt to get himself proclaimed emperor. But is this fear warranted? Is it generous? Louis Napoleon has disclaimed all pretensions as the heir of his uncle; he has sworn to maintain the republican constitution; and it is an undeniable fact, that he has thus far observed with scrupulous fidelity his oath of office, and has labored to protect the republic alike against the anarchical attempts of the Socialists, and the movements of the royalists for a restoration of fallen monarchy. What right has any one to distrust his intentions? For our part, we believe him resolved to support the republic, and we would rather trust the fate of France in his hands, with legislative power in the hands of the party of order, than, in the present state of opinion, to run the risk of a change in any direction.

But it is time to close. It may be said, that, in the whole of this article, we have been volunteering opinions

on matters which only remotely concern us, and on which we can, of course, have only imperfect information. We cannot deny that there is truth in the charge; but the opinion of a disinterested foreigner, who takes a deep interest in French politics, who has no republican prejudices, although a supporter of republican government, and who looks at all political questions mainly in their bearing on religion and morals, perhaps may not be wholly without interest, nor wholly destitute of value, to French statesmen. We offer them in no intermeddlesome spirit, and in no arrogant tone, though we freely and frankly express them. France is the great central power of Europe, and, with the exception of Austria, the only great European power to which the Catholic in other countries can turn with affection and hope. Austria has done and is doing well, and the present emperor bids fair to give additional lustre to the illustrious house of Hapsburg, besides removing the stain from its escutcheon caused by the half-insane Joseph the Second. But France exerts, and must continue to exert, a powerful influence on all Southern and Western Europe, and on our own country in particular. She is as it were the missionary nation of the world, and it is not a matter of indifference to other nations whether she preaches the true Gospel, or another. Her doctrines have immense weight in England; they reign supreme in this country; Germany reaches us only through France, and from France we import not only our fashions, but our tastes, our principles, our ideas, our philosophy, and our literature. In France is the fountain whose streams flow either to fertilize or to deluge our land. This must be our apology for venturing to speak of French politics very much as if they were our own. We have spoken kindly, in love of that beautiful country, with which, though we have never seen it, we have so many pleasing associations, and whose literature has had more to do in forming our mind and taste than that of our own mother tongue. With our mother's milk we drew in a love of France, and we were early taught to be grateful to her for the generous aid she lent our own beloved country in her struggle to become a free and independent nation; and may God bless thee, beautiful France! and give thee, after thy long struggle, the freedom, the order, the peace, and the repose, thy heart so much needeth.

ART. V.—*The Chief Sins of the People: a Sermon delivered at the Melodeon, Boston, on Fast Day, April 10, 1851.* By REV. THEODORE PARKER. Boston: Benjamin H. Greene. 1851. 8vo. pp. 40.

THIS singular sermon was called forth under the excitement occasioned by the arrest in this city, last April, of a fugitive slave, named Sims, and the determination to give him up to his owner in Savannah, Georgia. Two attempts had been previously made here to execute the recently amended Fugitive Slave Law, but without success. In the first case, that of Crafts and his wife, the officers did not succeed in making an arrest, and the fugitives, it is supposed, were shipped off by their Free Soil or Abolition friends to England; in the second case, that of Shadrach, an arrest was, indeed, made, but the fugitive was rescued from the custody of the United States Marshal by a mob, and probably made his escape to Canada. In the case of Sims, better precautions had been taken against a rescue by a mob, whether black or white, and on the day this sermon was preached, it was highly probable that the law would be executed, and the fugitive given up to his master.

This probability threw all our Free-Soilers into a perfect frenzy. They called public meetings, harangued the mob, made the most inflammatory appeals to passions already greatly excited, and would, most likely, have attempted another rescue by force, if the vigilance of the police, and the military under arms and advantageously posted, had not made it pretty evident that it could not be done without serious inconvenience. Every method, short of physical violence, to intimidate the authorities, and to induce them to desist from the performance of their duties, was resorted to, and all that rare professional ability, craft, cunning, and unscrupulousness could do to evade the law was done; but all in vain. On the day of our annual State Fast, though the case was not yet decided, the friends of the Union, the supremacy of law, and social order, began to breathe more freely, and felt it to be reasonably certain that at length something would be done towards wiping out the disgrace which our city had incurred from the fanatics she had madly cherished in her

bosom. The fanatics were disappointed, and deeply mortified, and Mr. Parker availed himself of the occasion of the Fast to pour out their wrath and bitterness, as well as his own, in the sermon before us, which is equally remarkable for bad taste, bad temper, bad logic, bad religion, and bad morals. It professes to treat of the chief sins of the people, but finds the chief of these to be suffering the law to be executed.

We are not called upon to discuss the merits or demerits of slavery as an abstract question. If slavery did not exist in this country, we should oppose by all lawful means in our power its introduction; but it is here, one of the elements of American society, and directly or indirectly connected with the habits and the interests of the whole American people, and the only question for the moralist or the statesman is, How shall it be dealt with? Even supposing it to be evil, and only evil, the question as to the treatment of it where it exists is very different from the question of introducing it where it does not exist. To suffer a wrong to remain is not always to commit a wrong; for often in the complicated affairs of this world it is impossible to remove a long or widely existing evil, without causing a still greater evil. Be it that slavery is as great an evil as Free-Soilers pretend, it by no means follows that they are bound, or even free, to bring the political or social power of the country to bear on its abolition. Undoubtedly, we are never to do wrong that good may come, and if slavery is evil, and only evil, no advantages likely to result from it can ever justify us in introducing it; but of two evils we must choose the least, and when slavery cannot in all human probability be abolished without producing a greater evil, we are not even free to abolish it, and must tolerate it till it can be abolished without such result.

In this world, we must, to a greater or less extent, tolerate even moral wrong. It is a great moral evil that in the spiritual field the cockle should spring up to choke the wheat, and yet our Lord commands us to let both grow together, lest in attempting to root up the cockle we root up also the wheat with it. Infidelity, heresy, irreligion, are sins, and very grievous sins, and yet it is not lawful to extirpate them by fire and sword. The magistrate may, undoubtedly, repress their violence, and protect Christian faith



and social order from their disorderly conduct; but their extirpation must be the work of the missionary, not of the magistrate, — for faith and obedience must be voluntary, a free-will offering to God. There were zealous disciples of our Lord, who would have called down fire from heaven to consume his adversaries; but he rebuked them. “Ye know not of what spirit ye are. The Son of Man came not to destroy souls, but to save.” To a greater or less extent, we must tolerate sin, not in ourselves assuredly, but in others, and bear with transgressors, even as God bears with them. We must respect their free will, leave them the responsibility of their own misdeeds, because this is what God himself does, and because to attempt to root out all sins by violence, whether physical or social, for there is a social as well as a physical violence, would in the end only render matters infinitely worse, by destroying virtue itself. We cannot make this world a paradise, and all its inhabitants saints, as foolish puritans dream. As long as man retains free will, there will be abuses, there will be wrongs and outrages, and the sooner we come to this conclusion, and conform ourselves to it, the better will it be for all concerned, and the more real progress will there be made in virtue.

We have no quarrel with Free-Soilers for being hostile to slavery. We have as little sympathy with any species of slavery as they have, and perhaps as deep and as true a devotion to freedom. They are far from monopolizing all the love of freedom and all the hatred of slavery in the community. “Brave men lived before Agamemnon,” and love of freedom and hatred of slavery were born before Gerritt Smith, Robert Rantoul, William Lloyd Garrison, Wendell Phillips, Theodore Parker, or Abby Folsom, and would suffer little diminution were these choice spirits to die, and leave no heirs. It is very possible to oppose them and their proceedings without thereby opposing freedom, sympathizing with tyrants, or adding to the burdens of the oppressed. We oppose them, not for opposing slavery, but for the principles and methods, by which they oppose it. These principles and methods are repugnant to freedom, and as friends of freedom we oppose them, and must oppose them.

Nothing in the world is easier than to get off stale commonplaces against slavery and in favor of liberty; but the

man who deals largely in these commonplaces is always a tyrant in his heart, and one whom it will never do to trust with power. The essence of all slavery is in the predominance of passion over reason, and passion predominates in the community over reason in the exact ratio in which law is weak or wanting; for law is the reason of the community. As the individual can be free in himself only by the predominance of reason in his interior life, so can a community be free in its members only by the supremacy of law in its bosom. The maddest madness conceivable is that which proposes to abolish slavery and secure freedom by abolishing law, — or government, without which the supremacy of law cannot be maintained. It is this madness that has seized the Free-Soilers or Abolitionists. Their principles strike at the foundation of all government, and therefore are repugnant to the indispensable conditions of freedom. Without government, strong and efficient government, it is impossible to maintain the supremacy of law, and without the maintenance of that supremacy, there is no guaranty of freedom either for black man or white man. The supremacy of law is as necessary to secure the freedom of the slave when emancipated, as to preserve the freedom of the master now. Without it there is only anarchy, in which might usurps the place of right, and the weak are the prey of the strong. You do not advance freedom when you emancipate the slave from his master by overthrowing government; you only render thereby freedom impossible, and introduce the most detestable species of tyranny conceivable, of which your emancipated slave will be the first victim, because the least able to defend his liberty.

The cause of freedom is never aided by injustice; and yet the Free-Soilers, who, in principle, are not at all distinguishable from the Abolitionists, are urging the commission of open, palpable injustice. Slavery exists in this country by law, and by law which is enacted or sanctioned by the American people in their highest legislative capacity. Suppose that law is unjust, still its injustice is on the part of the law-making power. Before that power the master who owns slaves is not unjust; as before it, he has justly invested his capital in slaves, and therefore it cannot justly require him to free his slaves without full compensation. The people, who have authorized him to

hold slaves, cannot cast the burden of their wrongs on him. If they have sinned, they must bear their sin in the same capacity in which they have committed it. If they wish to repent and repair it, they must indemnify the master for the property they have authorized him to hold, and now require him to surrender. To propose, after having authorized it, the abolition of slavery, without proposing a just compensation to the master, is to propose a scheme of public robbery, is virtually to deny private property, and to claim for the state the right to plunder its subjects. And yet our Free-Soilers will not listen a moment to the proposal to indemnify the owners of slaves. They are urging the people to compel the masters to emancipate their slaves without compensation. Between the proprietor and the state, the property in slaves, whatever view we take of slavery itself, is as sacred and as inviolable as any other species of property, and to attack it is, in principle, to attack every species of private property, and to make the state the only proprietor, — the extreme of despotism, hardly reached by the pretensions of the Grand Turk. And yet the men who propose this do not blush to talk of justice, and to insist on being honored as friends of freedom!

We bring no unfounded charges against the Free-Soilers. Whoever has any acquaintance with their real principles and proceedings knows that what we allege is true. Mr. Parker is one of their most gifted leaders, and a faithful exponent of their doctrines, and he fully bears us out in what we say. Let us hear him for a few moments.

“Last Thanksgiving Day, I said it would be difficult to find a magistrate in Boston to take the odium of sending a fugitive back to slavery. I believed, after all, men had some conscience, although they talked about its being a duty to deliver up a man to bondage. Pardon me, my country, that I rated you too high! Pardon me, town of Boston, that I thought your citizens all men! Pardon me, lawyers, that I thought you had been all born of mothers! Pardon me, ruffians, who kill for hire! I thought you had some animal mercy left, even in your bosom! Pardon me, United States Commissioners, Marshals, and the like, I thought you all had some shame! Pardon me, my hearers, for such mistakes. One Commissioner was found to furnish the warrant! Pardon me, I did not know *he* was a Commissioner; if I had, I never would have said it!

"Spirits of Tyrants, I look down to you! Shade of Cain, thou great first murderer, forgive me that I forgot your power, and did not remember that you were parent of so long a line! And you, my brethren, if hereafter I tell you that there is any limit of meanness or wickedness which a Yankee will not jump over, distrust me, and remind me of this day, and I will take it back!

"Let us look at the public conduct of any Commissioner who will send an innocent man from Boston into slavery. I would speak of all men charitably; for I know how easy it is to err, yea, to sin. I can look charitably on thieves, prowling about in darkness; on rum-sellers, whom poverty compels to crime; on harlots, who do the deed of shame that holy woman's soul abhors and revolts at; I can pity the pirate, who scours the seas doing his fiendish crimes, — he is tempted, made desperate, by a gradual training in wickedness. The man, born at the South, owning slaves, who goes to Africa and sells adulterated rum in exchange for men to sell at Cuba, — I cannot understand the consciousness of such a man; yet I can admit that by birth and by breeding he has become so imbruted, he knows no better. Nay, even that he may perhaps justify his conduct to himself. I say I think his sin is not so dreadful as that of a Commissioner in Boston who sends a man into slavery. A man commits a murder, inflamed by jealousy, goaded by desire of great gain, excited by fear, stung by malice, or poisoned by revenge; and 't is a horrid thing. But to send a man into slavery is worse than to murder him. I would rather be slain than enslaved. To do this, inflamed by no jealousy, goaded by no desire of great gain, — only ten dollars! — excited by no fear, stung by no special malice, poisoned by no revenge; — *I cannot comprehend that in any man, not even in a hyena; beasts that raven for blood do not kill for killing's sake, but to feed their flesh. Forgive me, O ye wolves and hyenas! that I bring you into such company. I can only understand it in a devil!*

"When a man bred in Massachusetts, whose Constitution declares that 'all men are born free and equal'; within sight of Faneuil Hall, with all its sacred memories; within two hours of Plymouth Rock; within a single hour of Concord and Lexington; in sight of Bunker Hill, — when he will do such a deed, it seems to me that there is no life of crime long enough to prepare a man for such a pitch of depravity; I should think he must have been begotten in sin, and conceived in iniquity, and been born 'with a dog's head on his shoulders'; that the concentration of the villany of whole generations of scoundrels would hardly be enough to fit a man for a deed like this!

"You know the story of Sims. He crept on board a Boston vessel at Savannah. Perhaps he had heard of Boston, nay, even of Faneuil Hall, of the old Cradle of Liberty, and thought this was a

Christian town, at least human, and hoped here to enjoy the liberty of a man. When the ship arrived here, the first words he spoke were, 'Are we up there?' He was seized by a man who at the Court-House boasted of his cruelty towards him, who held him by the hair, and kept him down, seeking to kidnap and carry him back into slavery. He escaped!

"But a few weeks pass by, the man-stealers are here; the Commissioner issues his warrant; the Marshals serve it in the night. Last Thursday night, — when odious beasts of prey, that dare not face the light of heaven, prowl through the woods, — those ruffians of the law seized on their brother-man. They lie to the bystanders, and seize him on a false pretence. There is their victim, — they hold him fast. Can you understand his feelings? Let us pass by that. His 'trial'! Shall I speak of that? He has been five days on trial for more than life, and has not seen a judge! A jury? No. Only a Commissioner! O justice! O Republican America! Is this the liberty of Massachusetts?

"Where shall I find a parallel with men who will do such a deed, — do it in Boston? I will open the graves, and bring up most hideous tyrants from the dead: come, brood of monsters, let me bring you up from the deep damnation of the graves wherein your hated memories continue for all time their never-ending rot. Come, birds of evil omen; come, ravens, vultures, carrion-crows, and see the spectacle; come, see the meeting of congenial souls! I will disturb, disquiet, and bring up the greatest monsters of the human race! Tremble not, women; tremble not, children; tremble not, men! They are all dead! They cannot harm you now!

"Come hither, HEROD the wicked! Thou that didst seek after that young child's life, and destroyedst the Innocents! Let me look on thy face! No; go! Thou wert a Heathen! Go, lie with the Innocents thou hast massacred. Thou art too good for this company!

"Come, NERO! Thou awful Roman Emperor! Come up! No; thou wast drunk with power, schooled in Roman depravity! Thou hadst, besides, the example of thy fancied gods! Go, wait another day: I will seek a worse man. . . . .

"Come up, thou heap of wickedness, GEORGE JEFFRIES! thy hands deep purple with the blood of thy murdered fellow-men! Ah, I know thee! awful and accursed shade! Two hundred years after thy death, men hate thee still, not without cause! Let me look upon thee! I know thy history. Pause and be still, while I tell it to these men.

"Brothers, George Jeffries 'began in the sedition line.' 'There was no act, however bad, that he would not resort to to get on.' 'He was of a bold aspect, and cared not for the countenance of any man.' 'He became the avowed, unblushing slave of the court,



and the bitter persecutor and unappeasable enemy of the principles he had before supported.' He 'was universally insolent and overbearing.' 'As a Judge, he did not consider the decencies of his post, nor did he so much as affect to be impartial as became a Judge.' He was a 'Commissioner' in 1685. You know of the 'bloody assizes' which he held, and how he sent to execution three hundred and twenty persons in a single circuit. 'The whole country was strewed with the heads and limbs of his victims.' Yet a man wrote that 'a little more *hemp* might have been usefully employed.' He was the worst of the English Judges. 'There was no measure, however illegal, to the execution of which he did not devotedly and recklessly abandon himself.' 'During the Stuart reigns, England was cursed by a succession of ruffians in ermine, who, for the sake of court favor, wrested the principles of law, the precepts of religion, and the duties of humanity; but they were all greatly outstripped by Jeffries.' Such is his history.

"Come, shade of a judicial butcher! Two hundred years, thy name has been pilloried in face of the world, and thy memory gibbeted before mankind! Let us see how thou wilt compare with those who kidnap men in Boston! Go seek companionship with them! Go claim thy kindred, if such they be! Go tell them that the memory of the wicked shall rot,—that there is a God, an Eternity, ay! and a Judgment too! where the slave may appeal against him that made him a slave, to Him that made him a man! What! dost thou shudder? Thou turn back! These not thy kindred? Why dost thou turn pale, as when the crowd clutched at thy life in London street? 'T is true, George Jeffries, and these are not thy kin. Forgive me that I should send thee on such an errand, or bid thee seek companionship with such,—with hunters of the slave! Thou wert not base enough! It was a great bribe that tempted thee! Again, I say, pardon me for sending thee to keep company with such men! Thou only struckst at men accused of crime; not at men accused only of their birth! Thou wouldst not send a man into bondage for two pounds! I will not rank thee with men who, in Boston, for ten dollars, would enslave a negro now! Rest still, Herod! Be quiet, Nero! . . . . Sleep, Jeffries, underneath 'the altar of the church' which seeks with Christian charity to hide your hated bones."

"Well, my brethren, these are only the beginning of sorrows. There will be other victims yet: this will not settle the question. What shall we do? I think I am a calm man and a cool man, and I have a word or two to say as to what we shall do. *Never obey the law.* Keep the law of God. Next I say, resist not evil with evil; resist not *now* with violence. Why do I say this? Will you tell me that I am a coward? Perhaps I am; at least I am not

afraid to be called one. Why do I say, then, do not now resist with violence? *Because it is not time just yet; IT WOULD NOT SUCCEED.* If I had the eloquence that I sometimes dream of, which goes into a crowd of men, and gathers it in its mighty arm, and sways them as the pendant boughs of yonder elm shall be shaken by the summer-breeze next June, I would not give that counsel. I would call on men, and lift up my voice like a trumpet through the whole land, until I had gathered millions out of the North and the South, and they should crush slavery for ever, as the ox crushes the spider underneath his feet. But such eloquence is given to no man. It was not given to the ancient Greek who ‘shook the arsenal and fulminated over Greece.’ He that so often held the nobles and the mob of Rome within his hand, had it not. *He that spoke as never man spake*, and who has since gathered two hundred millions to his name, had it not. No man has it. The ablest must wait for time! It is idle to resist; *it is not the hour.* If in 1765 they had attempted to carry out the Revolution by force, they would have failed. Had it failed, we had not been here to-day. There would have been no little monument at Lexington; no little monument at Concord; nor that tall pile of eloquent stone at Bunker Hill, to proclaim that ‘Resistance to tyrants is obedience to God.’ Success is due to the discretion, heroism, calmness, and forbearance of our fathers: let us wait our time. It will come, — perhaps will need no sacrifice of blood. . . . .

“I suppose that this man will be carried back to slavery. The law of the United States has been cloven down; the law of Massachusetts cloven down. If we have done all that we can, we must leave the result to God. It is something that a man can only be kidnapped in Boston by riding over the law, and only tried in a Court-House surrounded by chains, when the Judges go under the iron of slavery to enter the house of bondage; that even on *Fast day* it is guarded by one hundred police, and three companies of military are picketed in Faneuil Hall. The Christians saw Christ crucified, and looked on from afar; sad, but impotent. The Christians at Rome saw their brethren martyred, and could not help them: they were too weak. But the blood of martyrs is the seed of the Church. To-day is *St. Bademus* day: 376 years after Christ, that precious saint was slain because he would not keep the commandment of the king. By crucified Redeemers shall mankind be saved. If we cannot prevent the crucifixion, let us wait for the redemption.

“Shall I ask you to despair of human liberty and rights? I believe that money is to triumph for the present. We see it does in Boston, Philadelphia, New York, and Washington: see this in the defence of bribery; in the chains of the Court House; in the judges’ pliant necks; in the swords of the police to-day; — see it

in the threats of the press to withdraw the trade of Boston from towns that favor the unalienable rights of man.

"Will the Union hold out? I know not that. But, if men continue to enforce the Fugitive Slave Law, I do not know how soon it will end; I do not care how soon the Union goes to pieces. I believe in justice and the law of God, and ultimately the Right will prevail. Wrong will prevail for a time, and attract admiration. I have seen in a haberdasher's shop-window the figure of a wooden woman showily arrayed, turning round on a pivot, and attracting the gaze of all the passers-by; but ere long it is forgotten. So it will be with this transient love of slavery in Boston; but the love of right will last as long as the granite in New Hampshire hills. I will not tell you to despair of freedom because politicians are false; for they are often so. Despair of freedom for the black man! no, never. Not till heaven shakes down its stars; nay, not till the heart of man ceases to yearn for liberty; not till the Eternal God is hurled from his throne, and a devil takes his place! All the arts of wicked men shall not prevail against the Father; nay, at last, not against the Son." — pp. 30 – 39.

This is strange language for a man who writes *Rev.* before his name. But what had this Commissioner, who is a respectable man, a loyal citizen, and a distinguished lawyer, done, to warrant this bitter, not to say foul-mouthed, denunciation? He had broken no law, attacked no man's freedom, violated no public or private right; he was honestly and faithfully discharging his official duty, executing in a legal manner as far as depended on him a very necessary and just law of his government. Is not that party hostile to all personal liberty and to all government, that for such a reason pronounces such a man and such a public officer a "wolf," an "hyena," nay, worse than either, and matched in iniquity only by the Devil himself? Is a man a devil because loyal to the state, and because he refuses to trample its Constitution under his feet?

All history, it seems, fails to furnish a tyrant who is not surpassed by Mr. Commissioner Curtis, and the officers of the United States government in this city, and simply because they execute a just and necessary law in opposition to the wishes of traitors and disorganizers. Is the preacher in earnest, or is he joking? Is his sermon irony, or is it an admirable specimen of the bathos? He speaks of excitement. Who caused that excitement? Certainly, he and his friends. He complains that the military were under arms, the Court-House guarded with chains, and sur-

rounded by a numerous and vigilant police. Against whom were these precautions necessary? Not assuredly against orderly citizens, not against the friends of the Union, not against loyal subjects opposed to the commission of treason; but against the Rev. Theodore Parker and his Abolition mob, black and white. But for them and their treasonable resistance, no such precautions would have been necessary. A man threatens to rob you; you call the watch, and are guilty of causing a disturbance! He threatens your life, and you call the police to prevent him from cutting your throat, and you are kicking up a row! Do these gentlemen need to be told that it is not they, but we, who have the right to complain of the excitement, and the precautions which they made it necessary for us to take to prevent *THEM* from violating the law!

Mr. Parker plainly counsels resistance to the laws, downright treason, and civil war,—only not just yet. The hour is not yet come, and armed resistance might be premature, because just now it might be unsuccessful! The traitorous intention, the traitorous resolution, is manifest, is avowed, is even gloried in, and nothing is wanting to the overt attempt to carry it into execution but a fair prospect of success. And what is of more serious consequence, the party of which this fierce declaimer is an accredited organ is now in power in this State, and has the Governor and the majority of the representatives in both houses of Congress. It rules or misrules the great State of Ohio; it is numerous in Pennsylvania, almost the majority in New York, triumphant in Vermont, and, we can but just *not* say, also in New Hampshire. Its principles are entertained by men who do not profess allegiance to the party. Nearly every member of Congress from this State, with the exception of Mr. Appleton of this city, is in reality as much of a Free-Soiler as Horace Mann or Robert Rantoul. Mr. Winthrop, the Whig candidate for the Senate, was not a whit sounder than Mr. Sumner, his successful Free Soil competitor, and would have made a far more dangerous Senator. The party has absorbed in its bosom all the separate fanaticisms of the Free States; and all who, like ourselves, have watched its growth from 1831, are well aware that it has been steadily advancing, that it has never lost an inch of ground once gained, and that it has never for a moment met with a serious check. It is as certain as any thing

human can be, that, if it is not speedily resisted, and resisted as it never yet has been, it will in a short time possess the power in nearly all the Free States, and consequently in the Union itself. To what then are we coming?

This statement will, no doubt, gratify and encourage the party; but the party has already become too strong to be pushed aside as contemptible, and we must not deceive ourselves as to the magnitude of the danger that threatens us. Both parties, Whigs and Democrats, — Whigs more especially till lately, — have criminally tampered with it, and aided it to acquire its present formidable power, — a power which, perhaps, is no longer controllable. The measures hitherto taken against it have thus far only exasperated and strengthened it. The "Compromise Measures" of the late Congress, which it was hoped would allay the excitement, and extinguish the party by depriving it of all pretence for further agitation, have had only a contrary effect. We do not agree with the so-called Disunionists of the South, for we are Unionists, but it must be confessed that they have been the only considerable party in the country that has had any tolerable appreciation of the Free Soil movement. They were correct in their predictions that the Compromise Measures would be ineffectual, and they have not overstated the danger. We say not danger to the institution of slavery, for the question of slavery loses itself in a much higher question, even higher and more important than the simple maintenance of the Union, — in the question of the maintenance of society itself. The Free-Soilers are to American society what Red Republicans and Socialists are to European society, and their triumph is the triumph of anarchy and despotism.

Good, quiet, easy men, looking over their ledgers, or sipping their wine, may flatter themselves that there is no serious danger, and tell us that we are unnecessarily alarmed; but in all human probability, if the fugitive slave Sims had not been given up on the claim of his owner, the American Union had now already ceased to exist. It is all very well to talk of "Southern bluster," and the "Hot-spurs" of the South, but there is something more than bluster just now. The Southern people are as virtuous and as patriotic as we, and their statesmen are as enlightened and sagacious as ours. They see what, with



individual exceptions, we do not permit ourselves to see, that the Free States are fast losing all their respect for law, and becoming unfaithful to their solemn engagements, and blind to all the claims of religion and morality. They see that the abolition of slavery at the bidding of our fanatics would be the dissolution of American society itself. They see the disorganizers steadily advancing, and that we are taking no efficient means to repress them, and they very naturally consult secession from the Union as the only means of self-preservation that remain to them. They may be wrong, but we of the North have no right to blame them for doing what we are forcing them to do, if they wish to retain any semblance of freedom.

We regard the Union as we do marriage, that is, as legally indissoluble. We deny in the one, as in the other, the lawfulness of divorce, and therefore are not accustomed to dwell on the advantages of the Union, or to speculate on the consequences of its dissolution. We will not so insult the friends of the Union as to enter into any argument to prove its absolute necessity to the well-being of the people of this country; but we may be permitted to say, that if the slave-holding States secede in a body, and form a Southern confederacy, they will not be the greatest losers. In all the Free States, the moment the conservative influence of the Union is withdrawn, Free-Soilism triumphs, and under the reign of its principles civilized society cannot subsist. The wild radicalism that underlies it, and which is suspected as yet, no doubt, only by a minority of those rallied under the Free Soil flag, will not be slow to develop itself, and to carry on with it even the mass of those who are unprepared at this moment to follow it to all lengths it may go. That radicalism, being in principle sheer anarchy or despotism, cannot serve as the basis of a civilized state. The Free States, paradoxical as it may seem to them, are, by the prevalence of this radicalism, deprived of the social and political virtues necessary to found or preserve civilized society. In an industrial and commercial point of view, the Southern confederacy would have the advantage over the Northern. It would include the great exporting States, and could therefore always trade more to its advantage in European markets than in ours. We are now the factors and manufacturers for the South, but we should not be when we come to sustain to

all the principles and maxims of the past, and all the moral, religious, social, and political institutions of the present. It is a party formed against the common reason, common sense, and common interests of mankind. With the cant of religion and morality on their lips, its leaders are, almost to a man, infidels and blasphemers, as well as traitors and disorganizers. They are men for whom it is not enough to sin from appetite or passion, but who must sin from principle, — for whom it is not enough to see the good, approve it, and yet pursue the wrong, but who must pervert conscience itself, erect evil into good, and make sin pass for virtue. They aim at reversing all the judgments of mankind, and brand the Christian virtues as vices, and exalt the vices opposed to them to the rank and dignity of Christian virtues. Whatever has hitherto been counted sacred they pronounce profane, and whatever has been hitherto counted profane, they command us to respect as sacred. They say with Milton's Satan, —

“ All good to me is lost ;  
Evil, be thou my good.”

They carry their zeal for reversing so far as to seek to reverse the natural relation of the sexes, to dishonor woman by making her the head, and sending her to the legislature, the cabinet, or into the field to command our armies, and compelling man to remain at home, and nurse the children, wash the dishes, make the beds, and sweep the house. Already are their women usurping the male attire, and beginning to appear in our streets and assemblies dressed out in full *Bloomer* costume, and little remains for the men but to don the petticoat and to draw the veil over their faces.

Let no man accuse us of exaggeration. We do not exaggerate in the least, and are only giving our readers a sober statement of the spirit and tendency of the great movement party of our times, — Red Republicans and Socialists in France, Italy, and Germany, *Progresistas* in Spain, Radicals in England, Free-Soilers and Abolitionists, just now, in the United States, — Destructives everywhere, borne forward by the under-currents of nearly all modern societies, glorified by all the popular literature of the age, defended by the newspaper press generally, and with us in the Free States already able to blast the reputation of al-

most every public man who ventures to assail them. We speak of a party which we have long known, and which, we grieve to say, we ourselves, when we had more influence with our countrymen than we can ever hope to have again, supported, under more than one of its aspects, with a zeal and an energy worthy of a better cause. Alas! men are often powerful to do evil, but impotent to repair it. Now that our eyes are open, and we are able to see the mischief we did, we have no power to undo it, and if we are permitted to speak out freely and boldly, as we do, against the party, it is because that party can afford to let us say what we please. No voice raised against it seems to be any longer heeded, and if a man of standing and weight in the community assails it under one of its aspects, he must save himself and friends by giving it a new impetus under another, as we see in the case of Mr. Webster, who apparently writes his Letter to the Chevalier Hulsemann to atone for his speech in the Senate-chamber on the 7th of March, 1850. He appears to have felt that the only way in which he could obtain a popularity for the administration, to balance the popularity lost by its adhesion to the Compromise Measures, was to express sympathy with radicalism and revolutionism abroad. In this he may have judged patriotically, if not wisely and justly; for to sympathize with foreign radicalism is less dangerous to us for the moment, than to sympathize with domestic radicalism. Now it is the progress and triumph of this wild radical party that the South really dread. They see it under the Free Soil and Abolition aspect, but also — though less clearly, perhaps — under other aspects, and they see that they have every thing to fear and nothing to hope from it. Hence the firmness with which they insist — and we, too, ought to insist, for we are as deeply interested as they — on the faithful execution of the Fugitive Slave Law; for if the party cannot be successfully resisted on this law, it is idle to think of resisting it at all. We and all the members of the Union are then without protection, and at the mercy of the worst and most frightful despotism, under the name of liberty, that it is possible to conceive.

But the Fugitive Slave Law, Mr. Parker and his associates tell us, is unjust, and they add, that, if the Union

cannot be preserved without sustaining an unjust law, let it go to pieces.

“*Quicquid id est, timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.*”

However that may be, we distrust Satan, even when he preaches morality; for he never preaches morality unless to persuade us to outrage it. We cannot prize very highly the moral lectures of those who are daily and hourly violating all social morality, and counselling us to do the same,—who are undeniably traitors, really guilty of treason, by their combined and persevering resistance to the execution of a law of Congress. No lawyer of character can doubt for a moment that persons associating together for the express purpose of permanently defeating the execution of any law of the State or of Congress, and in their conventions passing resolves to resist it, incur the guilt of treason; and treason, whatever some people think, is a violation of the moral law, a sin against God, as well as a crime against the state. It is a sad day for both public and private morals, when treason is regarded as a virtue, and the traitor punished for his treason is looked upon as a martyr. Men have, no doubt, been unjustly accused of treason, and punished as traitors when they should not have been; but this does not in the least lessen the crime of treason, and should not in the least screen from punishment those who are really guilty of it. It seems to be forgotten by the great mass of our people, that treason is a crime under our form of government, as well as under other forms, and that to sympathize with traitors, whether at home or abroad, is not even here a virtue. Perhaps the government would do well, if, instead of sending out ships of war to bring foreign traitors into the country, it would make examples of some few of our domestic traitors, and thus remind the people that here no more than elsewhere is it lawful to conspire to resist the laws. Perhaps some examples will have soon to be made, if the government intends to maintain itself. But be this as it may, it is certain that the Free Soil resistance to the execution of the Fugitive Slave Law is treason as defined by our laws, because it springs not from a momentary impulse or sudden exasperation, but from a settled purpose of defeating the law, not in one instance only, but in every instance in which there shall be an attempt to execute it.

We must be pardoned, then, if we are not disposed to listen to lectures on morals from the Free Soil leaders, especially when the morals they would teach us are only such as they need to save their own necks from the halter.

The Fugitive Slave Law is not unjust. It is a constitutional law, so declared by Judges Woodbury and Nelson of the United States Circuit Court, and by the Supreme Judicial Court of this Commonwealth. Chief Justice Shaw, than whom it would be difficult to find a higher legal authority, in giving the unanimous opinion of the court, said that the law was not only constitutional, but necessary, and Congress was bound to pass it. In principle it does not differ from the original law of 1793, and differs from it at all only in devolving on officers of the federal government certain duties which that law devolved on officers of the State governments. The amendment became necessary in consequence of several of the States having prohibited their officers, under heavy penalties, from performing those duties. The amendment which transferred these duties to officers of the federal government cannot in the least affect the constitutionality of the law, and therefore, since no one can pretend that the original law of 1793 was unconstitutional, the amended law of 1850 must be conceded to be constitutional. The law was enacted by the proper authorities, according to the forms prescribed by the Constitution, for the purpose of carrying into effect an imperative provision of the Constitution, and, after the decisions of the several tribunals, its constitutionality must be held to be settled, and no longer an open question. Unjust, then, it cannot be, unless the Constitution is unjust. The Constitution is not unjust, unless it contravenes the law of God. That the Constitution does contravene the law of God, no religious man can pretend, for men of all religions have approved it, and men of no religion have nothing to say on the subject, since for them there is no law of God, and therefore no conscience.

The Constitution ordains that persons held to service in one State escaping into another shall be given up on being claimed by those to whom such service is due. An independent state in the absence of treaty obligations, or with us in the absence of constitutional obligations, is not bound to give up fugitive slaves, or even fugitives from justice; but it is free to do so, for reasons satisfactory to



itself. To reduce a freeman to slavery is a sin, so declared by the highest religious authority, and accordingly our government prohibits the slave-trade under its flag, and declares it piracy. But to give up a slave to his owner is by no competent authority declared to be a sin. To give up a fugitive slave is not to reduce a freeman to slavery ; it is simply not interfering to liberate a slave. The slave in escaping does not become a freeman, nor in the least alter the relations between him and his master. So far as he is concerned, the master has the same right to reclaim him when he has escaped into another state that he would have if he had only escaped to a neighboring plantation in the same state. The right that debars the master from asserting his claim is not the slave's right, but that of the state into which the slave has escaped, which prohibits the assertion of the claim, because it cannot allow the laws of another state, however just, to operate by their own force within its jurisdiction. The question is not here between master and slave, but between two independent states. The state may, if it chooses, waive its rights, and permit the master to reclaim his slave, without adding to or taking from the previous right of either slave or master, as between themselves. Its waiving of its territorial jurisdiction is only not interposing it, and is therefore simply non-intervention, or not asserting, when it might, its right to intervene. It simply remains neutral, and leaves the relation between the master and slave as it finds it. This is all that the Fugitive Slave Law requires of any of the States, for the process it prescribes, and the powers it requires to be exercised, have for their sole object, on the one hand, to prevent a freeman from being taken under pretext of recovering a fugitive slave, and on the other, to maintain the neutrality of the State by preventing any portion of its citizens or subjects from interfering to prevent the recovery of his slave by the master.

Thus viewed, the question, even supposing slavery to be wrong, is simply, Has a state the right to remain neutral between two foreign parties, and suffer or permit the party assumed to be in the wrong to bear down the party assumed to be in the right ? If the state has this right, it of course has the right to take all the necessary measures to compel its citizens or subjects to remain neutral. Has the state this right ? It certainly has the right, for it is idle to

pretend that we are bound, either as states or as individuals, to interpose to redress all wrongs, real or supposed, committed or tolerated by others. The question is not as to the *right*, but as to the *obligation* to intervene. There may be cases when we are free to intervene, and others when we are bound to intervene; but the former are not numerous, and the latter are very rare. The experience of our Puritan ancestors proves this very clearly as to individuals, and that nothing is worse than to make every individual in a community the guardian of the morals of every other individual. It leads every one to mind every one's business but his own, establishes a system of universal espionage, and sacrifices all individual freedom and independence. It destroys all sense of individual responsibility, precludes all firmness and manliness of character, and superinduces the general habit of consulting, not what is true, what is right, what is duty, but what is popular, or rather, what will escape the censure of one's neighbors. Whoever knows what our society was under the strict Puritan regimen knows well how fatal to virtue is the system. The New-Englander of to-day bears but too many traces of the system, which makes him but too often a hypocrite at home or in public, and somewhat of a rowdy in private or abroad. The whole system, out of which Free-Soilism undeniably springs, is false, of immoral tendency, and founded on a misapprehension of the nature of man and the government of God. We must leave scope for individual freedom; we must trust something to individual responsibility, and place our main reliance on the principles we early instil into individuals, the religious influences with which we surround them, and the workings of their own consciences. It will not do to keep them always in leading-strings, or under lock and ward. If we do, we shall never have any strong or masculine virtue; never have any men on whom in the hour of temptation and trial we can rely. No doubt, outbreaks of passion, of wild and exuberant spirits, there will be; no doubt, disorders will occur, scenes of personal violence will be exhibited, scandals will be given; but these things, however much to be deplored, no human foresight or power can prevent, and we must make up our minds to bear with them. To attempt, as Calvin did in Geneva, and as our fathers did in New England, to guard against them by an

all-pervading espionage and minute legislation, descending even to prescribe the fashion of cutting the hair, only substitutes a darker and more fatal class of vices and crimes, such as can be practised in solitude or carried on in secret. We must bear with them, — knowing that, if there is less virtue than we wish, what virtue there is will be genuine, and able to abide the test.

The same principle applies to nations, for nations are only individuals to each other. As long as they remain unaggressive, disposed to live in peace with their neighbors, and to fulfil the obligations of good neighborhood, they must be left to stand on their own individual responsibility, and each to be supreme, under God, in managing its own internal affairs. To make them guardians of the morals and policy each of the others, would result only in evil. It would excite perpetual jealousies and heart-burnings, give the strong and grasping a pretext for interfering with and subjugating the weak, rendering peace impossible, war, rapine, and oppression permanent and universal. We deny, then, the moral obligation of independent states — unless it be in certain rare cases, when the very existence of society itself is threatened, and a given state is really waging war against social order and the common interests of mankind, and therefore really attacking the common right of nations — to interfere to redress even the moral wrongs which may be perpetrated in the interior of each other. Granting, then, — what we certainly do not grant, — that slavery is a moral wrong in itself, one state is not bound to interfere for its abolition in another. Then it is free to preserve in regard to it a strict neutrality, and to enforce that neutrality on its citizens or subjects. Then, as what is called giving up a fugitive slave is really nothing but remaining neutral between the master and slave, for by it the state only refuses to interpose its territorial jurisdiction as a bar to the recovery of his slave by the master, the state is not bound to prohibit the recovery of fugitive slaves; and in permitting and compelling its citizens to permit them to be recovered, it does and requires no one to do a moral wrong. It is false, then, to pretend that the Fugitive Slave Law or the Constitution in requiring it is unjust, — contravenes the law of God. The States, then, in forming this Union, had the right to stipulate that fugitive slaves should be given up, and their stipulation binds all their citizens or subjects.

The Free-Soilers and Abolitionists profess to appeal from the state to what they call the higher law; but no such appeal as they, in fact, contend for, is ever admissible. There is certainly a higher lawgiver than the state. God is the Supreme Lawgiver for states and individuals, and no civil enactment contrary to his law is obligatory, — not precisely because his law is a higher law, but because such an enactment is no law at all, and is null and void from the beginning. God as Universal Sovereign ordains civil government, clothes it with authority, within the limits of his law, natural and revealed, to govern, and we must never forget that it is by his authority that it governs. Consequently its enactments, within these limits, are, in effect, the laws of God, and being his laws, there can be no higher laws on the matters they include to override or annul them. They are by the will of God supreme in their province, and bind us as laws of God; and they can no more be disobeyed without sin against God, than they can without crime against the state.

But the Free-Soiler alleges that the Fugitive Slave Law transcends these limits, and ordains what the law of God prohibits; and concludes, therefore, that it is no law, and he is not only free to disobey, but even bound to resist it. This is not true, as we have shown in proving that an independent state has the right to remain neutral in the question between the master and slave of another state, and therefore the American States, in forming a federal union for their common weal, had the power to bind themselves to give up fugitive slaves. If they could not, as we know they could not, secure the advantages of the Union without so binding themselves, they had the right to do it, and a sufficient reason for doing it, and this obligation is binding on conscience upon all their citizens respectively. But let this pass. The burden of proof is on the Free-Soiler. Civil government exists and governs by Divine appointment, and therefore the presumption is always that its acts are in accordance with the Divine will, till the contrary is shown. Consequently, they who allege that they are not, must prove their allegation. It is not enough to say, that all civil enactments in contravention of the law of God are null; therefore the Fugitive Slave Law is null. The fact of its contravening the Divine law must be proved as the condition of concluding its nullity. This

the Free-Soiler does not even attempt to prove, or, if he attempts to prove it, it is simply by alleging in proof his own private opinion, private judgment, or, as he says, conscience; that is, by adducing in proof the very matter to be proved. The conscience he alleges is his private conscience, and private conscience is simply one's private judgment of what is or is not the law of God, and may be true or false. To allege this is only to allege private judgment, and to allege private judgment is to allege the very matter in question; for the very matter in question is the truth or validity of this private judgment of the Free-Soiler, that the Fugitive Slave Law contravenes the law of God.

Here is precisely where the Free-Soiler breaks down. His declamation is superior to his logic. He professes to appeal from the civil enactment to the law of God, but in reality appeals only to his own private judgment, and this appeal is not admissible; because it is not an appeal to a higher court, or to a court competent to interpret and declare the will of the Higher Lawgiver. The state is the lawgiver for individuals, not individuals for the state. The judgment of the state in all cases overrides the private judgment of individuals, and the individual is bound to submission, whatever his private convictions, unless he can back his private convictions by an authority paramount to that of the State, and which States as well as individuals are bound to obey. Such an authority the Free-Soiler has not, as we may presume from the fact that he does not attempt to allege it. His pretence is, that his private convictions themselves are the higher law, and override all civil enactments opposed to them, which is manifestly false, as well as repugnant to civil government itself.

Mr. Parker tries to prove that a man's private convictions are themselves the higher law, from the example of the early Christian martyrs, who absolutely refused to sacrifice to idols at the command of the Emperor. But this example is not to his purpose; for they offered only a passive resistance, and did not refuse to obey the Emperor on the authority of private judgment or private conscience, but on an authority which the Emperor himself was bound to obey, that is, the authority, not of private, but of universal reason, which forbids idolatry, and an express revelation of the will of God to the Church infallibly interpreted



to them. When the Free-Soiler will bring these authorities, or either of them, — that is, the authorities themselves, not merely his notions of them, — to back his private convictions or conscience, that the Fugitive Slave Law contravenes the law of God, then we will concede his right, and even his duty, to disobey it: for it is necessary to obey God rather than men. But this he cannot do, for if he could, he would have done it long ago. Conscience is the law for the individual in the absence of all other law, but is sacred and inviolable before civil enactments only when supported by the law of God; for it is not itself the law of God, but simply one's judgment of what that law does or does not command. The appeal to it, then, can never avail the Free-Soiler; for of itself it can never override a civil enactment.

The appeal to the Supreme Lawgiver is compatible with civil government, but the appeal to private judgment, or conviction, as to a higher law than that of the state, is not; for it virtually denies government itself, by making the individual paramount to it. The Free-Soiler, then, by the very fact that he appeals to private convictions or private conscience as the higher law, proves, what we have alleged, that his principles strike at the foundation of government. He asserts the supremacy of private opinion, and exalts private judgment to the dignity and authority of the law of God. If this pretence that private judgment is the law of God were an isolated fact, if it were a temporary resort of a party hard pressed, we should smile at its absurdity, and pass it over as harmless. But it is a settled doctrine, received as an axiom, as a sacred dogma, as their fundamental principle, by the universal Radical or Movement party of our times, and holds with them the rank and authority which the dogma of the infallibility of the Church holds with the Catholic. They seek to make it the basis of all ethical and legislative codes. Strange as it may seem, whatever minor differences there may be among the members of the party, they all agree in setting up man — humanity, as they say — in the place of God, and man's will — that is, their own — in the place of the Divine will. As if preluding Antichrist, they have the incredible audacity to allege that they do this in the name of our Blessed Lord himself. The sacred Mystery of the Incarnation, they tell us, symbolizes the Divinity of man, and signifies

to all who understand it that God is *for us* only in man. Man is the only God for men, and man's will is for men God's will, therefore the supreme law, *lex suprema*, to which all creeds, codes, hierarchies, and states must conform, or lose their right to be. This is the doctrine of Red Republicans and Socialists on the Continent of Europe, to a great extent of the Radicals and Chartists in England, and of the Free-Soilers or Abolitionists of this country. There can be no question of the fact. It is read in all the literature of the party; it is plainly taught in the Sermon before us; it is clearly implied in this very appeal to private conviction as to the law of God, which is made by even the more moderate of the Free-Soilers. Nor is the doctrine entertained simply as a closet theory. It is no longer a mere speculation; it is no longer confined to books, pamphlets, or newspapers; it has come forth into practical life, organized parties, formed conspiracies, produced revolutions, expelled sovereigns, convulsed all Europe, kindled the flames of civil war, and, if defeated on some points, is as yet nowhere subdued. It is here, laughing at constitutions, collecting mobs, arming a party to resist the constituted authorities, undermining the state, corrupting public and private morals, and preparing the way for the horrors of anarchy. It has become an organized party, and as such we have now to meet it, not in the schools only, but in the field, and with something more than syllogisms or moral protestations.

We shall not undertake to refute this doctrine, for they who entertain it are past being reasoned with. Reason and argument were thrown away upon them. But we do entreat such of our countrymen as have not yet entirely lost their senses to open their eyes to the dangers that threaten us. This terribly destructive doctrine takes possession of people in the name of liberty, and it captivates because it is supposed to exalt the individual, and to guaranty his freedom. But it does no such thing. It destroys all individual freedom. It magnifies the individual in the face of government, indeed, but it is only, after having used him to break down government, to crush him beneath the despotism of what it calls society. Why advocate we so strenuously, in season and out of season, the sacredness and inviolability of government, and inscribe *LAW AND ORDER* on the banner we throw out? Is it because we have no

sense of individual freedom, because we would sacrifice the individual to the state, because we would have government everywhere, and suffer no one to sit down or rise up but at the bidding of a master? Let no one be so foolish as to do us that injustice. We are freeborn Americans; we have battled for liberty all our life, and were never more resolute to battle for it than we are now. We love liberty, and would leave always a large margin for individual freedom. We oppose Socialism, because it destroys individuality, and is nothing but despotism; we oppose Radicalism, because it is despotism; we oppose Free-Soilism, because it is despotism; and we assert the necessity of government, because without it there can be no margin left for individual liberty. Tell us, ye wise ones, ye enlightened reformers of the nineteenth century, when ye have succeeded in making way with government, what protection ye will have left me for my individual and personal freedom? Whither, then, shall I be able to fly to save myself from being crushed beneath your huge, social despotism, rolling on under the impetus of lawless passion and irresponsible demagogues? What refuge can there be for personal freedom, when what is called society, as distinguished from government, is supreme, without law, without restraint, but the will and passions of the Radicals who are at its head? A cruel and despotic public opinion, variable and capricious as morbid feeling, will then become supreme, universal, all-pervading, and overwhelm every individual who has the hardihood to hesitate for a moment to comply with its imperious demands. What now takes place on a small scale in your voluntary associations for reforming society, will then be exhibited on a large scale. The capricious despotism will not stop with putting chains on the limbs, and a padlock on the lips, but it will enter into the soul, penetrate into the very interior of man; all free thought will be stifled in its conception, all manliness, all nobility of character, depart, virtue be unheard of, and men become a race of mean, cringing, cowardly slaves of an intangible despot, and wild and lawless passion revel in one universal and perpetual saturnalia. It is to prevent this fatal result that we demand government, strong and efficient government, — not to crush the individual, but to save him from being crushed under the tyranny of an ungoverned society, by restraining social action and influ-

ence within their legitimate bounds. Let the principles of Free-Soilism, of the fanatics, become predominant, as they are becoming, and government cannot be maintained, or, if maintained, only as an instrument of oppression. We demand, therefore, in the name of liberty, that the movements of the fanatics be repressed, and that the utmost rigor of the laws be enforced against their leaders. Lenity to them is cruelty to the people, and irretrievable ruin to the country.

Some cowardly but crafty Free Soil leaders counsel, it is true, not resistance to the Fugitive Slave Law, but agitation for its repeal. We confess that we respect in comparison with these the bolder traitors, who advise open and unremitting resistance. The highwayman is less despicable than the swindler, and of all traitors those who practise treason under cover of law are the most detestable. The man who, in our times, agitates for the repeal of the Fugitive Slave Law, is as much of a traitor in his heart as he who bids it open defiance. Why repeal it? It is constitutional. Would you have another more efficient? It is not needed. One less efficient? that is, one that you can evade, one that will not compel you to comply with the solemn obligations of the Constitution? So you would evade obedience to the Constitution, but without endangering the safety of your necks? No doubt of it. But agitation in the sense of Free-Soilism is precisely what now creates the danger, and every man who would keep it up in that sense is morally a traitor to his country.

But our limits are exhausted. We have not said half of what we intended to say when we commenced; but we have said perhaps enough. The question is one of vital importance to the republic. We have spoken strongly, but far less strongly than we feel. We see not in Free-Soilism a single redeeming element. It is wild, lawless, destructive fanaticism. The leaders of the party that sustain it are base and unprincipled men, whose morality is cant, whose piety is maudlin sentiment, and whose patriotism is treason. A more graceless set of deluded fanatics or unmitigated hypocrites could not be found, were we to search the world over. Some worthy persons may have been attracted to the party by their horror of slavery, and by their belief in the loyal intentions of its leaders; but no religious man, no loyal citizen, can, after the developments

the party has recently given, any longer adhere to it, or afford it the least conceivable countenance. Whoever continues to support it can be excused from treason only on the ground that he is insane, or else that he stands too low in the scale of intelligence to be responsible for acts.

Whether there is sufficient political virtue or intelligence remaining in the country to meet successfully the crisis, time must disclose. We hope there is, but we certainly have our fears. Matters have gone so far, that it will be no child's play to arrest them. The South must not now desert the North. They have their faults as well as we ours, and have erred as much in their encouragement of the "expansive democracy," as we by our disregard of constitutional engagements. But their interests must prompt them to discountenance internal radicalism, and to exert at home a conservative influence. Without them there is no hope for us, but with them, with their hearty coöperation with the friends of the Union yet remaining in the Free States, we may outride the storm; we may preserve the Union, check radicalism, and save American society from utter dissolution, and the liberties transmitted us by our fathers from utter annihilation. But we can do so only by waiving all minor issues, disregarding old party organizations, dismissing old party animosities, and bringing the whole conservative party of the republic to act together with one heart and soul, as one man.

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#### ART. VI. — LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. — *Elements of Latin Pronunciation, for the Use of Students in Language, Law, Medicine, Zoölogy, Botany, and the Sciences generally in which Latin Words are used.* By S. S. HALDEMAN, A. M., Professor of Natural History in the University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia: Lippincott, Grambo, & Co. 1851. 16mo. pp. 76.

THERE is something in this title which is calculated at the same time to surprise and to mislead. A Professor of *Natural History* publishing a work on the *Elements of Latin Pronunciation* is certainly a new and rather startling phenomenon; and when he in-



forms us, that his work is "for the use of students in Language, Law, Medicine, Zoölogy, Botany, and the sciences generally in which Latin words are used," we naturally infer, that we are to find in these same "Elements" some new and much improved system of the usual school-book kind, the offspring of that perplexity and despair which the utterances of a class-room are apt to generate in the breast of the college tutor. But Professor Haldeman has never been, we dare say, a college tutor, nor is he even, in the stricter use of the term, a classical scholar; his book is no book of "Elements" at all, nor was it suggested by the ordinary wants of the older or younger youths who are pursuing certain studies in which Latin words are used. Professor Haldeman *is*, heart and soul, an enthusiastic investigator of Nature; he has won distinction, at home and abroad, in various departments of natural history; but his favorite department has been the natural history of man. And whereas some naturalists, in studying the relations of the various races, compare the forms of the skull, others the peculiarities of the skin, and so on, another class examine their phonetic characteristics, and thus identify themselves, more or less, with the comparative philologists. It is to this latter class that Professor Haldeman belongs. He has been a most ardent and successful investigator into the phonetic peculiarities of the Indian languages, and it was while endeavoring (as he informs us) to record his results in the characters of the Latin alphabet, that he found himself under the necessity of ascertaining the real power of those characters beforehand. In the course of long-continued and extensive investigations for this purpose, he naturally found himself obliged to reëxamine the foundations, and many of the details, of etymology. The book which he has produced, therefore, is really an essay on the powers of the Latin alphabet with reference to the wants of the etymologist and comparative philologist, and of such classical scholars, of course, as choose to enlarge the domain of their studies in that direction. It is true that Professor Haldeman, while showing himself fully aware in what sense "pronunciation is the basis of philology," and in reference to what ends alone it is absolutely indispensable to use the true and original pronunciation of Latin, while for other purposes any conventional system may be adopted without hindrance to the acquisition of the knowledge which is sought for, would seem to be sanguine enough to hope, that the theoretically true may supersede the conventional in the schools, as well as in the study of the etymologist, and to urge the adoption in general practice of the results ascertained in his book. In so doing, he undoubtedly incurs the risk of being considered as a visionary, devoted to the pursuit of an object purely chimerical; but such a view of his real aims and hopes would evidently be entirely unjust; and we have only to regret, that he

should have so expressed himself on his title-page as to confound the secondary and merely accidental object of his work with that which was first in importance and in his intentions.

We think it a happy circumstance, that the subject of Latin pronunciation should have engaged the attention of a physical inquirer. "Scholars" have always confined themselves to what may be called merely *historical* materials,—the incidental testimonies of the ancient classical authors, the statements of the ancient grammarians, inscriptions, &c. But in many cases the use of these materials produces results entirely unsatisfactory. Descriptions of sounds are generally imperfect and inadequate; and a very slight examination of the matter would satisfy us, that what we might think a surer testimony, namely, the same word written in the elements of two or more different languages, may often likewise fail. In many such cases, nothing more may have been intended than a convenient approximation; and even where the writer supposed there was strict identity, he may have been under an entire misconception. Something more is wanted to harmonize such historical testimony where it is discordant, to complete it where it is imperfect, and to clear it up where it is obscure. This is to be found, if anywhere, in a knowledge of the mechanism of human speech, and of the natural relations and interchange of the vocal elements. But here is where the naturalist must come in to the aid of the scholar. And herein lies the strength of Professor Haldeman, that in the region of phonetics he walks as a master; that he has investigated the laws of human speech with the perseverance and tact of a practised observer and with the anticipative insight of a true discoverer; that, having thus attained sure footing in this region, he has accumulated literary and historical materials in surprising abundance, but, instead of being overwhelmed by them, has managed them with a perfect control.

Professor Haldeman informs us, that his results usually agree with those of his predecessors. This is true; and yet the reader will receive the impression of originality from sections in which the materials referred to, and the results arrived at, have the least of novelty, the method is so obviously original and the evidence of genuineness speaks out so convincingly in the unauthorlike simplicity of the style. The features of the greatest novelty are those which are found in the accessory details of the book. At page 16, for instance, he has given us, without a word of heralding or a line of commentary, what he calls a "Scheme of Affinities between the Vocal Elements in Latin." We are much mistaken if the reader will not find it necessary, and well worth his while, to meditate this modest *Scheme* often and long. It contains the skeleton of an entire system of etymology, and is the original result of independent investigations by our author. It is to be regretted that he has *not*

attached to it a commentary of many pages. So again, in speaking of the Latin substitutes for the *Zeta* and *Phi* of the Greek, Professor Haldeman has been led, while asserting with Quintilian that the former was equivalent to *sd* and not to *ds*, to sustain his position by a convincing argument peculiar to himself. If (he argues) *ds* were found in Greek, we should certainly find *ts* also, for "*surd consonants being less difficult to form than sonant ones, they may be expected where the latter occur. But the Italian ds and ts are not Greek combinations; and were the former included in z, we should still want ts, which should at least be as common as ds.*" But the same principle justifies the identity of *z* with *sd*, for "*compounds like esdechomai show that sd is a Greek combination, although usually represented by z; we may, therefore, naturally expect its corresponding surd st, which we find so common, that it has been provided with a character [σ], as in αστρον, a star.*" (p. 45.) With respect to the *Phi*, he explains it in a manner peculiar to himself, as neither *f* nor *r* followed by an aspirate (as in *haphazard*), but as the cognate of the Digamma and of the Spanish *B*. In this instance he founds his deduction entirely upon the writings of the ancients, which had failed to suggest any thing definite to his predecessors.\*

In a mere notice like the present, we cannot enter into further details. The specimens we have given may serve to show that Professor Haldeman's work, besides being an accurate manual of Latin pronunciation, abounds with discussions of the greatest interest to the philologist. The specimens of etymology scattered over its pages, when compared with the *Scheme of Affinities* before alluded to, have impressed us so strongly, that we cannot but urge the author, with the most unfeigned earnestness, to favor the public as early as possible with the elementary work on etymology which he informs us, in his *Preliminary Remarks*, he now has in preparation.

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2. — *The Golden Manual: being a Guide to Catholic Devotion, Public and Private, compiled from approved Sources.* New York: Sadlier & Co. 1851. 24mo. pp. 1041.

THIS is a reprint from an English Manual approved by Cardinal Wiseman, with large additions by the American editor. It is the

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\* Pennington, in his *Essay on the Pronunciation of the Greek Language* (p. 71), had thrown out a hint that  $\Phi$  might not be *f*, when he said it was "*more like a sigh*"; and Mr. Castanis, in his *Greek Exile* (p. 246), published since Professor Haldeman's view had been made known in the *Proceedings of the American Academy*, under date of Octo-



largest and most complete manual of devotion we are acquainted with. It contains a great variety of devotions, adapted to almost every occasion and to every taste, and, as far as we have examined it, selected with judgment and true devotional feeling. We know of little, except in devotions before and after communion, that we could desire to have added, and we have met with nothing in it that we wish to have omitted. It is due to the publishers to say that the copy before us is well printed, and richly bound. It contains numerous illustrations, several of which are executed with much artistic skill and taste. We have noticed several typographical errors, especially in the references in the Index, which we presume will be corrected in a second edition. There is no occasion to commend this Golden Manual to the public, for it is approved by the Most Reverend, the Archbishop of New York, and is sure to become, and deservedly, a great favorite with devout Christians.

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3. — *The Antiquities of the Anglo-Saxon Church.* By the Rev. JOHN LINGARD. 2d American from the London Edition. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1851. 8vo. pp. 322.

WE wish to be grateful to such enterprising publishers as Messrs. Murphy & Co., but we regard this edition, in 1851, of Dr. Lingard's work on the Anglo-Saxon Church as an insult to the author and an imposition upon the public. It is a reprint of the second English edition, published at Newcastle, in 1810, — a valuable work certainly, considering what was then the state of Anglo-Saxon literature; but the author, in 1845, published a new edition in two volumes, entirely recast, greatly enlarged, and much improved, under the title of "*The History and Antiquities of the Anglo-Saxon Church; containing an Account of its Origin, Government, Doctrines, Worship, Revenues, and Clerical and Monastic Institutions.*" This new edition contains the substance of the earlier edition, and supersedes it. He who has this does not want that edition, but he who has that needs this. It is altogether a superior work, and is the one that should have been selected for republication. It is no more than fair, when we republish an author's works, that we republish them with his latest corrections and improvements.

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4. — *Annie and her Aunt.* By a Convert to the Catholic Church. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1851. 24mo. pp. 72.

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ber, 1849, and even since the *Elements of Latin Pronunciation* was in press, has ascribed to the  $\Phi$  the very same power, and has thus given Professor Haldeman the support of a testimony entirely independent.

5. — *Concilia Provincialia, Baltimori habita ab Anno 1829 ad Annum 1849. Editio altera.* Baltimore : Murphy & Co. 1851. 8vo. pp. 307.
6. — *Ancient History : from the Dispersion of the Sons of Noe to the Battle of Actium and Change of the Roman Republic into an Empire.* By PETER FREDET, D. D. Second Edition, carefully revised, enlarged, and improved. Baltimore : Murphy & Co. 1851. 12mo. pp. 490.
7. — *Modern History : from the Coming of Christ and the Change of the Roman Republic into an Empire to the Year of our Lord 1850.* By PETER FREDET, D. D. Fifth Edition, enlarged and improved. Baltimore. 1851. 12mo. pp. 552.
8. — *Lectures on the Principal Doctrines and Practices of the Catholic Church : delivered at St. Mary's, Moorfields, during the Lent of 1831.* By CARDINAL WISEMAN. Two volumes in one. Third American, from the last London Edition, revised and corrected. Baltimore : Murphy & Co. 1851. 12mo. pp. 484.
9. — *Songs and Ballads.* By SAMUEL LOVER. New York : Sadlier & Co. 1851. 12mo. pp. 224.
10. — *Christ in Hades. A Poem.* By WM. W. LORD. New York : Appleton & Co. 1851. 12mo. pp. 183.

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*New Catholic Quarterly Review.* — We are informed that it is in contemplation to publish for Europe, at Paris and in French, a Catholic Quarterly Review, devoted to the discussion in the light of Catholic truth of the great historical, literary, social, and political questions of the day. The names of the projectors have been communicated to us ; they are names already well known to the Catholic world, and such as offer a sufficient guaranty that it will be a work of rare merit, and admirably adapted to the wants of the age. It will command the attention of philosophers, moralists, statesmen, and scholars out of our communion as well as within it. We can promise it, when it appears, a hearty welcome, and no mean circulation, in this country. The work is called for, and we pray God to prosper it.

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\* \* \* The request of "An Irish Ecclesiastic," Birmingham, England, will be cheerfully complied with, and most probably in our Review for October next.